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Abstract 
 
 Wetlands drainage is one of the oldest and commonest forms of land modification 
in American history.  Colonists and later Americans perceived wetlands as a threat to 
progress and prosperity.  Wetlands impeded travel, depressed property values, harbored 
dangerous predators, segregated otherwise arable land from cultivation, and were thought 
to discharge miasmas and miasmata into the atmosphere that caused a variety of febrile 
illnesses.  In response to these fears, local communities and the national government 
implemented policies and created institutions to drain wetlands for health and agricultural 
purposes.  By 1900, Americans identified wetlands drainage as a form of enlightened 
land stewardship that rivaled forest preservation, the protection of migratory waterfowl, 
western irrigation, flood control, and the regulation of grazing and mineral extraction on 
public lands in importance.  Surface water removal was a paramount public policy 
objective in United States history and shaped Americans‘ relationship to their physical 
environment and one another.   
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INTRODUCTION:  WETLANDS DRAINAGE, HISTORIANS, AND THE  
HISTORY OF WATER IN THE UNITED STATES:  A REAPPRAISAL 
 
 In the United States, as in other countries, intensive agriculture required the 
control of water.  Since the colonial period, rural Americans have diverted and stored 
water to convert Atlantic coastal wetlands into rice fields, maximize hay output in New 
England meadows, transform riparian and interior swamps into crop fields, and irrigate 
western deserts.  The history of rural America is one of people creating political 
institutions and adopting technologies that enabled them to harness watercourses, 
wetlands, and underground aquifers for cultivation.  The managerial relationship of 
people towards water, which predominated in every community that practiced a form of 
monoculture, shaped much of the history of the rural United States.  
 Over the past half century, historians have begun to study the contested and 
contentious history of water in the United States.  There have been many excellent 
studies that evaluate the role of irrigation in overcoming the arid climate of the American 
West.  In the eastern half of the country, however, the history of water has been ignored 
and marginalized.
1
  As a result, the hundredth meridian, the north-south axis running 
                                                          
1
 There is a voluminous literature on western irrigation and the federal reclamation program, 
which Congress established in 1902.  Some of the most important works include Wallace Stegner, Beyond 
the Hundredth Meridian:  John Wesley Powell and the Second Opening of the West (Boston:  Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1954); Donald Worster, Rivers of Empire:  Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the 
American West (New York:  Pantheon Books, 1985); Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert:  The American West 
and its Disappearing Water (New York:  Viking, 1986); Donald J. Pisani, To Reclaim A Divided West:  
Water, Law, and Public Policy, 1848-1902 (Albuquerque:  University of New Mexico Press, 1992); and 
Pisani, Water and American Government:  The Reclamation Bureau, National Water Policy, and the West, 
1902-1935 (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 2002).  For a concise and insightful introduction to 
the literature‘s major interpretative themes, see William D. Rowley, ―Introduction,‖ Agricultural History 
76 (Spring 2002):  137-41.  There are a small number of studies that evaluate the role of state legislatures 
and Congress in developing water resources in the eastern United States before World War I.  The 
manipulation of New England‘s rivers by textile mills and dams beginning in the late eighteenth century 
has attracted scholarly attention.  See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 
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from Manitoba and North Dakota through Texas, which roughly divides North America 
into arid and humid halves, constitutes a significant historiographical boundary.  West of 
the famous line, precipitation seldom exceeds 20 inches each year, reaches the ground 
mostly in the form of snowfall, and is insufficient to raise crops during the growing 
season.  In the humid half of the continent, rainfall is abundant in all seasons and 
sometimes surpasses 40 inches each year. Yet since irrigation required the construction of 
large dams and diversion canals that could be captured in photographs and artwork as 
visible symbols of progress, modernity, and technological prowess, agricultural and 
environmental historians identified aridity as the primary water-related problem in rural 
United States history.  Nonetheless, vast stretches of wetlands and flood-prone riparian 
lands concentrated east of the hundredth meridian invited intensive human management 
no less than arid lands.  Despite the tremendous amount of scholarly ink spilled on the 
subject of western irrigation, the 53 million acres of American farmland improved by 
drainage in 1919 dwarfed the 19 million acres improved by irrigation despite the latter‘s 
massive federal subsidization.
2
  The digging of drainage ditches, construction of 
underground clay tile networks, channelization and straightening of creeks and streams, 
and erection of levees in the eastern United States did not capture the public‘s 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard University Press, 1977), 34-42; and Theodore Steinberg, Nature 
Incorporated:  Industrialization and the Waters of New England (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 
1991).  Furthermore, Martin Reuss and Karen O‘Neill have written excellent studies on the historical 
development of federal flood control and drainage policies.  Reuss, Designing the Bayous:  The Control of 
Water in the Atchafalaya Basin, 1800-1995 (College Station:  Texas A&M Press, 2004); and Karen 
O‘Neill, Rivers by Design:  State Power and the Origins of U. S. Flood Control (Durham:  Duke University 
Press, 2006).  In another recent study, Paul F. Paskoff argues that the national government aided 
antebellum steamboat transportation by removing hazards from rivers in the county‘s humid half.  Paskoff, 
Troubled Waters:  Steamboat Disasters, River Improvements, and American Public Policy, 1821-1860 
(Baton Rogue:  Louisiana State University Press, 2007). 
 
2
 These drainage and irrigation statistics are drawn from Fourteenth Census of the United States 
Taken in the Year 1920, vol. VII, ―Irrigation and Drainage,‖ (Washington:  Government Printing Office, 
1922), 14, 365. 
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imagination in the same way as towering western dams, but they were just as 
instrumental in shaping the modern American landscape before World War I.
3
   
 The western orientation of water scholarship reflects broader shortcomings in the 
traditional story of American land conservation.  Since the 1959 publication of Samuel P. 
Hays‘s seminal Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency, a formidable body of 
scholarship insisted that American land conservation between the Civil War and World 
War I focused primarily on public lands management in the American West.  According 
to most interpretations, a conservation ethos evolved during the late nineteenth century in 
response to rapid industrialization, urbanization, the growth of big businesses, nostalgia 
for the frontier, and the gradual breakdown of the myth that natural resources were 
inexhaustible.  Hays argued that during the 1890s an emergent bureaucratic and scientific 
class in Washington confronted these fears by shifting control over natural resource 
management from local communities to the federal government.  Appalled by the waste, 
inefficiency, and overexploitation of the public domain, conservationists imposed 
policies regulating grazing, hunting, and mineral extraction on federal lands, created 
national forests, and assumed responsibility for irrigating the arid half of the country.  
The flurry of administrative activity created the illusion that land conservation was 
limited in scope and objectives to public land administration in the western United States.   
It would be difficult to overstate the influence of Hays‘s pioneering study on the field of 
                                                          
3
 Widespread efforts to drain, and later to preserve, wetlands are completely ignored in surveys of 
American environmental history.  Benjamin Kline, First Along the River:  A Brief History of the U. S. 
Environmental Movement, 3d ed. (Lanham:  Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007); Philip 
Shabecoff, A Fierce Green Fire:  The American Environmental Movement, rev. ed. (Washington:  Island 
Press, 2003); and Ted Steinberg, Down to Earth:  Nature’s Role in American History, 2nd ed. (New York:  
Oxford University Press, 2009).  Despite the tremendous quantity of American wetlands converted into 
crop fields by nineteenth- and twentieth-century farmers, agricultural historians also overlook the 
importance of drainage in favor of irrigation.  R. Douglas Hurt, American Agriculture:  A Brief History, 
rev. ed. (West Lafayette:  Purdue University Press, 2002); and David B. Danbom, Born in the Country:  A 
History of Rural America, 2
nd
 ed. (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). 
4 
 
environmental history.  Although recent scholars take a more circumspect view of the 
concentration of political power in the early twentieth-century, they follow in Hays‘s 
footsteps in interpreting the genesis, evolution, and trajectory of conservation from the 
prism of natural resource management in the American West.
4
 
 The time has arrived to nationalize the history of water in the United States.  As 
the historian Donald J. Pisani recently argued, ―water in the humid half of the nation 
posed as much of a challenge to those who would reorder nature as water in the arid and 
semi-arid region … There are more reasons for erasing the 100th meridian as a scholarly 
demarcation than for maintaining it.‖5  The historical neglect of drainage is troubling for 
two specific reasons.  First, few American landscapes have historically been more feared, 
reviled, and stigmatized than wetlands.  During the nineteenth and early twentieth 
                                                          
4
 Samuel P. Hays‘s seminal study of the Progressive Era conservation movement devoted only 3 
pages to wetlands drainage.  See Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency:  The Progressive 
Conservation Movement, 1890-1920 (Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard University Press, 1959), 222-25.  The 
generation of historians who followed Hays, as well as a handful of earlier scholars, also completely 
overlook the importance of land conservation by drainage to nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
Americans.  See Charles Richard Van Hise, The Conservation of Natural Resources in the United States 
(New York:  The Macmillan Company, 1921), 344-48; Loomis Havemeyer, ed., Conservation of Our 
Natural Resources (New York:  The Macmillan Company, 1930), 342-46; Ray Lyman Wilbur and William 
Atherton Du Puy, Conservation in the Department of the Interior (Washington:  Government Printing 
Office, 1931); Ian Burton and Robert W. Kates, eds., Readings in Resource Management and Conservation 
(Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1960); Donald C. Swain, Federal Conservation Policy, 1921-1933 
(Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1963); James Penick, Jr.,―The Progressives and the 
Environment:  Three Themes from the First Conservation Movement,‖  in The Progressive Era, ed. Lewis 
L. Gould (Syracuse:  Syracuse University Press, 1974), 115-31; Stephen Fox, The American Conservation 
Movement:  John Muir and His Legacy (Madison:  University of Wisconsin Press, 1981); Clayton R. 
Koppes, ―Efficiency/Equity/Esthetics:  Towards a Reinterpretation of American Conservation,‖  
Environmental Review 11 (Summer 1987):  127-46; Louis S. Warren, The Hunter’s Game:  Poachers nad 
Conservationists in Twentieth-Century America (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1997); Karl Jacoby, 
Crimes Against Nature:  Squatters, Poachers, Thieves, and the Hidden History of American Conservation ( 
Berkeley:  University of California Press, 2001); John F. Reiger, American Sportsmen and the Origins of 
Conservation, 3d ed. (Corvallis:  Oregon State University Press, 2001); and Thomas R. Wellock, 
Preserving the Nation:  The Conservation and Environmental Movements:  1870-2000 (Wheeling, IL:  
Harlan Davidson, 2007).   
5
 Donald J. Pisani, ―Beyond the Hundredth Meridian:  Nationalizing the History of Water in the 
United States,‖ Environmental History 5 (October 2000):  466-82, quotes at 466, 478.  Shannon Stunden 
Bower argues that Canadian scholars, like their American counterparts, have also demonstrated a bias 
towards arid land reclamation in Canadian water historiography.  Bower, ―Watersheds:  Conceptualizing 
Manitoba‘s Drained Landscape, 1895-1950,‖ Environmental History 12 (October 2007):  796-819, esp. 
797. 
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centuries, Americans who took up farms in Midwestern, southern, and Mississippi Valley 
states considered the coterminous United States‘ 221 million acres of wetlands (11% of 
the surface area) as a threat to progress, prosperity, and human health.  Wetlands impeded 
travel, depressed property values, segregated otherwise arable land from agricultural 
production, provided sanctuary for dangerous reptiles and predators, and were thought to 
release dangerous ―miasmas‖ or ―miasmata‖ into the atmosphere attributed to a host of 
febrile illnesses in people, livestock, and barnyard fowl.  The only good wetland, 
Americans reasoned, was one which had been drained, cleared, and cultivated.  By the 
start of World War I, ordinary Americans and natural resource planners identified 
wetlands drainage as a form of environmental stewardship that rivaled the importance of 
forest preservation, the protection of migratory waterfowl, the regulation of grazing and 
mineral extraction on public lands, and western irrigation.  Since so many people lived, 
traveled, raised crops, and breathed air in or near landscapes characterized by an 
abundance of surface water, wetlands decisively shaped Americans‘ understanding of the 
physical world they inhabited. 
 Second, water scholarship‘s western focus suggests that Congress, at least prior to 
World War I, was so preoccupied with reclaiming western deserts that it ignored other 
water resource management issues.  Yet Congress never perceived national water policy 
as a program limited to the American West.  Although many scholars have interpreted the 
passage of the Reclamation Act of 1902, which nationalized irrigation in the seventeen 
western states, as evidence that arid land development was the primary focus of national 
water policy, the law actually attracted broad support outside of the West.  Supporting the 
Reclamation Act by a margin of 4:1, southern Democrats expected that the law‘s passage 
6 
 
heralded a more comprehensive national water policy that included wetlands drainage in 
the Midwest and south.  As this dissertation will argue, Congress took a keen interest in 
the development of wetlands.  In the mid nineteenth-century, Congress subsidized the 
drainage of wetlands in fifteen public land states and, between 1906 and World War I, 
tried to nationalize wetlands drainage on several different occasions.  Unfortunately, 
scholars of American wetlands have not bridged the sectional divide in U. S. water 
scholarship or studied the relationship of drainage and irrigation at the state or national 
policy levels after 1900.  Portraying surface water removal as a profoundly local event 
dominated by drainage districts and county governments, Ann Vileisis, Hugh Prince, and 
John Thompson reinforce the misperception that Congress avoided helping communities 
overcome water problems that did not involve irrigation.  This dissertation, then, has two 
major goals.  First, it will seek to evaluate the historical circumstances that led Americans 
to develop an intense antipathy towards wetlands.  Second, it will argue that drainage 
constituted a centerpiece of national water policy before World War I.
6
 
 ―Drain the Swamps for Health and Home‖ is divided into five roughly 
chronological chapters. The opening chapter surveys American attitudes towards 
wetlands beginning in the mid eighteenth century.  Drawing heavily on recent works by 
historians of science and medicine, it shows how a flurry of medical, meteorological, and 
pneumatic chemistry discoveries in Enlightenment Europe and the United States 
stigmatized wetlands as a pestilential landscape inimical to progress and prosperity.  
Inspired by the eighteenth-century revival of Hippocratic medical theories, physicians 
                                                          
6
 Ann Vileisis, Discovering the Unknown Landscape:  A History of America’s Wetlands 
(Washington:  Island Press, 1997); Hugh Prince, Wetlands and the American Midwest:  A Historical 
Geography of Changing Attitudes (Chicago:  Chicago University Press, 1997); and John Thompson, 
Wetlands Drainage, River Modification, and Sectoral Conflict in the Lower Illinois Valley, 1890-1930 
(Carbondale:  Southern Illinois University Press, 2002). 
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identified swamps, marshes, bogs, and other landscapes characterized by an abundance of 
stagnant surface water as insidious sources of atmospheric contamination.  According to 
physicians, the decomposing vegetable and animal matter in wetlands released dangerous 
―miasmas‖ or ―miasmata‖ into the atmosphere which, once inhaled or absorbed by 
people‘s skin, caused a variety of fevers.  Benjamin Rush, Charles Caldwell, and other 
leading American physicians called for farmers to participate in a general campaign of 
atmospheric reform.  They argued that a broad program of swamp drainage, 
deforestation, cultivation, and flood control would decontaminate North America‘s 
miasmatic atmosphere.  Agricultural progress begot atmospheric reform.  In sum, land 
drainage during the early republic focused as much on improving public health as 
opening up new farmland. 
 Chapter 2 studies how the medical and environmental ideas articulated by 
atmospheric reformers reached a wider audience.  Beginning in 1819, the rural press, 
which exploded in circulation and readership before the Civil War, began to disseminate 
Hippocratic medical theories to American farmers.  Agricultural journalists instructed 
farmers to drain their waterlogged fields to protect their families, livestock, and barnyard 
fowl from miasmatic diseases and malaria.  In addition to decontaminating the rural 
atmosphere, drainage improved the soil‘s ability to support crop life, elevated crop yields, 
and also enhanced the overall quality of rural life.  By repeatedly emphasizing the health 
and wealth benefits of wetlands drainage, the rural press turned the idea of land 
conservation by drainage into an enlightened form of land stewardship.  Editors and 
contributors contended that farmers had an ethical responsibility to drain because 
wetlands were illegitimate landforms that served no useful purpose other than generating 
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telluric miasmas.  Adopting the logic of atmospheric reformers, editors clamored that 
water properly belonged in circulating watercourses where it could not intermingle with 
vegetable and animal matter and poison the atmosphere, drive down property values, or 
impede agriculture.  Farmers who drained their fields practiced a form of land 
stewardship because wetlands were unnatural collections of surface water that 
represented one of nature‘s shortcomings.  Wetlands had no intrinsic or aesthetic value. 
 The third chapter surveys the evolution of national wetlands policy before the 
Civil War.  Early in the eighteenth century, colonial legislatures formally adopted 
Medieval English institutions known as ―commissions of sewers‖ or ―courts of sewers‖ to 
initiate, manage, and fund land drainage projects.  As settlers crossed the Appalachians 
and fanned out across the vast wet prairies of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois after 1800, many 
western states followed colonial precedent and authorized the creation of commissions of 
sewers or similar ditch associations.  After meeting a set of preconditions, the laws 
empowered neighboring farmers to petition a local court or the state legislature for 
permission to form a commission that possessed the authority to impose land 
assessments, build drainage projects, and, if necessary, condemn land.  Problems 
abounded with land drainage west of the Appalachians.  Residents from public land states 
discovered that the creation of the public domain (land owned and distributed by the 
federal government) after the American Revolution undermined the effectiveness of 
colonial drainage institutions.  Unlike private land, federal property could not be taxed by 
state or local governments, condemned, or forcibly included in ditch or sewer 
commissions.  The federal government‘s dilatoriness in disposing the public domain, 
which was attributable to the fact that it dumped too much land onto the market too 
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quickly, and the ineffectiveness of local drainage institutions infuriated communities in 
public land states.  In the late 1830s and 1840s, western communities, state legislatures, 
individual citizens, and local drainage conventions flooded Congress with petitions 
demanding that the national government cede public wetlands to the states so they could 
drain them, create a national drainage program, or authorize local communities to drain 
the public domain.  In 1849, 1850, and 1860, Congress acquiesced by passing three 
Swamp Land Acts that ceded all of the federal governments ―swamp and overflowed‖ 
lands to fifteen Midwestern, southern, and Pacific coast states on the condition they sell 
the lands and invest the revenue in draining other wetlands. 
 The Swamp Land Acts made drainage a state priority and represented a large 
giveaway.  With the possible exceptions of Louisiana and Arkansas, however, 
participating states flagrantly subverted the law, using their land grants for every purpose 
but drainage.  The failure of state administration compelled the states to devolve authority 
for land drainage back to local communities by authorizing the formation of drainage 
districts and county drainage projects.  During the last decades of the nineteenth century, 
drainage districts and county drainage projects proliferated around the country.  Local 
institutions generally were capable of handing drainage independent of federal and state 
intervention and converted a respectable quantity of wetlands into cultivated fields before 
1900. 
 Lingering public health fears regarding wetlands constituted a second reason for 
the passage of the Swamp Land Acts.  New studies about the bodily experiences of 
nineteenth-century Americans living near certain landforms suggest why people despised 
wetlands.  Settlers living near wetlands attributed the recurrent and debilitating bouts of 
10 
 
fever and ague that they experienced to miasmas released into the air by stagnant waters.  
In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, land conservation had as much to do with 
promoting the efficiency of the human body as turning marginal lands into commodities.  
For too long scholars have indicted a capitalist ethos for the vast exploitation and 
degradation of the American environment.  Such a crude economic determinism does not 
account for the fact that many Americans‘ bodies told them that certain landscapes, such 
as wetlands, could maim or kill.  The cultural mandate to drain had as much to do with 
improving people‘s health as padding their pocketbooks.  
 Chapter 4 provides a case study of the failure of national wetlands policy under 
the Swamp Land Acts.  In the early 1880s, the Valley of the Red River of the North, 
which forms the present-day boundary of Minnesota and North Dakota, eclipsed Kansas 
and Nebraska as the epicenter of western settlement.  Settlers quickly discovered that 
springtime snowmelt and late summer thunderstorms transformed their wheat and oat 
fields into a patchwork of marshes, sloughs, and wet prairies.  The Valley‘s flat 
topography, paucity of natural outlets, and meandering watercourses, which regularly 
overflowed their banks and created sprawling marshes, frustrated the best efforts of 
ordinary settlers and local institutions to drain the land.  At first, desperate settlers asked 
the St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railroad (SPM&M), the predecessor of the Great 
Northern Railway, to provide drainage outlets for farmers.  The SPM&M‘s system of 
drainage ditches failed abysmally, flooding the homes, pastures, and fields of several 
dozen farmers.  As a result, the SPM&M disavowed future responsibility for drainage 
and dismantled many of its ditches.  Finally, Valley farmers and regional business leaders 
led a grassroots uprising, which the SPM&M later assisted, demanding that the state of 
11 
 
Minnesota live up to its responsibilities under the Swamp Land Acts by appropriating 
state funds for drainage.  In 1893, the lobbying campaign yielded results and the state 
created the Red River Valley Board of Audit to channelize and improve the Valley‘s 
watercourses and help drain the land.  The grassroots campaign illustrates that 
Midwestern farmers deemed land drainage just as important of a state function as the 
regulation of transportation and financial corporations.  Just as the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century national state expanded to accommodate farmers‘ demands for 
the regulation of railroads and financial houses, so, too, did state and local governments 
grow to accommodate their demands for a drained landscape. 
 Chapter 5 looks at the one of the most significant, yet overlooked, events of the 
Progressive conservation movement.  By the early 1900s, Americans concluded that 
enlightened land stewardship included draining wetlands in addition to irrigating western 
deserts, curtailing the destruction of forests, and regulating private economic activities on 
western public lands.  By 1904, southern and Midwestern congressmen openly 
questioned why Congress had subsidized western irrigation using public land revenue but 
not wetlands drainage.  Wetlands presented a public health menace and economic threat 
no less troubling than irrigation.  They demanded that Congress divert money from the 
fund dedicated to building western irrigation projects to wetlands drainage.  Fearful that 
the proposals would jeopardize the completion of unfinished western irrigation projects, 
western farmers and communities fiercely opposed the diversions.  Proponents of the 
nationalization of drainage responded by rallying around the proposals of Congressman 
Halvor Steenerson, a second-term Republican from Minnesota who, in the 1880s, 
participated in the Red River Valley drainage movement, and Senator Frank P. Flint, a 
12 
 
one-term Republican from California.  The proposal sought to put drainage on the same 
footing as western irrigation.  In 1908, the campaign for drainage faltered due to 
bureaucratic rivalries, partisan politics, sectionalism, and American federalism.  The 
setback dealt a crippling blow to the movement for a national drainage program.  
Supporters of nationalized irrigation never recovered from this defeat and, prior to World 
War I, could not recapture enough momentum to bring another nationalization bill to the 
floor of either the House or Senate. 
 By 1912, Frederick H. Newell, the second director of the Reclamation Service 
(1907-1914), harbored misgivings about the wisdom of the irrigation-centered model of 
federal reclamation.  Newell slowly came to believe that federal reclamation should have 
started with Midwestern and southern swamps and then moved on to western irrigation 
only as population pressures demanded.  Settling American land seekers on drained 
swamps was cheaper than building mammoth dams and might have alleviated many of 
the problems that reclamation project farmers encountered.  Wetlands were closer to 
major population centers, transportation hubs, and existing social institutions such as 
churches and schools. Newell‘s disillusionment symbolized the shattered dreams and 
hopes of the nation‘s first generation of federal environmental reformers who had 
invested so much time, energy, and hope in making the reality of cheap irrigated farms 
available to Americans.  As Newell reluctantly admitted, irrigation had failed as a 
panacea for the nation‘s social ills while drainage might have succeeded. 
* * * * * 
 For the sake of clarity, it is worth making a couple of general comments about the 
terminology employed in this study.  First, it preserves the original historical context of 
13 
 
the word ―drainage.‖  Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Americans used the term 
to describe any action that modified the land with the goal of eliminating noncirculating 
surface waters such as draining swamps, drying out waterlogged soils, straightening and 
channelizing watercourses to prevent overflows, and building levees to prevent floods.  
Although Americans historically used the terms drainage and ―reclamation‖ 
interchangeably, this study will use ―drainage‖ to differentiate the action of draining 
wetlands from irrigation, which was often described as the reclamation of arid lands.  
Second, since the 1950s, scientists have lumped different landscapes characterized by a 
seasonal or permanent abundance of surface water, hydric soils, and hydrophytic 
vegetation under the general heading of ―wetland.‖  Swamps, bogs, marshes, wet prairies, 
prairie potholes, everglades, tule lands, estuaries, and so forth are examples of specific 
wetland ecosystems.  Historically, Americans preferred ―swamp‖ or ―marsh‖ to describe 
any number of wetlands and rarely used the term ―wetland.‖  The fact that Americans 
regarded wetlands as wastelands that served no redeeming purpose other than poisoning 
the atmosphere and inhibiting agriculture made it easy for Americans to describe such 
landscapes with imprecision and ambiguity. 
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CHAPTER 1:  ―VAST FACTORIES OF THIS FEBRILE POISON‖:   
AMERICAN WETLANDS AND EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY  
ATMOSPHERIC REFORM, 1750-1820 
 
 In the history of Western Civilization, few landscapes have inspired more fear, 
abhorrence, and distrust than wetlands.  Until very recently, people have blamed wetlands 
of all forms and varieties—bogs, coastal estuaries, fens, marshes, peat lands, prairie 
potholes, sloughs, swamps, tule lands, and wet prairies to name just a few—for causing 
fevers, poisoning the atmosphere with ―miasmas,‖ and disrupting commerce and 
agriculture.  Europeans from antiquity forward despised wetlands for impeding travel, 
depressing property values, locking otherwise productive land out of cultivation, 
facilitating the growth of strange and noxious weeds, and providing sanctuary for harmful 
predators, reptiles, and stinging microorganisms. 
 Medieval Christians popularized the myth that wetlands were evil, sinister, and 
forbidding.  In Medieval Christian literature, stagnant water, oozing mud, darkness, 
humidity, and the putrid smells associated with swamps and bogs were part of the 
iconography of hell.  The seventeenth-century English poet John Milton embraced this 
tradition by imagining swamps as Satan‘s personal stomping ground.  In contrast, the 
freshness, limpidity, and sweet aroma of flowing springs and gentle brooks symbolized 
God‘s goodness and grace.  By demonizing swamps as the den of reprobate sinners and 
Lucifer himself, Medieval Europeans implied that honorable and lawful Christians should 
avoid the corruption of fetid stagnant waters.
1
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 This chapter will show how the vilification of wetlands reached a fever pitch 
during the age of Enlightenment and eventually shaped American environmental 
thinking.  During the eighteenth century, European physicians revived the ancient 
Hippocratic medical tradition attributing the onset of certain diseases to marshes and 
poorly-drained lowlands.  According to physicians, decomposing vegetable and animal 
matter in swamps and marshes released miasmas into the atmosphere which, after being 
inhaled or absorbed by the skin, disrupted or weakened the body‘s normal functioning, 
prompting fevers, other physical maladies, and possibly even death.  At the same time, a 
growing number of European physicians, chemists, and natural historians studied the 
association between air, weather, and disease using new apparatuses such as the 
barometer, hygrometer, thermometer, and eudiometer.  Their discoveries legitimized the 
idea that the elimination of miasmatic sources could improve public health.  Inspired by 
the Enlightenment‘s confidence and optimism, physicians recommended draining 
marshes, filling lowlands, culling forests, and cleaning up the rot and filth of cities to 
reform the atmosphere.  The result of these efforts, atmospheric reformers concluded, 
would be less suffering, an increase in life expectancy, and fewer epidemics. 
 North American wetlands, which are the focus of this study, were at the center of 
this unfolding epidemiological drama.  During the eighteenth century, the celebrated 
French naturalist Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon, theorized that miasmatic 
marshes dominated North America‘s geography.  The continent‘s pervasive wetness, 
which he attributed to a recent transcontinental flood, produced biological and 
atmospheric oddities:  North American quadrupeds were smaller than their Old World 
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counterparts, imported animals atrophied and degenerated, insects and unwanted reptiles 
proliferated, and unwholesome miasmas saturated the air.  Coinciding with the revival of 
ancient medical theories originally articulated by the Greek physician Hippocrates, the 
critique stigmatized North America as a pathogenic continent unfit for human habitation. 
   Americans met the challenge of Buffon‘s disparaging remarks by launching their 
own campaign for atmospheric reform.  Influenced by the Hippocratic revival and 
breakthroughs in pneumatic chemistry, North American physicians assimilated the latest 
European scientific discoveries into a public discourse emphasizing the nexus between 
bad air and endemic disease.  Physicians celebrated how intensive European-style land 
use helped purify the air.  As settlers drained wetlands, chopped down forests, eliminated 
the native vegetation, and cultivated land, the soil dried out and the atmosphere was 
decontaminated.  Thomas Jefferson‘s cherished yeomen farmers were more than the 
vanguard of western settlement and source of the young nation‘s virtue and republican 
values:  they redeemed America‘s atmosphere from its wretched, brutish, and unhealthy 
condition.  Wetlands drainage evolved into a patriotic obligation designed to establish the 
country‘s habitability and repudiate Buffon‘s wrongheaded theories. 
 Environmental historians have offered many theories about why Americans 
developed such an intense hostility towards wetlands.  In most cases, they interpret 
wetlands from the perspective of economics, commerce, and agrarianism.  Wetlands 
hindered crop production on otherwise arable lands, disrupted travel, depressed property 
values, impeded the distribution of commodities, provided habitat for predators that 
preyed on livestock, and occasionally overflowed adjacent farms and plantations.  As the 
United States‘ population grew during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
17 
 
historians argue, drainage became an important social tool to open up more farmland, 
revive the nation‘s agrarian heritage, and offset problems related to industrialized urban 
life.  Yet the impetus to drain wetlands initially took form in response to collective fears 
about the deleterious impact of wetlands (and the miasmas they produced) on public 
health.  Other factors dealing with commerce and social anxieties emerged much later 
and only served to reinforce prejudices inherited from Europe.  Scholars of American 
wetlands have largely ignored how the eighteenth-century revival of Hippocratic medical 
theories and revolution in pneumatic chemistry established the destruction of wetlands as 
an essential element of enlightened environmental management.  Like their European 
counterparts, American physicians identified wetlands as a pestilential landscape and the 
primary source of rural atmospheric contamination.  In a country afflicted by endemic 
malaria and recurrent yellow fever outbreaks, miasmatic explanations of disease held a 
powerful sway on the public imagination.  By 1820, Americans sought to eliminate 
wetlands because they were the only landscapes capable of sickening or killing by the 
simple virtue of their existence.
2
 
 
The Hippocratic Corpus 
 Eighteenth-century theories of disease etiology had their historical roots in ancient 
Greece.  The Hippocratic Corpus, a series of works attributed to the Greek healer 
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Hippocrates of Cos (circa 460-377 B. C. E.) and his followers, correlated the onset of 
fevers and epidemics with specific environmental conditions, personal habits, and 
physical constitutions.  Many of the Corpus‘s seminal works—Air, Waters, Places, the 
first and third books of Epidemics, the Regimen, On Humors, Internal Affections, and On 
the Nature of Man— emphasized the association between pure air and good health, which 
depended on maintaining a proper balance of the body‘s four humors.  Early Hippocratic 
practitioners believed that an amalgam of four humors (blood, phlegm, black bile, and 
yellow bile) constituted the human body.  Illness and disease resulted when impure airs, 
such as ―miasmas‖ or ―miasmatas,‖ disrupted the humors‘ equilibrium.  The precise 
nature and composition of miasma is hard to define.  In general, miasma referred to 
contaminating or polluting substances released into the atmosphere through various 
sources:  stagnant waters, putrefying vegetable and animal matter in swamps and 
marshes, human excrement, decaying corpses, and subterranean gases discharged through 
openings on earth‘s surface.  Hippocratic practitioners speculated that offensive odors 
indicated the presence of miasmatic concentrations.
3
 
The Hippocratic tradition elevated disease avoidance and treatment above 
prevention.  Since diseases stemmed from particular locations, traveling Greek physicians 
were expected to learn the topographical features and prevailing wind patterns of the 
communities they visited.  Elevation, offensive odors, fog, heat, humidity, moisture, soil 
composition, sunlight, winds, and especially the fetid waters of marshes, swamps, and 
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fens determined a place‘s epidemiological qualities.  Proximity to swamps, sodden soils, 
and torpid waters, for instance, triggered humoral disruptions and fevers.  Distant from 
wet lowlands and serviced by flowing springs, elevated villages enjoyed wholesome airs 
uncorrupted by miasma.  James C. Riley observes that the Hippocratic tradition suffered 
from a pessimistic ―fatalism.‖  Although Greek physicians treated fevers by 
administering barley water, hydromel (a mixture of water and honey), or oxymel (vinegar 
and honey), they considered themselves powerless to eliminate the environmental sources 
of disease.  Humans were the captives of their environments.  Within the Hippocratic 
tradition, the avoidance of miasmatic sources remained the best technique for eluding 
seasonal fevers.
4
 
 The Hippocratic Corpus stigmatized wet landscapes as uninhabitable wastelands.  
As early as the second century B. C. E., Roman writers and architects invoked 
Hippocratic theories to encourage the isolation of towns and villages from marshes and 
fens.  Varro warned against erecting structures adjacent to marshes because they provided 
habitat for tiny, invisible creatures which, after being ingested by people, prompted 
febrile symptoms.  To preserve the health and longevity of Roman citizens, Vitruvius 
encouraged their segregation from miasmatic marshes.  According to Columella, marshy 
areas imperiled health, prosperity, and agriculture since they corrupted the atmosphere 
and encouraged the proliferation of dangerous snakes, reptiles, and stinging insects.  
Columella blamed the moisture, humidity, and molds associated with marshes for ruining 
nearby crops and agricultural equipment.  Strabo judged it foolish to build cities near 
lakes since high summer temperatures usually dropped water levels, leaving a patchwork 
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of miasmatic marshes at the lake‘s edge.  By portraying wetlands as the incubators of 
potent miasmas, hostile reptiles, harmful microorganisms, and suffocating humidity, 
Roman writers cast them as pestilential and forbidding wastelands.
5
 
 Ancient Greek and Roman writers established a powerful set of dichotomies 
about water‘s role in nature and society.  Circulating waters in watercourses symbolized 
life, hope, longevity, and refreshment.  Stagnant waters in fens and marshes represented 
death, despair, and decay.  Rivers signified health and purity while marshes denoted 
sickness and contamination.  The limpid waters of brooks and streams were invigorating 
and therapeutic while turbid fen waters were enervating and foul.  As ―liminal zones‖ 
where water and land intermingled and surrounding airs were defiled, wetlands indicated 
nature‘s imperfection and flaws.  Water properly belonged in circulating streams, creeks, 
and brooks where movement precluded the formation of miasma.  Greco-Roman authors 
thus forged a stark dualism between humanity and noncirculating waters that later 
Europeans (and Americans) appropriated for their own purposes.
6
  
 
The 18
th
-Century Hippocratic Revival 
 In the late seventeenth century, European physicians began to revive the 
Hippocratic concept of an environment-disease nexus while abolishing the premise that 
illnesses could not be prevented.  By the 1750s, confident physicians boasted that 
enlightened societies could liberate themselves from disease by identifying and 
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eliminating miasmatic sources.  Humans could become the masters of their environment.  
Disease prevention emerged as the hallmark of a ―new Hippocratism‖ which flourished in 
eighteenth-century Europe (and especially the British Isles).
7
 
 Renewed curiosity about the influence of air and weather on human health, 
character, and physical development encouraged the Hippocratic renaissance.  Beginning 
in the late 1600s, English physicians, natural philosophers, and other intellectuals, 
influenced by the ―New Science‘s‖ experimental methodology, encouraged the 
systematic observation and recording of atmospheric phenomena for largely medical 
purposes.  Physician Thomas Sydenham‘s (1624-1689) inquiry into the relationship 
between seasonal diseases and weather changes in London in the 1660s-70s using 
climatic observations jumpstarted the Hippocratic project. Other Englishmen followed 
Sydenham‘s lead.  In 1666, John Locke (1632-1674) started a weather diary, recording 
atmospheric pressure, rain, temperature, and wind.  Christopher Wren (1632-1723), one 
of the Royal Society of London‘s founding members, instructed society physicians to 
submit annual reports describing prevailing diseases and meteorological conditions.  In 
1723, James Jurin (1684-1750), a physician and secretary of the Royal Society, invited 
men of learning to submit meteorological observations to the society and to chart the 
seasonal rhythms of disease.  In 1731, physician Francis Clifton touted the usefulness of 
quantitative tables in cataloguing local weather and disease variations.  Probing the 
relationship between the atmosphere and human health, physicians believed, would shed 
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new light into the etiology of disease and push medicine beyond its hitherto speculative 
and theoretical footing.
8
 
 The growing availability of weather instruments and the Royal Society‘s 
patronage spurred on the Hippocratic project.  Eighteenth-century British citizens 
enjoyed unprecedented access to new apparatuses including barometers, hygrometers, 
thermometers, and wind and rain gauges.  Standardized instrumentation facilitated the 
measurement of meteorological events with the precision demanded by Enlightenment 
standards.  Dedicated to the pursuit of natural philosophy, the Royal Society encouraged 
the meticulous documentation of barometric pressure, humidity, temperatures, wind 
patterns, and precipitation levels.  The Society disseminated measurements from 
domestic and overseas weather diarists in its influential journal, the Philosophical 
Transactions, thereby enlisting meteorology as medicine‘s servant.  From 1735-80 
surgeons and physicians comprised 25% of the Royal Society‘s membership and several 
held the prestigious secretaryship:  Jurin (1721-1727), William Rutty (1728-1730), 
Cromwell Mortimer (1730-1752), and Matthew Maty (1765-1784).
9
 
 Pneumatic chemistry made invaluable contributions to physicians‘ quest to 
catalog the environmental sources of disease.  Until the third quarter of the eighteenth 
century, most men of learning believed that the atmosphere was a single substance 
instead of an assortment of gases.  Cracks emerged in this theory with the 1766, 1772, 
and 1774 discoveries of nitrogen, hydrogen, and ―dephlogisticated air‖ (oxygen).  The 
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identification of oxygen was especially meaningful because of its classification as a gas 
of remarkable purity.  Prior to mid-century, European chemists had subscribed to a theory 
of combustion pioneered by Johann Joachim Becher (1635-1682) and elaborated by 
Georg Ernst Stahl (1660-1734).  The Phlogiston theory held that combustible substances 
were made up of three kinds of earth:  terra lapidea (vitreous), terra mercurialis 
(mercurial), and terra pinguis (fatty).  According to Becher, inflammable substances 
contained large portions of terra pinguis, which Stahl later renamed ―phlogiston.‖  When 
fire consumed a substance like charcoal, phlogiston was released into the air, leaving 
behind only ash residue.  Phlogistonists located the principal of combustion (as well as 
calcination and respiration) in the chemical composition of objects, and not air.  In 1774, 
the English chemist Joseph Priestley (1733-1804) uncovered that heating the red calx of 
mercury produced an unadulterated kind of air bereft of phlogiston.  Priestley‘s 
―deflogisticated air‖ was pure, light, and produced a refreshing feeling in his lungs.  One 
year later the French chemist Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier (1743-1794) identified 
deflogisticated air as oxygen.
10
 
 Knowledge that the atmosphere contained gases of varying wholesomeness had 
obvious medical implications.  Quantifying aerial purity levels promised to help unravel 
the mysteries surrounding air‘s role in promoting the onset of certain diseases.  Until the 
development of effective instrumentation, however, physicians had to rely on their sense 
of smell to discern the presence of undesirable airs (such as miasma).  The invention of 
the eudiometer (Greek for ―measure of good air‖), an apparatus designed to measure air 
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purity, equipped physicians with the scientific means to measure atmospheric quality.  As 
one historian of science puts it, ―medical and chemical traditions converge in 
eudiometry.‖11  In the 1770s, Italians Marsilio Landriani and Felice Fontana developed 
marketable eudiometers that administered a nitrous air test originally formulated by 
Priestly to measure an air sample‘s purity.  The test measured the wholesomeness of a 
given air sample by combining it with nitrous air in an enclosed container over water.  
After combining the sample and nitrous air, the mixture was shaken until brown fumes 
filled the container and were absorbed by the water.  At this point, the chemist measured 
the volume of the remaining air and then subtracted it from the volume of the air mixture 
before the chemical reaction.  The original sample‘s wholesomeness was proportional to 
the degree it diminished in volume:  the greater the volumetric decrease, the purer the air.  
Pure air samples contained low phlogiston levels and better supported combustion and 
respiration.  Eudiometry reinforced physicians‘ belief that elevated phlogiston levels 
constituted a public health menace no less hazardous than miasma.  In the 1770s, 
physicians in Italy and England carried out ―eudiometrical tours‖ in the countryside, 
measuring and comparing the aerial goodness of different locations.
12
 
 
English Atmospheric Reform and the Control of Nature 
 The Hippocratic revival‘s central premise was that any given society‘s destiny 
was related to the purity of its atmosphere.  Citizens of countries burdened by adulterated 
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air might be subject to perpetual illnesses, display uneven temperaments, and suffer from 
torpor.  It logically followed that civilized societies move beyond simply observing 
nature to controlling and imposing order on it.  Atmospheric reform, which intended to 
achieve a disease-free society through the eradication of miasmatic sources, was a 
precursor to nineteenth-century sanitary and public health movements.  It owed its origin 
to the renaissance of Greek medical theories, the dissemination of meteorological 
observations, the proliferation of new scientific apparatuses, breakthroughs in pneumatic 
chemistry, and an unwavering faith in man‘s ability to shape his own destiny. 
Eliminating the incubators of miasma and other chemically undesirable airs was 
atmospheric reform‘s chief objective.  Eighteenth-century English physicians identified 
common urban and rural sources of miasma.  Unventilated homes, cellars, cemeteries, 
crowded prisons, narrow city streets, tanneries, butcher shops, hospitals, barracks, 
markets, slaughter houses, and open sewers poisoned the atmosphere of cities with 
effluviums.  The unimproved countryside was an even more potent generator of the 
deadly poisons.  Decomposing vegetable matter and stagnating water in swamps, fens, 
marshes, floodplains, sodden soils, and slow-moving streams discharged miasmas.  
Dense forests aggravated the problem by shielding damp soils from sunlight, blocking 
winds from dispersing miasmatic concentrations, and facilitating the buildup of humidity 
and moisture.  Neo-Hippocratic physicians touted several ameliorative strategies:  
widening city streets, razing dilapidated buildings, properly disposing of human and 
animal waste, erecting spacious courtyards for air to circulate, providing cities with fresh 
water, draining marshes, and thinning forests.
13
 
                                                          
13
 Mary J. Dobson, Contours of Death and Disease in Early Modern England (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 16-7; James Rodger Fleming, Historical Perspectives on Climate 
26 
 
 The preponderance of historical evidence and eudiometrical experiments 
suggested to physicians that marshes were the primary rural source of atmospheric 
contamination.  Thomas Short, a Sheffield physician who compiled four decades worth of 
meteorological observations, singled out marsh drainage as a critical step civilized 
nations should take to ―mend the air.‖  In his seminal A Comparative History of the 
Increase and Decrease of Mankind (1767), Short studied bills of morality to determine 
which geographic locations had the purest airs.  He concluded that lightly-timbered 
mountains and hills, situated on well-drained soils, constituted the healthiest locations.  
Short was less sanguine about: 
Fenny, marshy, low, wet, and long-flooded Situations; spungy, ouzing, soft, 
springy Ground, always wet, near to uninclosed, dry, great Woods or Forests, are 
all unhealthy Habitations, which often bury more than are born.
14
 
 
In 1778, the York physician William White published his eudiometrical findings.  
Confirming Short‘s conclusions, White‘s eudiometer measured higher proportions of 
impure air in the vicinity of marshes than most other landscapes.  According to the York 
resident, the solution was unambiguous and straightforward:  ―It is evident, that bogs and 
marshy grounds, when dry, or perfectly drained of their moisture, become healthy, and 
emit no noxious exhalations.‖15 
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 Two factors lent urgency to English atmospheric reform.  First, during the 1700s, 
the ―culture of sensibility‖ transformed British middle-class life as individuals developed 
polished manners, refined tastes, and a heightened awareness of their feelings.  As the 
middle classes adorned themselves in lavish clothing, indulged in tea and coffee, took 
extravagant carriage rides, and played indoor card games, physicians worried that they 
might become too ―soft‖ or effeminate, unwittingly increasing their susceptibility to 
miasmas.  Loose and luxurious living threatened to make the middle classes just as 
vulnerable to bad airs as the urban poor wallowing in squalor and overcrowded slums.  
Should modern conveniences prove too alluring for people to resist, atmospheric reform 
would become indispensable to society‘s welfare.16 
 Second, overseas imperialism increasingly brought British subjects into contact 
with different climates and supposedly unhygienic atmospheres.  For several decades 
scholars have described the transoceanic transmission of disease during the age of 
imperialism as a one-way phenomenon, with Europeans introducing maladies as diverse 
as bubonic plague, chickenpox, cholera, diphtheria, dysentery, influenza, malaria, 
measles, scarlet fever, smallpox, trachoma, and whooping cough to New World 
indigenous populations.  The demographic consequences of the introduction of Old 
World diseases were indisputably tragic and irrevocable.  ―Virgin soil epidemics‖ 
decimated New World Indian communities and aided Europeans in expropriating their 
land.  Indeed, as seventeenth-century English colonists witnessed Indians succumb to one 
virgin soil epidemic after another, they concluded that English bodies were stronger and 
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more robust than their Indian counterparts.  The Hippocratic revival chipped away at the 
belief in English corporeal superiority by emphasizing that Europeans‘ susceptibility to 
exotic diseases increased in proportion to the distance they strayed from their home 
climates (which were understood as constant across latitudes) and in their proximity to 
certain undeveloped landscapes.  The Hippocratic renaissance thus taught colonial 
administrators, Creole physicians, and colonists that purifying colonial atmospheres by 
introducing European land use techniques was the only way to ensure that the bodies of 
English soldiers and colonists overseas retained their epidemiological superiority.
17
 
 
Soggy and Miasmatic North America 
 North America‘s allegedly unwholesome atmosphere made the continent an ideal 
laboratory to test the effectiveness of atmospheric reform.  The Hippocratic revival 
coincided with a scholarly dialogue in Europe about North America‘s environment.  
During the third quarter of the eighteenth century, the French naturalist Georges-Louis 
Leclerc, Comte de Buffon, popularized the idea that miasmatic marshes dominated the 
continent‘s topography.  In his verbose 44-volume Histoire naturelle, Buffon insisted that 
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North America, just prior to its discovery, began to recover from a transcontinental flood.  
As a result, long stretches of marshes and swamps, towering forests, impenetrable 
undergrowth, and a frigid and miasmatic atmosphere predominated.  Buffon hypothesized 
that the deluge had a degenerative impact on North America‘s flora and fauna.  The 
continent had fewer large quadrupeds than the Old World, little species diversity, 
sluggish and slothful small animals, and swarms of insects and reptiles, which thrived in 
marshy and cool conditions.  Viewing large quadrupeds as a yardstick for nature‘s 
vitality, Buffon deplored that camels, dromedaries, giraffes, hippopotamuses, and lions 
were nowhere to be found in North America.  The chilly and wet climate produced an 
indolent, sickly, and unimpressive natural order: 
In this state of abandon, everything languishes, decays, stifles.  The air and the 
earth, weighed down by the moist and poisonous vapors, cannot purify 
themselves nor profit from the influence of the star of life.  The sun vainly pours 
down its liveliest rays on this cold mass, which is incapable of responding to its 
warmth; it will never produce anything but humid creatures, plants, reptiles, and 
insects; and cold men and feeble animals are all that it will ever nurture.
18
 
 
 European intellectuals embraced the eminent naturalist‘s critique.  In his 
Recherches philosophiques sur les Américains, the Dutchman Cornelius de Pauw 
ridiculed North America as an uninterrupted marsh plagued by a ―fetid and boggy 
terrain.‖19  British natural philosophers eagerly contrasted their country‘s salubrious 
climate with that of North America.  In 1767, Adam Ferguson explained that ―the 
climates of America … are observed to differ from those of Europe.  There, extensive 
marshes, great lakes, aged, decayed, and crowded forests, with the other circumstances 
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that mark an uncultivated country … replenish the air with heavy and noxious vapours 
[sic.].‖20  William Robertson‘s popular History of America captured the mood by 
insisting that ―prodigious marshes overspread the [North American] plains.‖21 
  The Hippocratic tradition stigmatized marshes as unhealthy, unnatural, and 
pestilential—the rural equivalent of crowded urban slums littered with human and animal 
excrement.  Heirs to this tradition, English North American colonists gloomily 
recognized the implications of Buffon‘s thesis:  living in North America was akin to 
living in a crowded, filthy, and pestiferous European city.  As an unavoidable reality of 
human existence, air for the first time in history became regarded as a vital natural 
resource.  Colonists (and later Americans) naturally developed a profound anxiety about 
the quality of the air surrounding their cities, homes, and farms.  Unless human action 
reformed the atmosphere, questions would linger about the long-term potential of 
European settlement in North America.  What if the stigma of North America‘s 
miasmatic atmosphere disrupted the tide of European emigration?  What if prolonged 
exposure to bad air sapped Americans‘ industriousness, returning them into a state of 
nature?  What if recurrent fever outbreaks and other atmospheric marvels—such as 
hurricanes, tornadoes, intense lightning storms, and waterspouts—were the products of 
aerial contamination?  Benjamin Franklin‘s iconic experiments with lightning lent 
credibility to some Europeans‘ suggestions that America‘s atmosphere was as electrically 
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supercharged as it was miasmatic.  Fortunately for colonists, Europe‘s Hippocratic 
revival offered strategies and methods for reforming contaminated atmospheres.
22
 
 
American Atmospheric Reform 
During the second half of the eighteenth century, Americans developed a program 
of atmospheric reform modeled after its British predecessor but tailored to New World 
circumstances.  Unlike its British counterpart, which emphasized protecting an 
increasingly vulnerable middle class from adulterated airs, American reform intended to 
allay European anxieties about North America‘s atmosphere, publicize strategies for 
improvement, and develop a compelling narrative explaining why the continent suffered 
from bad air.  Carried out in the pages of learned journals, medical discourses, and in the 
halls of learned institutions such as the American Philosophical Society, American 
atmospheric reform constituted an elite-directed crusade carried out at the grassroots.  
Optimistic and forward looking, the program sought to establish that ordinary settlers and 
farmers, through clearing the land, draining marshes, and cultivating the soil, had already 
improved the atmosphere‘s quality.  The cumulative impact of thousands of unaffiliated 
farmers and local communities working towards a single goal—atmospheric 
improvement—would, in time, provide all Americans with universal access to pure air. 
 Physicians spearheaded the campaign of atmospheric reform.
23
  They used two 
justifications.  First, breakthroughs in European medicine and pneumatic chemistry were 
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useless unless accessible to the wider public.  Promoting themselves as the purveyors of 
scientific knowledge, physicians educated the public about the medical dangers of 
leaving the continent unexploited and its marshes undrained.  Second, physicians 
explained why North America‘s airs were so befouled.  The only problem with North 
America‘s atmosphere, the narrative insisted, was that Indians, and not industrious and 
enlightened Europeans, had inhabited the continent during the past few centuries.  The 
narrative invoked the usual litany of disparaging and racist criticisms of Indians‘ 
character, work ethic, and aversion towards economic progress in vogue since the 
seventeenth century.  According to this critique, the refusal of Indians to heed the 
Christian injunction to ―subdue the earth‖—broadly interpreted as practicing sedentary 
agriculture, owning property, raising livestock, and selling natural resources like timber 
or furs for a profit—made them unworthy of possessing the land.  Clothing an old 
argument in new clothes, physicians argued that human consumption constituted the most 
enlightened use of natural resources.  Culpability for North America‘s miasmatic 
atmosphere thus rested with the inherent shortcomings of the continent‘s previous 
occupants and not the air itself.  After 1750 physicians claimed that the wholesomeness 
of air increased in proportion to the degree people cultivated the land, drained off surface 
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water, and cut down timber for sale on the market economy.  Capitalism and atmospheric 
reform thus went hand in hand.
24
 
 
A Narrative of Progress 
 In order to prove that North America‘s pathogenic condition was not beyond 
repair, physicians sought to demonstrate, first, that local outbreaks of fevers were due to a 
lack of human activity and, second, that aerial improvement was inevitable and 
inexorable.  Cadwallader Colden was the first North American physician to use neo-
Hippocratic medical theories to explain a local disease outbreak.  Born in 1688 in Ireland 
to Scottish parents, Colden received the Edinburgh baccalaureate in 1705 and then 
studied anatomy, botany, and chemistry for three years in London.  In 1710, Colden 
moved to Philadelphia and practiced medicine for a decade before becoming New York‘s 
surveyor general.  In 1721, he accepted an appointment into the governor‘s council, a 
position he held for 55 years.
25
  In 1743, Colden attributed a series of ―epidemical 
distemper‖ outbreaks in New York City to ―noxious vapors‖ arising from the ―moist 
slimy ground‖ of undeveloped marshes.  ―Stagnating waters,‖ Colden maintained, ―have 
been infamous from all antiquity for their noxious quality, and for that reason by the 
ancient poets described under the representation of the hydra, throwing out a poisonous 
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deadly breath.‖26  Preventing future epidemics required decisive action.  First, Colden 
recommended draining all undeveloped marshes, swamps, and stagnant ponds within city 
limits.  In support of his argument, he cited the resourcefulness of Bristol, Pennsylvania, 
residents.  Located northeast of Philadelphia on the Delaware River, Bristol‘s founders 
built the town near a large swamp.  During its formative years, town residents 
complained of recurrent annual fevers until they drained the swamp.  If New York 
drained its marshes, cleaned up the filth littered around riverfront docks, and constructed 
public drains to convey street waste into nearby rivers, it would purify its atmosphere and 
reduce the incidences of fevers.
27
 
 Deforestation constituted the other half of Colden‘s formula for atmospheric 
improvement.  Lands stripped of timber promoted the circulation of refreshing sea 
breezes and diluted miasmatic concentrations.  Colden‘s suggestion anticipated later 
eudiometrical experiments that measured sea breezes to be of a higher quality than airs in 
the vicinity of crowded urban streets or marshes.  According to Colden, long-time 
residents supported his theory that the settler‘s axe had moderated atmospheric 
conditions.  ―The climate grows every day better as the country is cleared of the woods, 
and more healthy, as all the people that have lived long here testify. …I therefore doubt 
                                                          
26
 Cadwallader Colden, ―Observations on the Fever which prevailed in the City of New-York in 
1741 and 2, written in 1743, by the late Hon. Cadwallader Colden.  Communicated to Dr. David Hosack by 
C. D. Colden, Esp.,‖ The American Medical and Philosophical Register; or, Annals of Medicine, natural 
history, agriculture, and the arts (July 1810):  324, 320. 
 
27
 Ibid., 323, 325-6. 
 
35 
 
not but it will in time become one of the most agreeable and healthy climates on the face 
of the earth.‖28 
Over the next few decades, physicians and other colonists marveled at how the 
spread of European-style land exploitation across the colonies slowly decontaminated the 
atmosphere.  In 1769, New Jersey‘s Edward Antill informed the American Philosophical 
Society that land drainage, deforestation, and cultivation had improved the quality of the 
air.  ―Whoever compares the present state of the air,‖ Antill explained, ―with what i[t] 
was formerly, before the country was opened, cleared and drained, will find that, we are 
every year fast advancing to that pure and perfect temperament of air.‖29  In a 1770 paper 
read before the Society, physician Hugh Williamson identified deforestation and 
wetlands drainage as the principle catalysts in reducing diseases.  According to 
Williamson, ―tall timber greatly impedes the circulation of air,‖ making it difficult for 
―fresh‖ ocean breezes to disperse miasmatic concentrations.  Before the beginning of 
European colonization, ―the face of this country was clad with woods, and every valley 
afforded a swamp or stagnant marsh … and [because of] a general exhalation from the 
surface of ponds and marshes, the air was constantly charged with a gross putrefcent 
[sic.] fluid.‖30 
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 Having established that poor air quality was but a normal, and temporary, stage in 
the civilizing process of a new territory, colonists next attacked Buffon‘s theory of 
degeneration.  The most famous and persuasive of these rebuttals came from the pen of 
Thomas Jefferson.  In Notes on the State of Virginia (1785), Jefferson ridiculed the 
suggestion that the continent‘s frigid temperatures and abundance of aerial and surface 
moisture reduced the size and diversity of animal species.  Without disputing Buffon‘s 
allegation that North America had ―more waters … spread over its surface by nature, and 
fewer of these drained off by the hand of man,‖ Jefferson demonstrated that the 
continent‘s animal species, as a whole, were more impressive in size, stature, and 
diversity than their Old World counterparts through a side-by-side comparison.
31
  
Jefferson also refuted Buffon‘s contention that North America had a cooler climate than 
European countries of similar latitudes.  Endorsing the findings of his countrymen, 
Jefferson unoriginally argued that during the previous generation the climate had 
warmed, annual snow accumulation had decreased, and river overflows had occurred less 
frequently.  Keeping watercourses confined within their banks was a critical strategy of 
atmospheric reform since it prevented floodwaters from recharging marshes and 
saturating dry soil, prompting the decomposition of vegetable and animal matter.
32
 
 Jefferson and Buffon‘s other American detractors always ignored that the 
renowned Frenchman tempered his statements about the New World‘s environmental 
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inferiority later in life.  The naturalist admitted that the industry of Englishmen was at 
least transforming North America from a miasmatic and frigid wasteland into a 
productive Eden: 
All the evidence seems to point toward the greater part of the American continent 
being a new land, still untouched by men, in which nature had not had time to 
carry out all her plans, to develop herself to the full; the men are cold and the 
animals small, because the ardor of the men and the size of the animals are 
dependent on the healthiness and the warmth of the air; in several centuries, when 
the earth has been tilled, the forests cut down, the rivers controlled and the waters 
contained, this same land will become the most fruitful, healthy, and rich of all, as 
it is seen to be already in parts that man has cultivated.
33
 
Buffon‘s statement captured the cultural biases, spirit, and aspirations of atmospheric 
reform.  Living in a state of nature, Indians had neglected the control of water and 
thereby condemned the air to its current pathogenic condition.  Once the Indians were 
swept aside and replaced by a civilized and enlightened race, however, nature could reach 
a state of perfection. 
 
Manmade Contamination 
 The pageant of atmospheric progress extolled by physicians and national elites 
overlooked a serious problem.  By the late 1770s, a few physicians began to question 
whether certain modes of agriculture and economic development were themselves 
contributing to miasmatic contamination.  In 1776, Lionel Chalmers, a Scottish physician 
living in Charlestown, South Carolina, singled out three economic enterprises responsible 
for reversing the progress of atmospheric reform:  rice cultivation, indigo extraction, and 
milling.  In a passage worthy of quoting at length, Chalmers elucidated the process by 
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which diverted and impounded waters contaminated the air.  Capitalism itself was now a 
chief contributor to atmospheric contamination: 
In almost every settlement, much land is designedly overflowed, by stopping the 
water courses with strong banks of earth; whereby reservoirs of a good depth and 
extent are formed, in order to be let into the rice fields, when the plant is of a fit 
growth for receiving the water; for extracting the dye from the plant which yields 
indico [sic.]; or for mills of various forts.  And, whenever these collections of 
water are expended in the above purposes, or they are exhaled by the sun or swept 
away by winds, such multitudes of fish and reptiles of various kinds perish, that, 
for a long time after the air is tainted, with the putrid effluvia that arise as well 
from the numberless bodies of animals, which are in the highest state of 
putreaction [sic.], as the muddy soil.  But these pools are dangerous to health on 
another score:  for the surfaces being but little agitated by the gentle winds that 
commonly blow in the summer, and no motion or fresh air being communicated 
to the waters at bottom, whilst the sun daily acts on them with great power, they 
necessarily must acquire some degree of mephitism.  But noxious exhalations will 
abound still more, when the waters are nearly or quite expended—For then the 
sun‘s rays penetrating the miry soil, those vapours [sic.] that had been pent up for 
a long continuance of time, which, therefore, may be supposed to have contracted 
vicious qualities, are now set at liberty, and mix with the air we breathe.
34
 
The recognition that economic progress sometimes came at an environmental cost—in 
this case, impure air and dead fish and reptiles—was revolutionary and threatened to 
throw atmospheric reform into disarray.  Chalmers‘ somber admission that capitalism 
might actually threaten human welfare by contaminating the atmosphere with 
unwholesome substances threatened to overwhelm atmospheric reformers‘ initial 
uncritical and triumphal narrative of progress.  
 Like their southern counterparts, northern physicians probed the connections 
between economic development and impure air.  Benjamin Rush, a professor of 
Chemistry at the University of Pennsylvania, eminent Philadelphia physician, and 
signatory of the Declaration of Independence, speculated that the proliferation of 
millponds and counterproductive strategies of atmospheric reform had increased the 
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incidences of bilious and intermitting fevers in Pennsylvania.  In a December 1785 
speech delivered at the American Philosophical Society, Rush blamed the erection of 
millponds, which artificially impounded running water for various economic purposes, 
for producing ―miasmata.‖  Embracing the Hippocratic tradition, Rush used circulation as 
a barometer for judging water‘s wholesomeness.  Circulating and free flowing waters, 
such as those found in unobstructed rivers, creeks, and streams, posed little risk since 
motion inhibited the formation of miasma.  Stagnant waters, such as swamps, marshes, 
flood waters, and lakes lacking an outlet, were unhealthy because they promoted the 
decomposition of vegetable and animal matter.  Impounded and deprived of movement, 
millpond water fell into the second category and posed a risk to nearby communities.
35
 
 Second, Rush emphasized that physicians had overstated deforestation‘s capacity 
to purify the air.  Acting as natural buffers, forests appropriated space around the 
perimeters of swamps, marshes, flood plains, and millponds and confined miasmatic 
contamination to a limited area.   Before settlers cleared the forest adjacent to the 
Susquehanna River, Rush explained, fevers seldom afflicted people more than half a mile 
away.  As settlers cut down the riparian trees, they unwittingly removed an obstacle to 
the diffusion of miasmas.  As Rush wrote, settlers as far away as ten miles complained of 
seasonal ailments.
36
  Rush contended that deforestation was only effective if it was 
included in a broader program: 
I beg a distinction to be made here between clearing and cultivating a country.  
While clearing a country makes it sickly … cultivating a country, that is, draining 
swamps, destroying weeds, burning brush, and exhaling the unwholesome or 
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superfluous moisture of the earth, by means of frequent crops or grain, grasses, or 
vegetables of all kinds, render it healthy.
37
 
 
The fact that the Hippocratic revival‘s medical theories put economic progress in 
conflict with public health pushed atmospheric reformers into an uncomfortable position.  
Physicians had the choice of either alienating emergent capitalists (millpond owners and 
millers) and plantation owners (southern rice and indigo producers) by demanding that 
they cease operations for the good of public health or offending ordinary Americans by 
demanding no reform.  Not surprisingly, physicians resolved the tension by straddling a 
middle course that emphasized the mitigation of environmental hazards.  As a result, 
Rush appropriated the recent findings of pneumatic chemistry to propose methods of 
reducing, rather than eliminating, the damage inflicted by manmade industries.  Seizing 
on the 1779 discovery of Dutch physician/botanist Jan Ingenhousz that plants, during 
exposure to sunlight, gave off dephlogisticated air (the process now known as 
photosynthesis), Rush proposed encircling every millpond with trees.  After reaching 
maturity, the trees would shield the water from sunlight, confine miasmatic 
contamination to a limited area, and render the air wholesome by absorbing, purifying, 
and then releasing ―unhealthy air[s]‖ in a ―deflogisticated‖ state.  Willow trees were the 
ideal species to plant around ponds since they ―purif[ied] the air the most rapidly of any 
tree [Ingenhousz] subjected to his experiments.‖38  Tree planting was a pragmatic 
solution since it promoted better air quality without offending either capitalists or 
ordinary Americans.  Indeed, for a brief time the notion that trees were the allies of 
atmospheric reform replaced the earlier idea of the usefulness of deforestation.  In 1792, 
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for instance, Jeremy Belknap boasted that the air in New Hampshire‘s forests was 
―remarkably pure.  The tall and luxuriant growth which an European might call ‗rank 
vegetation,‘ not only indicates strength and fertility of soil; but conduces to absorb 
noxious vapors.‖39 
 
Progress Averted:  The Return of Yellow Fever 
 In the summer of 1793, yellow fever returned to the United States after a 28 year 
absence.  The deadliest epidemic struck Philadelphia, then the nation‘s political and 
intellectual capitol.  By the time of the first frost, when the epidemic faded, more than 
4,000 people—almost 10% of Philadelphia‘s population—were dead.  The epidemic 
commenced a new wave of outbreaks up and down the coast mocking the progress of 
atmospheric reform.  Every year from 1793 to 1805, yellow fever killed scores in coastal 
cities ranging from Portland, Maine, to Charleston, South Carolina.  From 1693-1799 
yellow fever claimed at least 17,088 lives in cities along the eastern seaboard and 
probably many more.
40
 
Ordinary Americans embraced the prevailing etiological explanations for disease.  
Philadelphians accepted Rush‘s theory that the 1793 epidemic owed its origins to a 
―noxious miasma‖ produced by marshes and urban filth, waging a futile battle against the 
ambiguous and invisible substance.  Philadelphians lit bonfires on street corners to 
decontaminate the air.  They fired musket volleys at the elusive miasmas.  They placed 
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tar ropes in their homes, doused floors and walls with vinegar, wore camphor bags 
around their necks, chain-smoked cigars, and gnawed on garlic in a desperate attempt to 
ward off bad airs.  Affluent Philadelphians simply fled.  In some communities, the new 
cycle of epidemics pitted local residents against millpond owners.  In January 1799, for 
instance, Elijah Boardman and a group of New Milford, Connecticut, residents tore down 
part of Joseph Ruggles‘ dam across the Housatonic River.  Boardman and his 
coconspirators alleged that since 1796, when Ruggles‘ elevated the dam ten inches, 300 
New Milford citizens had fallen sick due to a mysterious fever.  Blaming stagnant waters 
impounded by the dam for poisoning New Milford‘s air, angry residents justified the 
dam‘s destruction on the grounds it constituted a public health nuisance.41 
 Yellow fever‘s resurgence led some physicians to reevaluate marshes‘ pestilential 
nature.  In a 1795 paper read before the American Philosophical Society and later 
published, physician William Currie suggested that the decomposition of vegetable and 
animal matter in marshes triggered a chemical reaction diminishing atmospheric oxygen 
levels.  According to Curry, the eudiometrical experiments of Dutch physician Jacob Van 
Breda confirmed that the 18:48 ratio of oxygen to ―azote‖ found in the vicinity of 
marshes was far below the normal atmospheric level of 1:3.  ―The causes of the 
unwholesomeness of low and moist situations,‖ Currie asserted, ―is not owing to any 
invisible miasmata or noxious effluvia, which issue from the soil and lurk in the air, but 
to a very different cause, viz. to a deficiency of the oxygenous [sic.] portion of the 
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atmosphere in such situations.‖42  Breakthroughs in medicine, pneumatic chemistry, and 
human anatomy during the previous two centuries demonstrated oxygen‘s centrality to 
cardiovascular and pulmonary functions.  Starved of oxygen, bodily functions performed 
―imperfectly and languidly.‖  As Currie explained, oxygen deprivation rendered the 
―vessels on the surface of the body powerless, and atonic [sic.].‖43  The cardiovascular 
system‘s weakened constitution made the body more susceptible to insalubrious airs.  ―It 
appears more than probable,‖ Currie concluded, that ―febrile contagion … is rendered 
virulent and powerful in proportion to the absence or defect of the oxygen and the degree 
of heat to which the living body has been exposed.‖44 
 Boosting oxygen levels around marshes could enhance people‘s resistance to 
febrile illnesses.  Enhancing oxygen levels depended on the construction of a system of 
―drains, deep trenches, and wells‖ through marshes that conveyed stagnant surface water 
into running watercourses.  Currie instructed physicians to encourage farmers to fill low, 
miry spots with clay, sand, or lime; set fire to dead and decomposing weeds, grass, and 
trees; and sow grasses, ―plants of vigorous growth,‖ and vegetables for the purpose of 
―replenish[ing] the atmosphere with oxygen.‖45  Finally, farmers living near millponds or 
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marshes which could not be drained should plant trees to ―intercept … the moisture in its 
progress … [and] furnish a constant supply of oxygen to the atmosphere.‖46 
 Disagreement over whether marshes caused febrile illnesses mirrored a larger 
debate within the medical community between proponents of the miasmatic theory of 
disease (atmospheric causation) and those of contagion (person-to-person transmission).  
This debate raged until the latter nineteenth century, when scientists demonstrated that 
mosquitoes, and not miasmas, were the true vectors of yellow fever and malaria, but most 
physicians and Americans accepted the miasmatic model as the predominant etiological 
theory of disease.  In the early republic, however, the debate was inconsequential in terms 
of public perceptions of marshes since they were viewed as pestilential regardless of 
whether they (and the miasmas they produced) constituted a primary cause of disease or 
something that predisposed people to physical maladies.
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Currie‘s theory of oxygen starvation attracted little support.  In the late 1790s, the 
idea that deforestation offered an effective tool of aerial reform stubbornly lingered.  
After visiting North America, Thomas Wright, an Irish surgeon and anatomy instructor, 
decided that the flat topography of the area sandwiched between the Appalachian 
Mountains and Atlantic seaboard precluded comprehensive drainage, leaving 
―evaporation‖ as the only alternative for destroying wetlands.  According to Wright, 
culling the primeval forest would allow prevailing winds to ―sweep the bare bottom of 
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the earth, and bear away the combining moisture.‖48  He invoked Irish history to support 
his theory.  Before English colonists introduced intensive land exploitation, Ireland, like 
pre-Columbian America, languished as an impenetrable, miry, and miasmatic forest.  
Since the United States was a ―new country,‖ its atmosphere would remain pathogenic 
until enough industrious Americans cultivated the soil and fanned out across the 
country.
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 After the turn of the century, southern physicians decided that rhetoric had been in 
insufficient in reforming Georgia‘s miasmatic atmosphere.  Organized in 1804, the 
Georgia Medical Society took the unprecedented step of enlisting direct government aid 
to curb the practice of wet rice cultivation.  ―With a semi-tropical climate, such as ours,‖ 
the Society‘s charter explained, ―there could be no worse or more malignant incidental 
cause of disease than the stagnant water, which remains on a rice field exposed to an 
ardent summer‘s sun, and the saturated soil which is next exposed, when the water is 
drained off.‖50  In 1810, the Georgia Medical Society encouraged the Savannah city 
council to implement a program aimed at eliminating wet rice cultivation on the outskirts 
of town.  In 1817, the city approved the plan, imposing taxes on white city residents to 
raise revenue to pay nearby rice planters to drain their property and convert to dry rice 
culture.  The program enjoyed limited success since most cultivators, despite the 
subsidies, found it too costly to drain their land or convert to dry cultivation.  Three years 
after the program‘s approval a yellow fever epidemic struck Savannah, killing 907 
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people.  The Georgia Medical Society blamed planters‘ dilatoriness in converting to dry 
culture, the slow pace of swamp drainage in the hinterland, and the absence of tree 
barriers outside of Savannah for the epidemic.
51
 
For the first few decades of the nineteenth century, the uneven pace of wetlands 
drainage remained physicians‘ primary explanation for North America‘s pathogenic 
atmosphere.  In 1802, Charles Caldwell, a student of Benjamin Rush and later founder of 
Louisville University‘s medical school, published the period‘s defining study on the 
nexus between American marshes and disease.  Caldwell explained that ―powerful‖ 
diseases visited the U. S. more ―frequent[ly]‖ than Europe because of North America‘s 
―super-abundance of marsh miasma.‖52  He recognized that the Creator had imposed 
undue burdens on Americans.  The nation‘s flat topography, abundance of precipitation, 
suffocating heat, and raging rivers, which regularly overflowed their banks, produced 
long stretches of stagnant and diffused surface waters.  From the coastal salt marshes 
along the Atlantic seaboard to the Mississippi River‘s riparian floodplains the United 
States was home to ―vast factories of this febrile poison.‖53 
 Caldwell reasoned that the ―halfway state of our agricultural improvements‖ 
explained the nation‘s elevated miasmatic levels.54  Residing on low and flat sections of 
land, many farmers, like those outside Savannah, found it unnecessary to drain and 
cultivate every square foot of their property.  The rural press sometimes defended farmers 
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against unrealistic expectations regarding the cultural mandate of drainage.  In 1820, the 
Baltimore-based American Farmer editorialized that selective house location was a 
viable disease prevention measure.  Escaping ―autumnal diseases of the agueish [sic.] and 
febrile character,‖ editors insisted, required farmers to wisely position their homes, barns, 
and stables—rather than laying out costly drainage ditches.  Healthy farm families did not 
reside in homes or work in barnyards downwind from ―wet and watery places, 
particularly stagnant pools, ponds, mill dams, marshes, swamps, meadows, &c. &c.  
Every physician will confirm this simple advice.‖55 
The problem with the Farmer’s advice was that it resembled the fatalistic medical 
doctrines espoused in ancient Greece rather than the confident, instrumental, and 
assertive theories of eighteenth-century medicine and pneumatic chemistry.  Neo-
Hippocratic physicians likened nature to a ball of unformed clay that civilized people 
could and should mold to benefit themselves and posterity.  In the opinion of Rush, 
Currie, the Georgia Medical Society, and especially Caldwell, farmers who forsook 
marsh drainage were little better than the continent‘s previous occupants, American 
Indians, whose neglect of intensive, market-oriented land exploitation allegedly 
condemned the atmosphere to its current miasmatic condition.   ―The most unlettered 
husbandman,‖ Caldwell lectured, understood ―that the only method of rendering 
[marshes] innoxious [sic.] to health, and useful in agriculture, is to circumscribe and 
intersect it with a number of ditches sufficient to carry off its redundant waters.‖  ―A 
neglect of this rational, salutary, and lucrative practice, subjects thousands in the United 
States to the malignant action of marsh miasma, who would otherwise escape this 
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deleterious poison.‖56  The medical community‘s jubilant, optimistic, and cocksure belief 
that all that was necessary to alter the atmosphere‘s chemical composition was a 
commitment to land drainage at the grassroots had serious consequences for the fate of 
American wetlands.  The only good wetland, physicians instructed Americans time and 
again, was one which had been cleared, drained, and cultivated.
57
 
 American atmospheric reform had important implications for the national state‘s 
role in natural resource development.  According to physicians, responsibility for 
improving the air fell to themselves and ordinary farmers.  In the first place, physicians 
with access to the latest medical and scientific findings would propose a plan of action.  
Farmers and local communities, acting independently and for the common good, would 
then carry out those recommendations.  Physicians hoped to fulfill their neo-Hippocartic 
obligations to wipe out disease, enhance the medical community‘s prestige, and 
demonstrate their indispensability to society.  Farmers hoped to shield themselves and 
families from pestilential airs.  Detaching national and state governments from the 
business of land drainage, the public discourse of atmospheric reform unofficially 
devolved responsibility for the destruction of marshes to local communities and 
individual farmers who understood that land drainage was a pillar of proper 
environmental stewardship. 
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CHAPTER 2:  ―THE  FOUNDATION OF ALL CORRECT TILLAGE‖: 
DRAINAGE, THE RURAL PRESS, AND THE IDEA 
OF ENLIGHTENED LAND STEWARDSHIP 
 
 The eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century campaign for atmospheric reform 
unfolded in the pages of academic journals and the lecture halls of scientific institutions.  
Inspired by the revival of ancient Hippocratic medical theories, atmospheric reformers 
sought to deny the European claims that North America was uninhabitable by arguing 
that intensive cultivation, deforestation, and especially land drainage had improved the 
continent‘s atmosphere.  In the early republic, support for wetlands drainage was elitist 
and restricted to Americans engaged in nonagricultural pursuits.  Physicians, pneumatic 
chemists, and politicians promoted drainage as the best means to improve the 
atmosphere‘s wholesomeness and reduce the incidences of miasmatic illnesses.  
Beginning in the 1820s, however, popular support for drainage broadened as farm 
journals took up the issue and Americans ventured west of the Appalachian Mountains, 
an area notorious for its marshiness and miasmatic condition.  Vilifying wetlands as a 
pestilential landscape inimical to the health of farm families, livestock, and barnyard 
fowl, the rural press, for the first time, made the findings of atmospheric reformers 
accessible to the broader public. 
 In publicizing the agenda of atmospheric reformers, the antebellum rural press 
emerged as the primary clearinghouse for drainage-related information.  Its interest in 
wetlands reclamation, however, did not begin and end with public health issues.  
Dedicated to disseminating useful knowledge about agriculture and rural living, the rural 
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press celebrated drainage as ―the foundation of all correct tillage‖ and the ―first great 
lesson of agricultural improvement.‖1  Farm journals touted drainage as the first step in 
carving a farm out of the marshy American wilderness because other improvements 
intended to enhance crop production, such as deep plowing, crop rotation, manuring, and 
the adoption of new technologies, proved useless if the soil languished in a saturated 
state.  By publishing the minutes of local agricultural society meetings devoted to 
drainage, reprinting county and state fair speeches dedicated to the subject, reporting the 
success of farmers who transformed miasmatic marshlands into profitable fields, and 
providing a forum for farmers to exchange ideas about the benefits of drainage, the rural 
press pieced together a compelling narrative about agricultural progress in which the pace 
of wetlands destruction served as a barometer of rural prosperity.   
 Environmental historians have described American land conservation as a post-
Civil War movement dedicated to preserving forests, protecting the integrity of common 
resources, saving desirable bird and big game species from wanton slaughter, establishing 
national parks, and irrigating the far western deserts.  Yet it is impossible to understand 
the genesis, evolution, and trajectory of American conservationist thinking without 
acknowledging the medical ideas that shaped antebellum Americans‘ understanding of 
their relationship with nature and inspired their land use patterns.  Eighteenth-century 
atmospheric reformers, who constituted North America‘s first proponents of land 
conservation, envisioned conservation as a program to eliminate unhygienic landscapes.  
In this preliminary phase of land conservation, medical values represented the primary 
calculus used to evaluate a landscape‘s usefulness.  Borrowing liberally from atmospheric 
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reformers, antebellum farm journalists popularized the medical advantages of eliminating 
unhygienic landscapes, which they defined as any topographical landform that discharged 
miasmas to the detriment of people and animals.  The rural press maintained that water 
rightly belonged in rivers, ponds, or oceans where it could not interact with vegetable or 
animal matter and generate telluric miasmas.  When water escaped from the banks of 
creeks, streams, and rivers or fell to the ground as precipitation but failed to reach an 
outlet, agricultural literature identified the presence of noncirculating surface water as 
evidence of an environmental ―defect.‖  The message was clear:  wetlands were unnatural 
landscapes that had no justification for existing.   Farmers had a responsibility to 
conserve the land, as well as the air, by building drainage ditches and burying 
underground tiles to convey surface water back into circulating watercourses. 
This chapter takes a fresh look at what the antebellum rural press said about land 
drainage.  Drawing on a broad geographic sampling of farm journals published before the 
Civil War, it argues that the rural press popularized land conservation by drainage by 
introducing Hippocratic environmental ideas into the mainstream of agricultural thought.  
Largely overlooked by environmental historians, farm journals are a treasure trove of 
historical information about the environment and agricultural progress.  As Lake Douglas 
recently put it, ―agricultural literature contains first-person accounts of issues and 
experiences that influenced nineteenth-century American economic, social, political, 
educational, and cultural attitudes about the land and its stewardship.  Often, those who 
contributed to agricultural periodicals were ordinary men (rarely women) who reported 
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on individual experiences.  Their observations are eyewitness accounts of American 
attitudes towards the land and its uses.‖2 
 
Virtue, Health, and Agricultural Literature in the Nineteenth Century 
 The Hippocratic revival emphasized that unexploited territories were deleterious 
to human health.  Until enlightened and industrious people thinned the virgin forests, 
drained fetid marshes, cultivated the soil, and burned off decaying underbrush, miasmatic 
and insalubrious atmospheres would afflict ―vacant‖ regions.  Beginning in the second 
quarter of the 1800s, concern over the state of North America‘s atmosphere shifted from 
the eastern seaboard to the block of territory sandwiched between the Appalachian 
Mountains and the Mississippi River (and later California‘s Central Valley).  The shift 
followed the admission of several new states to the Union, their ―official‖ opening for 
settlement, the securing of navigation rights on the Mississippi River, the gradual 
breakdown of Indian resistance following General Anthony Wayne‘s 1794 victory over 
the Western Indian Confederacy at Fallen Timbers, Ohio, and the defeat of Tecumseh‘s 
Indian alliance.  In a few short decades following independence, ten states west of the 
Appalachians entered the union:  Kentucky (1792), Tennessee (1796), Ohio (1803), 
Louisiana (1812), Indiana (1816), Mississippi (1817), Illinois (1818), Alabama (1819), 
Maine (1820), and Missouri (1821). 
 Western expansion was a strategy to preserve the young republic‘s virtue.  
Influenced by the philosophical ponderings of French physiocrats and Scottish political 
economists, leaders of the revolutionary generation perceived history as a process in 
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which societies, like biological organisms, were conceived, matured, grew old, and died.  
According to this theory, social development unfolded in four consecutive stages:  
hunting, pasturage, agriculture, and commerce.  When societies became commercialized, 
densely populated, urbanized, or embraced mercantilist policies privileging a favored 
few, they entered the fourth stage of historical development and teetered on the verge of 
―old age‖ and death.  American leaders such as Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson 
hypothesized that the United States, unlike its European counterparts, could escape the 
inexorable march towards social decay/death by remaining suspended in the agricultural 
phase, which was the preferred stage of social development.  Franklin and Jefferson 
contended that the United States‘ abundance of ―vacant‖ land enabled its society to 
expand across space rather than time.  As long as western lands attracted settlers, the 
population density of the United States would remain low and its people would prosper as 
independent farmers—not wage earners in bondage to the caprices of the economic 
market and venal factory bosses.  ―Our governments will remain virtuous for many 
centuries,‖ Jefferson explained, ―as long as they are chiefly agricultural; and this will be 
as long as there shall be vacant lands in any part of America.‖  ―While we have land to 
labour [sic.] then, let us never wish to see our citizens occupied at a work-bench.‖3  
Nonetheless, in the first few decades after independence, westward emigration 
symbolized a trickle rather than a flood.  The 1810 census counted a national population 
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of 7.23 million people, but only 1 million of them lived in the new territories and states 
carved out of the trans-Appalachian West.
4
 
 Unfortunately for national leaders, many westerners discovered the trans-
Appalachian West to be an impenetrable, marshy, and pestilential death trap rather than a 
laboratory of republican agrarianism.  As settlers fanned out across the vast wet prairie 
states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and the swampy states bordering the Lower Mississippi 
River watershed, the region entered the public imagination as a prolific incubator of 
miasmatic poisons.  Westerners employed a host of terms to describe the febrile illnesses 
they attributed to miasmas or miasmata discharged by western marshes, swamps, and 
seasonal floods:  ―Arkansaw chills,‖ ―autumnal fever,‖ ―bilbous fever,‖ ―black swamp 
fever,‖ ―intermittent fever,‖ ―malaria,‖ ―remittent fever,‖ ―seasoning,‖ and ―swamp 
fever.‖  Modern epidemiologists recognize that endemic malaria spread by the bite of the 
female anopheles mosquito—not miasmas—triggered many of the eruptions of ―shakes,‖ 
―fevers,‖ and ―chills and ague‖ that afflicted settlers living near swamps, bogs, and 
shallow lakes, the anopheles‘ preferred breeding habitats, during humid summer months.  
Despite this etiological misunderstanding, westerners had good reason to associate 
miasmas with death:  by 1850, for instance, malaria killed more people in Illinois than 
anything else.  Annual bouts of ―shakes‖ and ―fevers‖ were so prevalent that mid-century 
Midwesterners accepted them as a routine, though dreaded and despised, part of everyday 
rural life.  As one Pike County, Illinois, resident explained in 1821:  ―An illness native in 
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the prairie country was fever and ague.  There was burning fever following chills which 
left the patient so weak he could not work.  It came with perfect regularity.‖5 
 So unnerved were many western land seekers about succumbing to miasmatic 
diseases that they uprooted their families and retreated back to the east coast.  In 1818, 
Thomas Nuttall happened upon several individuals near Georgetown, Pennsylvania, who 
left the West ―in search of a situation which might afford them health.‖  The next year 
William Faux met half a dozen wagons hauling a group of families and their belongings 
from Missouri to Kentucky since they had been ―scared out of Missouri by sickness.‖  
Journeying to Indiana in 1821, William Forster observed as many people returning east 
due to ―sickness‖ as he saw heading west.6  Government explorer Stephen H. Long, a 
Major in the U. S. Army, disparaged Ohio‘s wet prairies as a barren and mosquito-ridden 
wasteland.  After traversing the 24 miles between Fort Wayne and the Indiana-Ohio 
boundary, Long judged that ―the country is so wet that we scarcely saw an acre of land 
upon which a settlement could be made.  We travelled for a couple of miles with our 
horses wading through water, sometimes to the girth … We attempted to stop and pasture 
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our horses, but this was quite impossible on account of the immense swarms of 
mosquitoes and horse flies.‖7 
   Civic leaders from Atlantic states denigrated the West‘s pathogenic reputation to 
discourage the increasing tide of emigration.  At the 1843 meeting of the Berkshire 
Agricultural Society in Massachusetts, Henry W. Bishop warned audience members ―that 
it was part of wisdom for New-Englanders, instead of emigrating to the ‗fertile prairies‘ 
of the Far West, and falling before the miasma of those regions, to remain at home, 
improve their pleasant places, and ‗make two blades of grass grow where only one grew 
before.‘‖8  Irritated by the ―one-sided‖ accounts of western boosters, who portrayed their 
region as a bucolic and healthy paradise, the Philadelphia Inquirer in the same year 
compared western migration to a death sentence. 
It is a well ascertained fact, that in most new countries, especially where the lands 
are low and the streams are numerous, fevers of various kinds prevail.  And yet, 
thousands and tens of thousands annually wend their way westward, build their 
mud huts or log cabins in the vicinity of swamps, by the side of rivers, where 
agues and aches have their origin…  [Boosters] say little of the overflows, the 
epidemics, the disease and the death which are so frequent and common.
9
 
 
Neither newspaper warnings nor the occasional retreat of disheartened westerners to the 
east coast disrupted westward emigration over the long run.  Spectacular national 
population growth led a growing number of antebellum land seekers to pursue 
opportunities on western lands and also in undeveloped lowlands and valleys in the 
Atlantic states.  By 1840, the United States achieved population equality with Great 
Britain when the census counted 17 million Americans.  Within ten years, natural 
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increase and European immigration pushed the number of people living in the United 
States above 23 million.  If the United States hoped to remain suspended in the third state 
of historical development, committed to the principles of republican agrarianism, 
Americans would have to transform undeveloped wetlands into new farms or children 
would continue to forsake the country for the city.  The destruction of unhygienic 
landscapes had acquired a particular urgency.
10
 
Settling the mushrooming population on farms, instead of rapidly industrializing 
cities, became a cherished objective of the incipient rural press.  Evolving from humble 
origins as the organs of local agricultural and horticultural societies, agricultural journals 
exploded in circulation and readership between 1819 and 1860 as more than 400 
periodicals sprung up across the nation.  On the eve of the Civil War, 60 farm newspapers 
were published and distributed in the United States.  In 1880, circulation eclipsed the 1-
million threshold.  Dedicated to ―book farming,‖ the rural press promoted a form of 
agriculture in which farmers implemented the technological and scientific farming 
methods described in printed sources.  Among the most successful early agricultural 
periodicals was John Stuart Skinner‘s Baltimore-based American Farmer, which began 
publishing in 1819 and continued its operations until 1897.  The Genesee Farmer, first 
published in Rochester, New York, in 1831, and the Cultivator, the official publication of 
the New York Agricultural Society beginning in 1834, exemplified the northeastern 
dominance of early publications.  Within a few years, however, agricultural journals were 
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published and printed in every region of the United States although many were short-
lived, attracted small readerships, and were consolidated into other publications.
11
 
 The important question of who read the antebellum farm journals has attracted 
intense scholarly scrutiny.  In one of the topic‘s best studies, the historian Sally McMurry 
compares subscribers‘ lists, census data, atlases, and manuscript sources between 1839-
1865 to determine the socioeconomic status of subscribers to The Cultivator in Chenango 
County, New York.  McMurry finds that subscribers were ―well-off … but generally not 
rich— [they] consistently occupied a position between the two extremes‖ and practiced 
―a moderate ‗book farming‘ that mixed cautious experimentation with tradition.‖12  
Nonetheless, McMurry is careful to emphasize that a number of variables complicate 
drawing anything but a tentative conclusion:  ―That someone subscribed to a journal does 
not necessarily mean that he or she read it; on the other hand, it is safe to assume that 
copies of the journal reached more potential readers than the individual subscriber alone 
… Finally, Oxford [in Chenango County] represents just one agricultural community in a 
large and diverse geographical region.‖13  For the purposes of this study the debate over 
the rural press‘s readership is less important than how those journals provided a forum for 
editors and ordinary farmers to express their opinions about the importance of land 
conservation by drainage and diffuse the findings of the previous century‘s Hippocratic 
revivalists.  As one Ohio farmer described this process, ―an agricultural paper is the most 
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convenient and appropriate medium through which the farmers can converse with each 
other, concerning the improvements they have made.‖14  And between 1819 and the start 
of the Civil War, agricultural journals in every section of the country were replete with 
articles, letters, medical treatises, reprinted state and county fair lectures, and editorial 
propaganda about the medical and agricultural advantages of conserving the land by 
eradicating unhygienic landscapes. 
  
Draining for Health 
 Nothing disturbed the rural press‘s editors and contributors more about swamps, 
bogs, sodden lowlands, and other wet landscapes than their baneful impact on human 
health.  Miasmas triggered febrile illnesses, invited prolonged periods of torpor, and 
hastened premature death.  Sick or dead farmers could not cultivate the land or provide 
for their families.  As a result, the primary reasons farm journals championed drainage 
was to protect farm families from unhygienic landscapes.  They turned Americans‘ 
feelings of ambiguity about wetlands into abhorrence by arguing that responsible 
cultivators eliminated every possible source of marsh miasmata—or ―malaria‖ (literally 
translated ―bad air‖), as antebellum Americans increasingly referred to atmospheric 
poisons discharged by wetlands—before their families suffered sickness or death.15 
 The influence of ancient Hippocratic medical theories on agricultural journalists 
was clear and unambiguous.  American farm journals accepted without reservation the 
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claim that febrile illnesses owed their origins to the malarias and miasmas produced by 
wet landscapes.  Yet providing readers with a precise description of the form, substance, 
and chemical composition of malaria/miasma remained a task fraught with difficulty.  
Malaria‘s nebulous nature was due to the medical community‘s confusion and lack of 
consensus on the topic.  In 1837, ―R. B. J****‖ explained malaria‘s ―modus operandi‖ 
for subscribers of the Petersburg, Virginia-based Farmer’s Register.  According to R. B. 
J****, ―the effluvium arising from marshes, is a subtle, highly attenuated and undefined 
substance, the nature of which is unknown, and by no principles of analysis or synthesis 
have the medical part of the community been able to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion 
in relation to the thing itself.‖  The only thing certain about the physical nature of miasma 
was that it remained uncertain.  ―Theory succeeding theory has been exploded without 
arriving at any thing [sic.] like certainty about the substance of miasm [sic.] itself.‖16 
 While contributors struggled to explain what malaria or miasma constituted, they 
agreed about its origins and impact on human and animal health.  Writing in 1823, for 
instance, ―Rusticus‖ explained to readers of The American Farmer that inland swamps 
released ―nothing but the most pestilential miasma, thereby contaminating the otherwise 
wholesome atmosphere, and spreading disease and death through a whole region of a fine 
fertile country.‖17  Little changed over the next half century as letters, speeches, and 
medical treatises reprinted in farm journals reinforced the wetland-malaria nexus.  In 
1870, a ―Medical Man‖ felt compelled to elucidate for subscribers of the New England 
Farmer how miasmas took shape.  ―By [miasma] is meant the effluvia, exhalations, 
[etc.], which emanate from vegetable and animal matter while undergoing 
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decomposition‖ in swamps and marshes.18  As always, stagnant, noncirculating surface 
waters served as the primary rural source of unwholesome airs.   Speeches delivered at 
antebellum county fairs, which agricultural journals often published, drew on the 
prevailing wisdom that farmers who neglected drainage increased their susceptibility to 
malaria.  In a mid-century lecture at Ohio‘s Lucas and Fulton County fairs, Lewis 
Lambert argued that ―stagnant‖ surface waters and ―deadly‖ marshes ―prevent[ed] the 
growth of useful vegetation, sending forth their poisonous vapors, their death bearing 
miasma; spreading disease and destroying human life, decimating our population, and 
frightening the emigrant to other lands, a stench and curse to the neighborhood, and a 
sickening scene of disgust to the traveller [sic.].‖19   
 Malaria was no less harmful to livestock.  Contrary to the assertion of one 
historian, nineteenth-century Americans did not easily forget about European accusations 
regarding the degenerative influence of their country‘s climate and atmosphere.20  Farm 
journals worried that the presence of wetlands near grazing lands, stables, and barnyards 
sapped the health, vigor, and vitality of livestock in three ways.  In the first place, 
wetlands promoted the growth of aquatic plants and ―watery succulent herbage‖ that 
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contained fewer fortifying nutrients and vitamins than grasses sown on dry lands.  The 
Cultivator editorialized that the ―loss of flesh‖ that occurred in livestock when they 
grazed on aquatic plants ―is evidence of [their] want of nutrient.‖21  Second, poor soil 
drainage stunted the growth of most plant, hay, and grass species.  In 1856, E. 
Woolverton, an Ohio farmer, warned subscribers of the Genesee Farmer that surface 
water rendered the soil unproductive.  ―The growth of the plants [on wet soils] is 
retarded—the health of that plant which is to be used for man or beast, is materially 
injured, and the health of the consumer is injured accordingly.  Thus by [the] neglect [of 
drainage], the health, strength, vigor, and even life of plants may be extinguished.‖22  
Finally, malaria increased livestock‘s vulnerability to a special class of bovine diseases 
that mimicked the symptoms of their human counterparts.  According to the Cultivator, 
cattle that inhaled malaria and foraged on nutrient-deficient aquatic plants degenerated 
into weak, sickly, and scrawny creatures.  ―Several diseases of domestic animals, such as 
‗liver-complaint‘ in cattle, and ‗rot‘ in sheep, are known to be connected with the same 
causes which produce the diseases in man,‖ the journal editorialized in 1849.  ―The 
effects of malaria and watery succulent herbage, in producing the rot, have long been 
known.‖23  D. A. A. Nichols wrote in a St. Louis-based journal eleven years later that it 
was unwise to raise sheep near Mississippi Valley swamps since they ―are subject to 
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miasma—my own opinion would be, that it would not be very healthy for sheep or the 
shepherd, and would hardly be profitable to undertake raising wool in such sections.‖24 
 Returning surface water to natural watercourses was the primary solution for 
containing malaria.  Conveying stagnant water off the land, insisted Alabama‘s N. T. 
Sorsby in 1849, ―destroys the noxious miasmata that wet soils and decomposing 
vegetable matter so rapidly generates during the summer and fall, to [farmers‘] great 
annoyance and danger.‖  Yet Sorsby cautioned that proper drainage involved more than 
digging drainage ditches or burying U-shaped clay tiles underground to channel water 
into natural outlets.  ―By Draining,‖ Sorsby expounded, ―is meant not only the 
construction of artificial channels for water in wet soils, but also includes the operations 
of plowing, digging, and working soils reputed dry, which effects drainage by opening 
passages for the descent of water from the superficial to the lower strata.‖25   Farm 
journals pointed to the reduction of human and livestock fatalities in formerly fenny and 
swampy sections of England as evidence that drainage improved human and animal 
health.  In 1849, The Cultivator reminded subscribers that ―the rural population of 
drained districts in England have often remarked [on] the favorable effects of drainage on 
the health and improvement of animals, by which losses of stock have been prevented to 
a great extent … As might be expected, the health of sheep and cattle has been benefitted 
by drainage to an equal or greater degree than that of the human race.‖26  As the only 
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landscape capable of killing or sickening people and livestock by the simple virtue of 
their existence, wetlands demanded immediate drainage.  Delay only invited death and 
misery. 
 Yet if it were true that wetlands occasioned endemic fevers in uncultivated 
frontier regions, how did agricultural journals reconcile the fact that Indians, according to 
most credible observers, rarely suffered from malarial ailments?  The paradox was the 
source of endless speculation.  One of the most popular explanations was that Indians, by 
living near swamps since time immemorial, had built up an inexplicable immunity to 
malaria.  In 1847, the physician D. Prince offered a more nuanced explanation for readers 
of the Chicago-based Prairie Farmer.  Prince began his discourse by posing a rhetorical 
question:  ―The Indians formerly roamed over these plains, and were scarcely ever sick; 
[so] why should sickness attack the settler, and the little band whom he protects?‖  The 
answer was obvious.  When Mississippi Valley settlers initially stripped the ground of 
vegetation in preparation for cultivation, Prince argued, they unwittingly stirred up 
malaria levels in the atmosphere that, prior to European contact, Indians were never 
forced to inhale.  After removing the ground‘s vegetative covering, wet soil particles 
were exposed to the sun‘s powerful rays, providing optimum conditions for the 
generation of malaria.  He continued: 
The man of the chase leaves the soil untouched—the cultivator turns it over and 
over again, exposing it to the sun and rain, that he may bring out its hidden 
resources, and extract from it sustenance and wealth.  The roots of the former 
vegetation all die, and when, after the rainy season … the bare soil loosened by 
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the plough is exposed to our almost tropical sun, it is not strange that some cause 
of disease should be developed.
27
 
 
Depsite the initial spike in malarial complaints in frontier regions, Prince reassured 
farmers that intensive European-style land management promised to improve the 
atmosphere over the long run.  Although ―new countries, during their settlement, are 
more sickly than before they were disturbed by the hand of civilized man,‖ Prince 
concluded, once ―the soil is finally brought under his control, sickness … is greatly 
lessened or entirely removed.‖28  In Prince‘s opinion, the only thing wrong with interior 
North America‘s atmosphere was the fact that the continent had been settled by Indians 
rather than supposedly enlightened and industrious Europeans.  Agricultural progress 
produced hygienic and salubrious living environments.  In sum, malarial illnesses 
decreased in proportion to the quantity of cleared, cultivated, and drained wetlands. 
 
Draining for Wealth 
 Although the reduction of malaria was the most critical function of drainage, the 
rural press also publicized how the elimination of unhygienic landscapes increased 
farmers‘ wealth.  Epidemiological and economic justifications for drainage went hand in 
hand.  In this respect, agricultural journalists again borrowed from the arguments of 
physicians. The indefatigable Charles Caldwell, who published hundreds of articles and 
medical treatises before his death in 1853, favored this particular line of reasoning.  In 
draining ―a fenny or marshy tract of country,‖ Caldwell wrote in 1831, a farmer 
―subserves a two-fold interest.  He accumulates riches, and secures health.  That from 
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which neglect would distil a poison, industry turns to gold; and the vegetation sustained 
by masses of pollution, renovates the atmosphere, and renders it healthful.‖29   
Prosperity abounded for farmers who embraced drainage.  According to most 
farm periodicals, drainage elevated annual crop production by making the soil more 
conducive to agricultural production.  Indeed, the rural press identified four ways that 
drainage prepared the soil to produce bountiful harvests.  First, drainage aerated heavier 
soils, making them friable.  Throughout the nineteenth century, ―friable‖ became the rural 
press‘s favorite term to describe the soil‘s altered composition following drainage.  The 
process by which surface water removal broke down heavier, impervious soils into 
friable soil was straightforward.  Once farmers conveyed surface water into natural 
outlets via drainage ditches or underground clay tiles systems, ―a contraction of the soil 
soon follows, and cracks are formed.‖  According to the Cultivator’s editors, the 
―contraction‖ transformed the previously heavy soil ―into a state which allows the water 
readily to pass through it, the former difficulties of [soil particles] running together and 
baking, are obviated; the soil remains open and friable.‖30  In 1858, a writer for the same 
journal declared that following drainage ―the soil, no longer compelled to remain 
saturated with water, lost its brick and mortar character, and became a live [sic.], or at 
least an active and productive soil, ready to reward the labor of the farmer.‖31  Friable 
soils were ventilated soils.  Since most agricultural periodicals doubted that plant roots 
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could multiply without access to air, aeration was essential for cultivation.  In an 1849 
―report on drainage,‖ delivered to the Oberlin (Ohio) Agricultural and Horticultural 
Society and reprinted in the Ohio Cultivator, Henry Cowles, D. B. Kinney, and Henry 
Shipherd illustrated how drainage ventilated the soil.  ―A soil covered with surface-water 
cannot breathe.  The pores of the soil are its nostrils and lungs.  Cover them with surface-
water and no air can enter.  Atmospheric air is the vehicle of light and heat and of various 
fertilizing gases—all of which are essential to vegetation.‖32  In liberating the earth‘s 
surface from excess water, drainage caused soils to dry out, shrink, and then crumble into 
finer pieces, promoting subterranean air circulation to the benefit of crops. 
 Drainage‘s second contribution to soil quality involved fertilizer absorption.  
Since the colonization of North America, farmers recognized livestock manure‘s 
importance as an indispensible crop fertilizer.  Nonetheless, the nineteenth-century rural 
press ridiculed farmers who applied manure to fields that suffered from poor drainage.  In 
1858, ―A. D. G.‖ explained to subscribers of the Cultivator that ―draining also facilitates 
the work of enriching land.  Manure applied to the surface, instead of being washed off 
by the rains and lost, is carried downward, and its juices incorporated with the soil.‖33  In 
an 1859 issue of the same periodical, ―R‖ compared spreading manure onto undrained 
fields to ―putting it into a pond, so far as any visible effect upon the crop is concerned.‖34  
By making the soil porous and friable, drainage enabled gravity to draw manure‘s 
fertilizing agents downward into the soil‘s root zone.  Artificial drainage also enabled 
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fertilizers that occurred naturally in precipitation to enrich the soil.  According to almost 
every agricultural journal published before the Civil War, rainfall contained ammonia, 
which was recognized as manure‘s principal fertilizing agent.  ―Rain water, as it falls 
from the clouds, contains a small portion of ammonia,‖ the Ohio Cultivator editorialized 
in late 1852, so ―the importance of securing this valuable substance in the soil, instead of 
allowing it to run off the surface, is one of the strong arguments in favor of under-
draining.‖35  The next year ―J. H.‖ estimated in a different journal that ―rain water which 
falls on an acre of land in a year, is estimated to contain over 100 lbs. of ammonia, or 
sufficient for the growth of 17 bushels of wheat.‖36  The lesson was unmistakable:  
drainage opened up microscopic passageways in the soil for ammonia, both from manure 
and rainfall, to trickle downward and infuse crops with nutrients.  The result was larger 
annual yields and greater profits. 
 In addition to promoting aeration and fertilizer absorption, drainage counteracted 
the impact of drought.  Incredulous and skeptical farmers openly doubted the rural press‘s 
assertion that crops planted on artificially-drained soils were more likely to survive 
prolonged droughts.  In response to such disbelief, agricultural journalists felt obliged to 
justify and defend the claim.  In 1849, The Cultivator editorialized that wet clay soils 
―run together‖ and resembled ―mortar, which, when the water has evaporated, becomes 
like sun burnt bricks—unworkable, and totally unfit for the growth of plants.‖  During 
periods of scarce rainfall, crops cultivated on such soils withered and died because their 
roots could not penetrate the mortar-like substratum to a depth where moisture was 
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stored.  By making stiff and impenetrable soils friable, the author concluded, drainage 
―increase[d] the depth of the soil, to render it more permeable to the roots of plants, and 
less liable to be affected by drouth [sic.].‖37  Another author compared the manner in 
which drainage mitigated drought conditions to the process of condensation.  ―During a 
hot day of summer you fill a tumbler with ice water, and after standing it in your room 
for a short time, you notice that the outer surface of the tumbler is covered with drops of 
water.  The tumbler ‗sweats.‘  How is this?‖  ―R‖ answered his own rhetorical question 
by explaining that the tumbler‘s sweat was ―the condensed vapor of the atmosphere 
coming in contact with a substance colder than itself … the tumbler[,] being colder than 
the surrounding atmosphere, condensed the vapor which it contained, and which came in 
contact therewith.‖38  Like the tumbler, drained soils had a lower mean temperature than 
that of the summertime atmosphere.  The influx of moisture reinvigorated parched crops 
at their moment of greatest need and reduced annual yield losses. 
  Finally, farm journals rhapsodized about the exceptional fecundity of wetlands 
that had been converted into crop fields.   A common nineteenth-century belief held that 
formerly submerged swamps, marshes, wet prairies, and overflow lowlands contained 
topsoils that were unrivaled in fertility.  The slow accumulation of decomposing animal 
and vegetable matter at the bottom of wetlands and lowlands, which physicians blamed 
for producing malaria, were remarkably rich in nutrients, minerals, and organic matter.  
Farmers who cleared, drained, and then cultivated a wetland, rather than a well-drained 
prairie or upland, were rewarded with higher crop yields and slower rates of soil 
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exhaustion.  As the Boston Cultivator aptly put it in 1843, ―for ages and ages the 
vegetable matter has been washing down from the high lands to the low lands, and the 
vegetable growth on the low lands has been decaying there, and from these two sources 
there has been an accumulation of rich vegetable matter of more importance to the 
country than would be the mines of Golconda.‖39  Cultivating crops on drained wetlands 
required few or no manure applications.  Weary about the departure of farm children to 
cities and western lands, New Englanders argued that their region‘s abundance of 
undeveloped lowlands should discourage outmigration.   In 1861, for instance, H. W. 
Lester contended that drainage would bring New England‘s  ―richest land … into 
cultivation, and the [former] place of the bullfrog, water snakes, bulrushes, cat-tails and 
wild grass, hillocks, miasmas and pestilence, will excel the western prairies in 
productiveness, and our young men will not be so apt to catch the Western fever.‖40  
Early in the twentieth century, boosters of wetlands drainage continued to cite the 
unsurpassed fertility of drained swamps and marshes as evidence of why Congress should 
provide federal subsidies for wetlands drainage.
41
 
 Eager to demonstrate that drainage was a wise investment, the rural press 
routinely published letters from farmers that testified about reaping a financial windfall 
by converting miasmatic swamplands into cultivated fields.  In 1850, for instance, John 
Foster, a farmer from Guernsey County, Ohio, boasted about draining his 320-acre farm 
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to subscribers of the Ohio Cultivator.  As late as November 1846, Foster claimed that 
half of his farmland languished as uncultivable ―wet bottom[land]‖ because of two creeks 
that dissected his property.  Since the creeks followed meandering courses, they could not 
carry away rainwater quickly enough and overflowed during thunderstorms.  Determined 
to protect his property from the periodic inundations, Foster hired a ditcher to straighten 
the creeks.  The plan succeeded.  Within five years, the ditcher shortened the distance the 
creeks traveled across Foster‘s property from 953 rods to 250 rods.  As a result, Foster 
emphasized that following rainstorms ―the water now passes off so fast in the new, short, 
and straight channels, that the creeks do not now overflow my land—it is all dry and of a 
very rich soil.‖  Investing in drainage rewarded farmers over the long term.  After paying 
the ditcher $750, Foster estimated that his land, which he had purchased for $20 per acre, 
could now be sold for $30 per acre.  Furthermore, a previously uncultivable lowland 
section of his property measuring ―13 acres and 29 rods‖ now supported cultivation.  All 
in all, Foster calculated that the increased value of the land—$3,200—brought a return of 
$2,450 in addition to the grain produced on the formerly uncultivable tract.
42
 
 Farmers who heeded the rural press‘s drainage advice were rewarded with higher 
yields and property values.  In early 1860, ―A. L. H.,‖ a Georgia farmer, thanked the 
editors of the Southern Cultivator for offering instructions and encouragement about land 
drainage.  After reading an article describing how to improve wetlands, A. L. H. 
purchased, cleared, and then drained 100 acres of swampland.  To A. L. H.‘s 
astonishment, he reaped annual yields of 50 bushels per acre of corn and 20 bushels per 
acre of wheat each harvest.  The land purchase proved a wise investment.  After 
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acquiring the land for $3 per acre and investing $20 per acre in constructing the drainage 
system, the Georgian claimed that he could sell each acre for $50, which dwarfed the $23 
initial investment.  In addition to establishing that drainage led to bigger harvests and 
higher property values, A. L. H.‘s experiences illustrated how the rural press‘s boosterism 
persuaded some farmers to initiate the work of drainage.
43
 
 
Draining for a Better Life 
 The rural press also portrayed drainage as a strategy to improve farmers‘ quality 
of life.  Writing to the Prairie Farmer in 1864, Edgar Sanders described a field south of 
Lake Michigan in which the owner had drained half of the land and left the remainder 
―wet the same as nature left it.‖  Sanders was intrigued by the noticeable foliage 
variations between the property‘s two halves.  He speculated that the drained portion 
probably yielded two tons of high-quality grass per acre while the unimproved section 
supported a crop that was ―scarcely sufficient to pay for cutting.‖44  In addition to 
fostering the growth of hardier grasses and oats, drainage aided in the cultivation of 
flavorful and succulent fruits.  In 1855, ―Sub-soil‖ warned readers of the Genesee Farmer 
that poor land drainage diminished fruit quality.  Raspberries, cherries, currants, and 
strawberries grown on well-drained lands had a richer taste, brighter color, and 
uniformity of size.  In contrast, fruits grown on a ―cold or damp piece of land … are 
found almost without fine flavor.‖  Sub-soil recommended that fruit growers interested in 
enjoying flavorful and colorful fruit ―select a [farm] site, if possible, where water never 
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lies upon or near the surface.‖  Farmers who resided on poorly-drained farms should 
place ―well-laid pipes [under] every sour spot‖ to convey water into drainage ditches.45  
For Sub-soil and many other contributors to the rural press, the corrupting influence of 
stagnant surface waters on fruit and hay quality rivaled their impact on atmospheric 
wholesomeness. 
 In a handful of letters to agricultural journals, farmers celebrated the aesthetic 
benefits of wetlands destruction.  Since the European colonization of North America, 
settlers stigmatized wetlands as dismal, lackluster, and sinister.  They harbored dangerous 
predators and reptiles, were overrun with impenetrable underbrush, released dangerous 
miasmas into the atmosphere, and provided sanctuary for exotic and noxious plants.  
Population growth and western expansion intensified the public‘s antipathy towards 
wetlands by bringing more and more Americans into contact with undrained ecosystems.  
Indeed, editors and ordinary farmers sometimes suggested that the replacement of 
hideous and lackluster wetlands with neatly-manicured crop fields had a favorable impact 
on the dispositions and attitudes of rural Americans.  Writing to the Cultivator in 1864, 
for instance, a Long Island, New York, farmer marveled about how drainage had 
transformed his murky farm, which initially consisted of a low-lying swamp, into crop 
fields that were ―pleasing to the eye.‖  ―Those who were familiar with this swamp in 
bygone years would now scarcely recognize the spot.  A more forbidding spectacle could 
scarcely be imagined; the whole being densely covered with sumach, alders … [and] the 
whole landscape heretofore marred and unsightly.‖  By stripping the ground of its native 
vegetation, draining away the stagnant water, and planting crops, the farmer made the 
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plot ―an object of pleasurable contemplation to the admirers of the beautiful.‖46  Drainage 
created landscapes whose aesthetic qualities matched prevailing conceptions of natural 
beauty and attractiveness. 
 The final way drainage improved rural life in ways unrelated to health and wealth 
involved making farm labor less arduous.  As the Cultivator put it in 1837, bogs and 
marshes were ―dangerous for a person to walk across‖ and represented an obstacle to 
transportation where wagons, farm implements, or livestock became stuck.
47
  On a few 
occasions, farmers wrote to journals claiming to have discovered the ―entangled and 
mired‖ carcasses of livestock in marshy areas ―without any effort having been made for 
their recovery.‖48  Dead livestock constituted a significant economic loss.  Furthermore, 
water on or below the surface of the ground shortened the lifespan of fence posts.  
Erecting fences was one of the most expensive, grueling, and time-consuming of all 
antebellum farm chores.  In 1857, the Cultivator editorialized that farmers should build 
drainage systems if for no other reason than to prevent rotting fence posts.  ―The 
importance of a good drain under every post fence, is not generally understood … 
Wherever post holes retain water, they are sure to be heaved by frost, and the fence 
thrown out of shape; and the post cannot last so long, where they are alternatively 
subjected to water soaking and drying.‖49 
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Land Drainage as a Form of Enlightened Land Stewardship 
 To fully understand the diversity and range of ideas that shaped American 
conservationist thinking, one must consider the mid nineteenth-century public discourse 
that implored farmers to conserve the land, as well as the air, by transforming unhygienic 
wastelands into crop fields.  During this formative period of land conservation, which 
gained momentum in the 1840s-50s as Hippocratic medical theories reached the rural 
public through farm journals, Americans took their first tentative and halting steps 
towards recognizing that people and the environment were interrelated.  Atmospheric 
reformers insisted that the destiny of people was directly related to patterns of land use.  
Indifference to real or perceived environmental problems could no longer be tolerated 
without jeopardizing the welfare of the present and future generations.  In blurring the 
age-old dichotomy between humanity and nature, agricultural journalists argued that 
people had a responsibility to conform their habits and practices of land use to prevailing 
medical, cultural, and environmental ideas for the good of themselves and larger society. 
 In the decades preceding the Civil War, the rural press devoted itself to 
disseminating Hippocratic environmental theories regarding the appropriate role of water 
in society.  Since the rural press embraced the misconception that water rightly belonged 
in circulating watercourses, where it could not intermingle with vegetable and animal 
matter and generate malaria, editors portrayed wetlands as an environmental ―defect,‖ 
blemish, or imperfection.  Farmers acted as enlightened stewards when they corrected 
nature‘s shortcomings by diverting stagnant waters back into rivers, streams, or creeks.   
In 1863, for instance, The Cultivator reprinted a lecture delivered by A. B. Conger at the 
New York State fair held in Rochester.  During the presentation, Conger implored his 
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audience to take measures to ensure that water did not escape from the channels of 
creeks, streams, or rivers—where it naturally belonged— and create ―defects‖ on earth‘s 
surface.  Wherever ―water courses [sic.] are deficient in number, imperfect in flow, or 
obstructed in their outlet,‖ he contended, ―the first essay of the drainer is to remedy these 
defects.‖50  Conger encouraged the building of drainage ditches, straightening of 
watercourses, removal of obstructions from creeks and streams, or burying of U-shaped 
clay tiles underground to prevent the unnatural buildup of surface water.  Other farm 
journals followed Conger‘s lead.  In imploring farmers to tap the unbounded fertility of 
Louisiana‘s swamps, DeBow’s Review editorialized in 1854 that swamps were a perfect 
candidate for ―being controlled by wise legislation and agricultural energy‖ because they 
were a ―great physical evil‖ and the ―curse of our State.‖51  Farmers who left wetlands 
undeveloped committed a grave offense against humanity by failing to grasp that the 
destinies of people and nature were interconnected. 
 Accusations about the unnaturalness of wetlands were sometimes expressed in 
medical terms.  After emigrating from Scotland in 1821, John Johnston took up a farm 
near New Geneva, New York, alongside the Erie Canal.  To his dismay, Johnston quickly 
discovered that his farm failed to produce annual yields that rivaled those of his 
neighbors.  After applying lime and manure to his fields without results, he concluded 
that his farm suffered from poor subsurface drainage.  The industrious Scot soon made 
arrangements to have clay, U-shaped tiles imported into the United States from his native 
Scotland.  As the pioneer of American tile drainage, Johnston by mid century buried 
sixteen miles of tiles underneath his farm to convey surface water into nearby outlet 
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ditches.  News about Johnston‘s experiment reached farmers around the United States.  
Within decades, clay tile factories sprang up all over the country to supply farmers—
especially those residing west of the Appalachians.  Treating Johnston as an 
entrepreneurial genius, agricultural journals eagerly reprinted his letters.  In an 1856 letter 
to The Cultivator, Johnston argued that drainage served as a ―radical cure for all the ills 
that land or its products are heir to.‖52  By describing wetlands as ―ill‖ and in need of a 
―cure,‖ Johnston perpetuated the myth that wet landscapes were sickly and in need of 
treatment. 
 Other contributors interpreted the presence of wetlands as a sign of an unbalanced 
hydrological system.  In a letter to the Southern Cultivator in 1849, Sorsby perceived 
wetlands to be illegitimate collections of noncirculating water unconnected to broader 
watersheds.  As a consequence, wetlands robbed the hydrological cycle of water and 
potentially increased the chances of drought conditions.  Sorsby encouraged farmers to 
build drainage ditches and lay underground tiles to ―imitate the processes of nature‖ and 
get the water stored in wetlands back into circulating watercourses. 
Though [nature] fails in her efforts to drain some soils, does she not point out the 
mode by which it may be done by the aid of the hands of men?  Else, why does 
she adopt the modes of draining—of collecting the surplus water from the surface 
of the earth, and directing it into gullies, thence into little rippling brooks, that 
steal into bolder creeks, that run into dashing rivers, that charge into the angry 
ocean to be purified by raging tempests, and dissipated into ethereal vapor to 
descend again in crystal drops, refreshen [sic.] the earth and quench the thirst of 
dying creation?
53
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Farmers had a duty to reestablish and then maintain the hydrological cycle‘s equilibrium 
when nature ―failed‖ to return water to watercourses to avert the onset of drought. 
 Since agricultural journalists defended drainage as an appropriate form of land 
stewardship, it logically followed that they would denigrate farmers who left unhygienic 
landscapes undisturbed.  In 1858, The Cultivator chided the ―majority‖ of American 
farmers who understood but refused to heed the cultural mandate to drain.  ―On the one 
hand we see or hear of farmers who eagerly avail themselves of every opportunity of 
extending the drainage of their farms … [but] on the other hand, we behold the spectacle 
of hundreds and thousands—the great majority, indeed—shaking their heads and turning 
away, seemingly unconvinced or determined not even to try, when the most satisfactory 
and irrefutable proofs and demonstrations are placed before them … that draining is 
always a paying and highly advantageous operation.‖54   Agricultural journals heaped 
special scorn on westerners.  Writing to The Cultivator in 1853, the Iowa farmer W. G. 
Edmundson reproached his Mississippi Valley counterparts for being poor land stewards.  
―Little or no attention is given to the drainage of the land; well formed ridges are rarely 
made; no pains are taken to drain the soil by the use of the plow, and underdraining, even 
on the most retentive soils, is never practiced.‖  Instead of draining and cultivating a 
small parcel, as the rural press recommended, Valley farmers adopted the ―careless‖ and 
―unwarrantable‖ practice of cultivating large acreages bereft of improvements.55  As a 
result, crop yields plummeted and atmospheric quality suffered.   In 1858, the St. Louis-
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based Valley Farmer acknowledged that although its contributors ―frequently alluded to 
the importance of land draining … its benefits are so little understood in the West.‖56 
 The increasing stridency of drainage boosterism in the years leading up to the 
Civil War reflected disappointment regarding the pace of wetlands drainage, which 
remained uneven, localized, and mostly limited to isolated pockets of land east of the 
Appalachian Mountains.  Nonetheless, the slowness of farmers to convert wetlands into 
profitable crop fields had much less to do with their failure to conceptualize the risk that 
stagnant surface waters posed to the health of their families and livestock than the fact 
that the state and national governments had not yet passed drainage laws unleashing the 
collective energy of farmers against wet ecosystems.  Once state legislatures passed 
effective drainage legislation around the time of the Civil War, Americans experienced 
no compunctions about engaging in drainage because Hippocratic environmental values 
taught them that wetlands were dysfunctional landscapes that served no useful purpose 
other than poisoning the atmosphere, depressing property values, driving down annual 
crop yields, undermining the quality of fruits and grasses, and impeding travel. 
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CHAPTER 3:  THE AMERICAN STATE AND NINETEENTH- 
CENTURY NATIONAL WATER POLICY 
 
 The preceding chapters demonstrated that wetlands drainage in the early republic 
resulted as much from medical fears as the need to open up new farmland.  The 
eighteenth-century Hippocratic revival and pneumatic chemistry revolution dictated the 
elimination of atmosphere contamination as a means to improve public health.  
Influenced by prevailing medical theories and the Enlightenment‘s unfettered confidence 
in man‘s ability to improve his lot, physicians spearheaded the campaign of atmospheric 
reform.  Yet the enthusiastic support for land drainage masked the ignorance and naïveté 
of medical professionals regarding the administrative and jurisdictional conflicts involved 
in land drainage.  No matter how much Americans feared and reviled marshes, surface 
water disposal was a complicated endeavor requiring the cooperation, coordination, and 
collective investment of multiple landowners and specialized machinery that had not yet 
been invented.  As long as good lands remained abundant and cheap, Americans had little 
incentive to invest scarce capital in draining marginal lands. 
American mythology identifies individualism, industriousness, and self-reliance 
as the primary sources of the nation‘s exceptional character and the means by which its 
people created a thriving and prosperous country out of a desolate wilderness.  Rugged 
individualism was sometimes sufficient to set up a farm.  Equipped with the proper tools 
and plenty of time, a single farmer could chop down enough trees to clear room for 
cultivation, erect a crude shack, and construct fences.  During the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, the cumulative impact of thousands of such individual actions 
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dramatically thinned the primeval American forest.  Draining wetlands, however, defied 
individual effort.  Swamps, sloughs, bogs, marshes, and wet prairies did not respect 
artificial property boundaries and demanded collective action.  The neglect of one person 
(such as an absentee owner) to drain his property could render a broader drainage scheme 
unsuccessful.  Landowners without access to a natural outlet on their property—such as a 
stream, river, or other watercourse— found themselves powerless to drain their fields.  
To dispose of surface water, for instance, landowners often had to secure permission 
from a neighbor (or neighbors) to dig a ditch across his property to connect with an 
outlet.
1
 
 This chapter focuses on the institutions Americans created to administer land 
drainage.  The renaissance of ancient Greek medical theories heightened public interest in 
land drainage after the American Revolution, but local communities first confronted the 
challenge of surface water disposal during the colonial era.  In the early eighteenth 
century, New England colonies adopted Medieval English institutions known as 
―commissions of sewers‖ that allowed individuals to regulate the flow of water into 
meadow fields under the supervision of the colonial governor or legislature.  Colonial 
laws and customs that regulated the control of water were the seeds from which the 
United States‘ localized system of land drainage and flood control grew and flourished 
following independence.  By the close of the nineteenth century, drainage districts, which 
were a more sophisticated version of commissions of sewers, proliferated throughout the 
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Midwest and South, transforming nature as they transformed the relationship between 
people, local communities, and the federal government. 
 In colonial America, commissions of sewers developed due largely to the absence 
of centralized control over water.  Unwilling to direct and finance local drainage projects, 
colonial governments granted the responsibility for land drainage to local communities.  
As in Medieval England, landowners directly benefitted by the improvements, and not 
the state, supervised, financed, and maintained drainage projects.  The creation of the 
United States in the late 1780s did nothing to disrupt colonial drainage customs.  The 
Constitution‘s silence on natural resource matters, Americans‘ deep aversion towards 
concentrated political sovereignty, and the dispersal of formal authority between the 
national government and thirteen ―states‖ reinforced local control over surface waters.  
National wetlands policy before 1849 was built from the ground up with the national 
government deferring in matters of surface water management to local communities 
scattered across the country. 
 The local mode of land drainage came under increasing scrutiny in the 1830s and 
1840s.  During those decades, local communities, farmers, and state policymakers from 
public land states disputed the effectiveness of the local mode of drainage in their home 
states.  Unlike the original thirteen colonies, states carved out of the public domain west 
of the Appalachian Mountains entered the Union with large quantities of federally-owned 
land within their borders.  In public land states, farmers and plantation owners 
complained that a glut of unsold federal land interfered with surface water disposal since 
federal property could not be taxed, condemned, or included in local drainage enterprises.  
The outpouring of anger persuaded Congress to implement a special drainage program 
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for public land states before the Civil War.   In 1849, 1850, and 1860, Congress passed 
three ―Swamp Land Acts‖ that ceded the federal government‘s ―swamp and overflowed‖ 
to fifteen public land states on the condition that they sell the lands and invest the revenue 
in wetlands drainage.  The experiment in state administration proved an abysmal and 
embarrassing failure.  Instead of complying with the laws, states used their swampland 
grants to subsidize railroad corporations, erect public buildings, finance road and bridge 
construction, and fund education and benevolent institutions.  The failure of the Swamp 
Land Acts compelled state policymakers to devolve drainage responsibilities back to 
local communities.  The rapid proliferation of drainage districts following the brief 
interlude in state administration symbolized the American state‘s formal detachment from 
the process of land drainage, its inability to impose uniform wetlands policies on 
peripheral communities, and the triumph of the local mode of drainage. 
 
Administrative Problems and Solutions for Drainage:  English Commissions of Sewers 
In seventeenth-century New England, colonial leaders adopted English 
institutions empowering landowners to form associations that collectivized the costs and 
burdens of land drainage.  During the Medieval Period, the English Crown issued 
provisional tribunals called ―commissions of sewers‖ or ―courts of sewers‖ to oversee the 
improvement, repair, and, after 1550, construction of drainage and flood control works in 
the English countryside.  High turnover in landownership and disagreements between 
landowners about the apportionment of maintenance costs for existing projects had 
obliged the Crown to create an administrative body to mediate disputes.  In 1259, the first 
commission instructed Lincolnshire‘s Henry of Bath and a local sheriff to formalize a 
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plan to repair sea banks in Lincolnshire.  In 1531, Henry VIII empowered the Lord 
Chancellor, lord treasurer, and chief justices to grant three-year commissions.  (The 
three-year tenure proved inadequate and, in 1550 and 1571, ordinances extended 
commissions‘ period of operation to five and ten years).  Composed of prominent 
landowners, the commissions enjoyed wide authority over land drainage and flood 
control, although promoting river navigation fell outside of their jurisdiction.  They could 
order landowners (or tax them) to repair sea walls or embankments and to keep 
watercourses and drainage ditches unobstructed, free of debris, and confined within their 
banks.  In carrying out their responsibilities, commissioners sat juries and held hearings 
to fix tax liabilities and assign work orders.  Punishment for noncompliance was harsh, 
swift, and sometimes capricious.  Commissions had the authority to imprison, fine, or 
distrain the property of delinquent ratepayers or recalcitrant landowners.
2
 
 Important court rulings eventually pared back commissions‘ unlimited powers. In 
the early seventeenth century, a commission of sewers ordered 15 towns on the Isle of 
Ely to pay for the creation of a new river and make repairs to an e defective drainage 
system.  The controversial decree was referred to the justices of the Common Pleas for 
review.  In the Case of the Isle of Ely (1610), justices ruled that the commission 
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overstepped its authority by creating a new river nonessential for land drainage and 
levying taxes on distant towns instead of the landowners directly benefitted by the 
mandated improvements.  Upholding the common law principle that no individual could 
be compelled to provide for removing public burdens, the ruling instructed future 
commissioners to levy taxes only on parties directly benefitted by the improvements and 
only in proportion to the quantity of land they owned and their anticipated benefit.  The 
Case of the Isle of Ely institutionalized the principle of proportionality as the yardstick 
for calculating land drainage assessments in England.
3
 
 Despite the restraints imposed by the Case of the Isle of Ely, commissions 
continued to exercise broad judicial, executive, and legislative powers.  As judicial 
bodies, they held court, before local juries, to determine assessments, arbitrate disputes, 
issue new regulations, and impose penalties for noncompliance.  The commissions‘ 
ability to appoint surveyors, overseers, collectors, and other officers; to distrain property 
for delinquent taxes; and to impress landlords‘ tools, oxen, and wagons into service 
constituted executive authority.  Finally, commissions‘ legislative powers flowed from 
their ability to create policies regulating the use, maintenance, and renovation of drainage 
structures under their jurisdiction.  Commissions of sewers‘ multiplicity of tasks, broad 
autonomy, and oversight responsibilities have led some scholars to argue that they 
symbolized a harbinger of the modern administrative state.
4
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 The decentralized model of wetlands management pioneered in Medieval England 
appealed to English settlers living in overseas colonies where power was dispersed, 
capital was often scarce, and colonial authorities left the most basic questions of water 
management to local communities.  In his study of the agricultural development of 
colonial Concord, Massachusetts, Brian Donahue persuasively argues that the ―legal 
custom‖ of commissions of sewers was ―transferred to New England‖ as early as 1644.5  
The New England system of mixed husbandry, Donahue explains, depended on the 
routine harvesting of meadow hay.  Controlling the flow of water into and out of 
meadows was a prerequisite for producing a bountiful hay crop.  Elevated water levels at 
an inopportune moment could jeopardize the harvest if it prevented farmers from getting 
their livestock into the meadows to mow the hay or obstructed them from picking up 
harvested hay from the ground before it rotted.  Removing natural obstructions from 
watercourses, which caused untimely overflows into riparian meadows, also became an 
important community function.  In 1644, the Massachusetts General Court ordered four  
individuals from Concord, Sudbury, and Cambridge to form a commission ―to set some 
order which may conduce to the better surveying, improving, and draining of the 
meadows, and saving and preserving of the hay there gotten, either by draining of the 
same, or otherwise, and to proportion the charges layed [sic.] out about it equally and 
justly.‖6  Though the Court‘s language was vague and nondescript, the principle of 
proportionality was the primary factor in determining rate assessments.  As Donahue puts 
it, commissions of sewers in New England were ―an institutional means to compel all 
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those meadow owners who might benefit (rather than ratepayers in general) to contribute 
to improving their soggy property.‖7  Landowners were collectively responsible for the 
destiny of their own rural communities. 
In 1702 and 1711, Massachusetts and Connecticut officially formalized a 
procedure for granting commissions of sewers.  The ―Act for appointing Commissioners 
of Sewers‖ stipulated that when a ―major part‖ of the owners of a plot of land desired to 
drain it or remove obstructions from watercourses leading to its inundation, they could 
apply to the governor for permission to form a commission.  If approved, the commission 
was to meet occasionally to ―view, consider, consult and contrive, such ways and 
methods for the clearing and removing the obstructions … and dreyning [sic.] of swamps 
and other unprofitable grounds.‖8  The principle of proportionality mediated rate 
assessments:  landowners‘ tax rates were based upon the ―quantity of land‖ they owned 
and the potential ―benefits to be received.‖9  Commissioners‘ most coercive power—with 
the exception of imposing prison sentences, which North American colonies never 
allowed—was their authority to seize the property of delinquent taxpayers ―until the rates 
and profits to be received of those lands, may reimburst [sic.] them.‖  The decentralized 
model of land drainage pioneered in Medieval England had made the journey across the 
Atlantic.  By the mid eighteenth-century, local communities were the chief actors in 
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managing the continent‘s surface waters, a responsibility they would not relinquish until 
well into the twentieth century.
10
 
 From 1702 until the American Revolution four other colonies joined 
Massachusetts and Connecticut in enacting drainage statutes:  New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina.
11
  The laws varied in substance and scope, but they 
shared several key attributes:  first, drainage costs should be borne locally, assessed 
proportionally, and shared by dissenting landowners; second, the initiation of land 
drainage procedures should occur only after majority consent; third, delinquent and 
recalcitrant ratepayers should suffer severe penalties, including the confiscation of their 
property by the state.  As the legal scholar John F. Hart argues, English colonial leaders 
treated personal property as a fluid entity subject to a bevy of rules, regulations, and 
restrictions, elevating the rights of groups of individuals above those of a single person 
when competing interests over private land use collided.
12
  Since water was a community 
resource that could not be owned by individuals, colonial leaders viewed water 
management as so important that they were willing to strip dissenting landowners of their 
property if they refused to cooperate or pay taxes.  Surface water management dictated 
that the rights of minority landowners be subverted to the rights of the majority or the 
community at large; private landownership was not an inviolable privilege.  By the time 
of the American Revolution, the basic administrative institution for draining wetlands, 
which developed independently of centralized control, had been institutionalized and, 
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with uneven and varied results, used in several colonies to control the flow of water into 
marshes and drain interior and coastal wetlands. 
 
The Early American State and Wetlands Drainage 
The conclusion of the American Revolution did nothing to disrupt or displace the 
custom of local water management which evolved during the eighteenth century.  In 
addition to toppling British imperial rule, the American Revolution rejected European 
models of concentrated political authority.  It also unleashed a social revolution, inspired 
by the political ideology of republicanism, with a goal of erasing the last vestiges of 
monarchical social organization in the colonies.  In addition, the sheer geographic size of 
the United States prevented the development of a centralized and formal state structure 
similar to western European nations.  Power in the fledgling nation became vested in the 
people (i. e. white males), who elected their own representatives, and not in a supreme 
parliament (as in post-revolution Britain) or in a formal bureaucracy subservient to 
absolute monarchs (as in continental Europe).
13
 
The Constitution mirrored Americans‘ popular antipathy towards concentrated 
political authority, which they associated with corruption, tyranny, and avarice.  Judging 
power and liberty as irreconcilable antagonists, the founders wrote a Constitution that 
dispersed sovereignty, implemented a ―compound‖ structure dividing governing 
responsibilities between the central government and thirteen separate ―states,‖ created a 
system of checks and balances, and provided for the formal separation of powers in the 
national government between three distinct branches.  In the apt judgment of Stephen 
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Skowronek, the Constitution‘s silence on almost every substantive public policy issue—
including water management—―left the most practical questions of state operations 
shrouded in ambiguity.‖14 
The social structure of the United States did not hinder the Constitution‘s radical 
diffusion of power.  The United States was bereft of feudal precursors, monarchs, 
princes, or an aristocracy capable of concentrating power.  Lacking a state-financed 
church, clergy, landed gentry, intelligentsia, or military caste, the country had no ruling 
class that could impose a unified state development program.  The United States‘ 
tremendous geographical size, abundance of cheap and easily available land, ethnic and 
religious pluralism, and early universal manhood suffrage fostered a fondness for 
localism.  The ideology of republicanism, which infused the revolutionaries‘ battle 
against Britain with optimism, clarity, and a common purpose, furthered political 
fragmentation by attacking the practices monarchies traditionally employed to 
consolidate, wield, and dispense power.  As Gordon Wood puts it, republicanism served 
as a ―counterculture to monarchy‖ because it sought to blur the age-old distinction 
between gentlemen and the rest of society and substituted the social bonds of love, 
respect, merit, and consent in place of kinship, patriarchy, patronage, and coercion.  In 
the minds of early Americans, government favoritism of any one class, community, or 
group emerged as a form of tyranny no less reprehensible than liberty-usurping standing 
armies and cadres of ministers and bureaucrats.  Americans‘ suspicion that corruption 
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lurked everywhere men exercised power made them prefer that the seats of power remain 
close to home where they could be closely supervised.
15
 
 The absence of serious national security threats also hampered early American 
state building.  Waging protracted wars against other states played a pivotal role in 
western European state development.  Isolated from European conflicts and lacking 
bellicose neighbors on its borders, the federal government had little incentive to maintain 
a large standing army, appropriate scarce funds to educate officers, or establish a national 
defense-related civil service during its formative political period.  Comparisons between 
the United States and Britain are instructive.  From 1783 to 1815, the American 
government waged war against imperial powers for four years.  In the same period of 
time, Britain fought wars for 25 years.  The first American census, taken in 1790, counted 
people to determine congressional representation.  Carried out ten years later, Britain‘s 
first census tallied the number of men available for military service.  So puny, feeble, and 
stunted was the incipient national state‘s administrative capacity that congressmen 
initially outnumbered bureaucrats.
16
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 The dynamics of early American political culture shaped the contours of water 
resources management in profound and lasting ways.  Since the American Revolution, 
the association of centralized power with tyranny, the public‘s preference for localism 
and economic individualism, and the Constitution‘s complete silence on natural resource 
development detached the American state from the process of local land drainage.  As a 
result, the institutional framework for land drainage pioneered in Medieval England and 
transferred to colonial New England underwent a seamless transition between the 
colonial period and the early republic.  Constituting an invisible layer of American 
government largely unnoticed by national politicians, atmospheric reformers, and later 
historians, commissions of sewers ensured that American federalism remained robust and 
dynamic in rural water management.  To be sure, Congress never formally delegated 
authority for wetlands drainage to the states or local communities.  It did not have to.  
From the states‘ perspective, the national government‘s tentativeness symbolized a de 
facto devolution of authority and a tacit endorsement of local control.  States were free to 
set their own procedures and guidelines establishing the criteria for applying for a 
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commission (or later drainage districts), the petition process, penalties for 
noncompliance, the manner of setting and collecting assessments, the rights of minority 
landowners, and limitations regarding the disposal of surface water.  So radical was the 
devolution of authority over surface water management that most states allowed local 
associations/commissions to formulate their own rules, regulations, and traditions 
governing the day-to-day operation of surface water disposal independent of courts, 
governors, or legislatures.  By keeping power close to home, commissions fragmented 
political authority over wetlands drainage and effectively shut national and provincial 
elites out of managing 11% of the surface area of the contiguous 48 states.  Interestingly, 
atmospheric reformers‘ insistence that intervention by national policymakers in land 
drainage was unnecessary and superfluous proved prophetic.
17
 
 Congress did not defer to local communities in all areas of pre-Civil War water 
resource management.  Indeed, national policymakers took a decidedly different 
approach towards interstate rivers than isolated wetlands.  In the landmark 1824 decision 
of Gibbons v. Ogden, the nationalistic Supreme Court, under the direction of John 
Marshall, recognized Congress‘s authority to regulate ―commerce‖ to include navigation.  
Writing for a unanimous Court, Marshall insisted that the Commerce Clause 
―comprehends, and has been always understood to comprehend, navigation within its 
meaning.‖  The Constitution, then, ―expressly granted‖ Congress the authority to promote 
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navigation on the nation‘s interior waterways.18  Congress did not delay in asserting its 
authority over the nation‘s arteries of interstate commerce.  Before the year‘s end, it 
allocated $75,000 for the Army Corps of Engineers to promote navigation on the Ohio 
and Mississippi Rivers by removing river obstructions.  In 1826, Congress passed the 
nation‘s first omnibus river and harbor act, appropriating $86,000 for improvements at 20 
sites.  Federal expenditures for the removal of snags, sandbars, uprooted trees, obstructive 
rocks, ice chunks, and immersed steamboat wreckages from rivers surpassed every other 
nonmilitary item in the federal budget from the 1820s to 1860 and constituted one of 
Congress‘s clearest interventions into antebellum economic and environmental 
planning.
19
  Yet Gibbons paradoxically reinforced the colonial custom holding drainage 
as a local matter.  Politicians interpreted Gibbons as evidence that the national 
government possessed clear constitutional authority to engage in water projects 
facilitating the distribution of agricultural and consumer goods but not their production.  
The distribution of goods benefitted society as a whole but their production favored a few 
at the expense of many.  This critical distinction theoretically confined the federal 
government‘s role in managing water to those flowing between a navigable river‘s banks.  
Diffused surface waters unconnected to watercourses remained outside of Congress‘s 
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jurisdiction since their removal usually fostered cultivation and brought an economic 
benefit.
20
 
 
Surface Water Law and the Application of the Local Model of Drainage West of the 
Appalachians 
Beginning in the 1830s, western states passed laws modeled after colonial 
commissions to deal with the problem of surface water.  Intending to liberate Americans 
from the thorny financial and legal obstacles associated with drainage, these ―ditch laws‖ 
unleashed the collective energy of citizens against wetlands and represented a rural 
precursor of mid nineteenth-century urban sanitary reform.  Like urban homes, farms 
should be provided with outlets for the disposal of their supposedly fetid, miasmatic, and 
unsanitary waters.  Ditch laws enabled a landowner (or a group of landowners) whose 
property was isolated from natural outlets to build ditches across the land of neighboring 
proprietors after reimbursing them for damages.  In 1832, Indiana became the first public 
land state to create the institutional means for this process to occur.  Indiana‘s ditch law 
stipulated that ―any person or persons owning or possessing any swamps, bogs, meadow, 
ponds, or other low lands … who shall be desirous to drain such land, and who shall 
deem it necessary in order hereto, that a ditch or ditches should be opened through lands 
belonging to other persons, in case the owners of any such lands shall refuse to permit the 
opening of such ditch or ditches‖ could petition the township justice of the peace for 
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relief.
21
  Reviewing the petition‘s merits, the justice of the peace sat a ―jury‖ of twelve 
disinterested freeholders to visit and examine the site of the proposed ditch, determine the 
appropriateness of if its location and dimensions, consider objections, and assess 
damages for the injured neighbor(s).
22
 Michigan (1833), Florida (1834), Tennessee 
(1842), and Illinois (1845) soon followed Indiana‘s lead and adopted comparable 
legislation.
23
  In 1841, Ohio‘s legislature passed legislation that empowered local citizens 
to form ―commissions of sewers‖ when a ―major part‖ of the landowners of any 
particular meadow, marsh, or lowland desired to remove obstructions from nearby 
watercourses to prevent overflows or to drain swamps and other ―unprofitable lands.‖24 
 In the American South, policymakers empowered levee boards with authorities 
similar to northern ditch and sewer commissions.  Antebellum Americans generally 
regarded land drainage and flood control as flip sides of the same coin since both 
activities promoted public health and facilitated agriculture by keeping water and soil 
from intermingling.  After statehood, Louisiana and Mississippi formally adopted the 
French and Spanish colonial customs that required riparian landowners to erect and 
maintain levees along the Mississippi River.  Like commissions of sewers, levee boards 
possessed police, taxing, and confiscatory powers and granted recalcitrant landowners no 
participatory exemptions.  In March 1816, Louisiana passed an ―act concerning the levees 
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and roads on the banks of the Mississippi and for other purposes‖ that assigned 
responsibility for levee construction and maintenance to local parishes.  The law 
empowered parish police juries to appoint disinterested inspectors to supervise levee 
building and upkeep.  Riparian landowners had a certain period of time to comply with 
inspectors‘ instructions before facing stiff fines ranging from $100 to $1,000.  Judging 
from the number of detailed sections in the enabling legislation devoted to the subject, 
inspectors‘ most divisive, controversial, and hated power was their authority to 
requisition nearby planters‘ slaves during periods of high water for emergency repairs.  
The pace of levee building along the Mississippi River quickened after Louisiana entered 
the Union and, by 1828, levees stretched almost continuously from New Orleans to the 
Red River landing.
25
 
 In 1819, Mississippi‘s General Assembly took what the historian Robert W. 
Harrison calls the ―exceptional‖ step of authorizing the proportional assessment of 
riparian proprietors‘ land to fund the erection of a levee in Warren County.26  The law 
represented the first direct application of the principle of proportionality to southern 
water management.  The legislation instructed five specifically-named commissioners to 
appoint three ―discreet, disinterested freeholders‖ to assess proportional taxes, not 
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exceeding $8,000, on the property of riparian proprietors whose ―lands, houses or lots so 
assessed may be benefitted by the erection of the said levee.‖  The law instructed the 
sheriff to collect the taxes in the same manner as other county levies.  Little is known 
about the 1819 law‘s effectiveness or implementation.  Harrison describes it as the ―first 
state-authorized levee project‖ in American history that set a precedent for hundreds of 
later state levee laws by imposing pro rata assessments determined according to the 
benefits landowners expected to receive from the project.
27
 
 During the next 30 years, Mississippi and Louisiana strengthened the powers of 
levee boards and attempted to make them more equitable.  In 1833, Mississippi‘s General 
Assembly passed the first in a series of acts to facilitate levee construction in 
Washington, Coahoma, Tunica, Bolivar, Issaquena, and De Soto Counties.  Most of the 
laws empowered county Boards of Police (now known as Boards of Supervisors) with 
supervisory powers.  The 1838 Act relating to Washington and Bolivar Counties, for 
instance, authorized the Boards of Police to divide the counties into at least five levee 
districts and appoint five inspectors to oversee each district‘s operations.  Prohibited from 
supervising levees more than 10 miles from home, the inspectors elected a ―president‖ 
and additional officials to compose the county‘s Board of Levee Inspectors.  The 
inspectors made determinations for the location and size of drainage ditches, levees, and 
other structures and placed advertisements in local newspapers requesting bids for 
construction.  Noncompliant landowners faced stiff fines and court penalties.  In periods 
of imminent danger, such as high water, the inspectors could requisition slaves whose 
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owners lived within a three-mile radius of the levee in question.  Over time riparian 
plantations owners implored the Assembly to disperse the burden of levee construction 
by extending responsibility for assessments to interior landowners who also benefitted 
from flood control.  In 1846, assemblymen acquiesced and extended levee assessments to 
backcountry residents.
28
 
 After 1850, organized land drainage grew in importance due to increasing 
conflicts between landowners throughout the United States over surface water disposal.  
Indeed, some interpretations of surface water law barred landowners from 
indiscriminately disposing of water that originated on their land without incurring 
liability.  ―Diffused surface waters‖ were technically defined as ―waters from rain, 
springs or melting snow which lie or flow on the surface of the earth but which do not 
form part of a watercourse or lake.‖29  Surface water law regulated the use, diversion, and 
disposal of waters unaffiliated with a watercourse until they converged with the waters in 
a river, stream, creek, lake, or pond.  In an 1881 decision, the Kansas Supreme Court 
aptly described this transition:   
When surface waters reach and become part of a natural water course, they lose 
their character as surface waters, and come under the rules governing water 
courses … And such waters, when they have ceased to spread and diffuse over the 
surface or percolate through the soil, when they have lost their casual and vagrant 
character and have reached and come to rest in a permanent mass or body, in a 
natural receptacle or reservoir, not spreading over or soaking into the soil, 
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forming mere bog or marsh, cannot be regarded as surface waters any more than 
they can be after they have reached a stream.
30
 
 
In general, American states adopted one of three surface water rules:  civil law, 
―common enemy,‖ and reasonable use.  The civil law followed the natural law maxim of 
aqua currit et debet currere ut currere sole bat, that is, ―water runs and ought to run, as it 
used to run.‖31  Originally developed during Roman times and later incorporated into 
France‘s Napoleonic Code, the civil law rule imposed liability on landowners when they 
damaged adjacent proprietor‘s property during the process of surface water disposal.  The 
idea of servitude was the rule‘s basis:  an upper landowner could not injure a lower 
landowner while ridding his property of water.  Conversely, a lower landowner had no 
right to block the natural flow of water onto his land to the detriment of an upper 
landowner.  By curtailing the freedom of landowners to dispose of surface water in any 
manner they desired, the 18 states that adopted the civil law rule before 1940 placed a 
formidable obstacle before people seeking to drain their lands.  Local administrative 
bodies supervising and regulating the disposal of surface in an orderly manner were at a 
premium in civil law states.  In any case, the civil law rule‘s preference to avert disputes 
between property owners by leaving the natural flow of surface water unimpeded ran 
counter to prevailing nineteenth-century cultural attitudes privileging wetlands‘ rapid 
destruction for agricultural and health purposes.
32
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 Rejecting the civil law‘s passivity, the common enemy doctrine applied an 
instrumental approach to wetlands.  The legal maxim cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad 
coelum et ad inferos, that is, ―whose is the soil, his is even to the skies and to the depths 
below‖ constituted the rule‘s foundation.  Sometimes mistakenly called the common law, 
the common enemy rule, as its name implied, regarded water lying or flowing across the 
surface of the ground as a common enemy that a property-owner could eliminate as he or 
she desired, regardless of the consequences to others.  In the District of Columbia and 21 
states that adopted the rule, landowners incurred no liability if they damaged a 
neighboring proprietor‘s land during the process of surface water removal.  Though 
nineteenth-century courts imposed a host of qualifications and limitations to the common 
enemy rule (as well as the civil law), it corresponded nicely with cultural prejudices 
towards wetlands.  It envisioned a landscape devoid of noncirculating waters that exsisted 
outside of a watercourse or lake and, as a result, reinforced the myth, dating to ancient 
Greece, that wetlands were unnatural, undesirable, and anomalous.
33
 
 The reasonable use principle blended the civil law and common enemy doctrines 
to make ―reasonableness‖ the primary standard for determining liability in surface water 
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disputes.  Since prior to 1940 only Minnesota and New Hampshire adopted this rule, the 
reasonable use doctrine had little bearing on nineteenth-century drainage.
34
 
 
Prologue to the Swamp Land Acts:  The Creation of the Public Domain 
 Unanticipated difficulties impeded the progress of drainage and flood control 
institutions in public land states.  The most serious of these problems involved federal 
land ownership.  Unlike the original thirteen colonies, most territories west of the 
Appalachians entered the Union as public land states.  Federal land ownership and the 
leisurely pace of public lands disposal rendered local water management regimes 
ineffective since public lands could not be taxed or forcibly included in commissions or 
levee projects.  Furthermore, vacant public wetlands, westerners charged, poisoned the 
atmosphere with miasmas and often overflowed adjacent private property.  By the 1830s, 
communities west of the Appalachian Mountains clamored that Congress had a 
responsibility to get out of the way of surface water management by paying to drain the 
public domain, quickly disposing of unsold public lands, or ceding them to the counties 
or states so they could sell the lands and invest the revenue in drainage projects. 
 The creation of the public domain was one of the most contentious chapters in 
early U. S. political history.  The original colonial charters of Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, New York, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia 
conferred land grants stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific.  Dismissing the rights of 
American Indians, the ―sea to sea‖ charters envisioned the forging of a transcontinental 
empire.  In the 1763 Treaty of Paris, which ended the French and Indian War, Great 
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Britain recognized Spain‘s claim of sovereignty over the trans-Mississippi West by 
cutting off the sea-to-sea grants at the Mississippi River.  In 1774, Parliament further 
circumscribed the grants by passing the Quebec Act, which transferred the tract of land 
north of the Ohio River to Quebec.  Jeopardizing the western claims of Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, New York, and Virginia, the Quebec Act reduced colonial land claims by 
some 177 million acres, imperiled colonies‘ ability to reward veterans of the Seven 
Years‘ War with land bounties, interfered with the Indian trade, and nullified the claims 
of prominent land companies and speculators.
35
 
 When the Continental Congress convened during the American Revolution, 
controversy erupted over the fate of colonies‘ remaining western lands.  Colonies without 
western lands—Delaware, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
and Maryland—feared domination at the hands of the larger landed colonies after the 
overthrow of British authority.  The landless colonies fretted that western claims gave the 
landed colonies unfair economic and political advantages, enabling them to pay off war 
debts, attract new settlers, reduce taxes, and create loyal western territories.  In 1776, 
Maryland asked Virginia and other landed colonies to relinquish their existing charters 
west of the Appalachians to Congress.  The western lands, Marylanders insisted, should 
be held as ―common property‖ and sold to retire war debts.  Far-sighted leaders worried 
that the smaller colonies might bond together, raise an army, and violently seize the West 
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if the issue lingered without resolution.  Wanting the debate settled quickly and equitably, 
they asked for the creation of an impartial body to rule on the disputed territory‘s fate.36 
 In 1780, the independent committee sided with the smaller colonies and implored 
the landed states to: 
remove the embarrassment respecting the western country, [by making] a liberal 
surrender of a portion of their territorial claims, since they cannot be preserved 
entire without endangering the stability of the general confederacy; to remind 
them how indispensably necessary it is to establish the federal union on a fixed 
and permanent basis, and on principles acceptable to all respective members.
37
 
 
Dissension subsided once the landed colonies acquiesced.  One by one they handed over 
control of their colonial claims to Congress:  New York in 1780, Virginia in 1784, 
Massachusetts in 1785, Connecticut in 1786, South Carolina in 1787, North Carolina in 
1789-90, and finally Georgia in 1802.  The combined cessions, which created the young 
confederacy‘s public domain, exceeded 237 million acres.  On March 1, 1781, 
Maryland‘s legislature acknowledged the goodwill of the landed colonies and withdrew 
its opposition to the ratification of the Articles of Confederation.
38
 
 Agreeing on how to govern, dispose, and divide the public domain proved no less 
of a thorny problem.  Congress adopted two principles first articulated in Virginia‘s Act 
of Cession.  First, Congress should manage the public domain to benefit all of the 
colonies by depositing revenue generated from land sales into a ―common fund.‖  
Second, new states carved out of the public domain should enter the union on an equal 
basis with the original thirteen colonies.  Once the 1783 Treaty of Paris ended the War of 
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Independence and established the Mississippi River as the U. S.‘s western boundary, 
Congress passed legislation to achieve these goals.  The Land Ordinance of 1785 
stipulated how the western lands should be surveyed and divided.  The efficient section-
township-range system it created remains in effect to this day.  The 1787 Northwest 
Ordinance laid down the terms upon which new states could enter the union ―on an equal 
footing with the original States, in all respects whatever.‖  It required that territories reach 
a population of 60,000 before applying for admission, prohibited them from interfering 
with public land disposal, and barred them from taxing public property.
39
 
 It is unnecessary to review the daunting thicket of rules and regulations Congress 
implemented to govern the public domain‘s disposal.  Several able scholars have 
discussed the partisan conflicts surrounding public land prices, squatters, preemption, 
military bounties for soldiers, the minimum purchase size, and land speculation.  Land 
policies became a partisan political issue no less pivotal than debates over internal 
improvements, the national bank, slavery, and the tariff.  Polarization over such issues 
pointed to a shift in American political culture as the loosely organized, collegial, and 
uncompetitive first-party system gave way to a competitive, highly coordinated, and 
regionally-based system in which universal white manhood suffrage generated high voter 
turnout and participation by ordinary Americans.
40
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 National land policy created a multitude of competing interests that often 
splintered along sectional lines.  In the 1820s, western states carved out of the public 
domain demanded land reforms enabling them to share in a greater portion of the nation‘s 
prosperity and population.  No one articulated western grievances with more passion and 
clarity than Sen. Thomas Benton of Missouri.  Elected to the Senate following the 
Missouri Compromise of 1820, the cantankerous and irascible Missourian made 
liberalizing the terms of public land disposal a personal crusade.  Eastern avarice and 
prejudice, he fulminated, inflated public land prices, priced ordinary settlers out of the 
market, and biased land distribution in favor of speculators.  Statistics on the quantity of 
unsold public lands lent credibility to Benton‘s accusations.  In addition to the 128 
million acres of ceded Indian lands still unavailable to settlers, the 82 million acres of 
unsold public lands in the three territories and seven public land states dwarfed the 19 
million acres (subtracting relinquishments and forfeitures) that had been sold.
41
 
 Benton proposed two major overhauls.  First, he contended that previous 
reductions in prices and minimum acreage purchase requirements were insufficient.  The 
Land Act of 1796 established a minimum purchasing price of $2 per acre and set 640 
acres as the minimum tract size.  In 1800, 1804, and 1824, Congress halved the minimum 
tract size to 320, 160, and finally 80 acres.  The 1824 law reduced the minimum price to 
$1.25 per acre.  In 1824, Benton proposed that unsold public lands be offered at a 
minimum price of 50 cents per acre after five years.  Though the proposal elicited little 
support, the principle that public lands should incur progressive price deductions the 
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longer they sat on the market unsold—Benton called this idea ―graduation‖—became the 
Missourian‘s most cherished land reform.  Second, Benton believed that public land 
distribution should benefit the settler, not the speculator.  Since tariff revenue had 
produced budget surpluses, public lands were no longer indispensible as a revenue 
source.  Congress, therefore, should give 80 acres to anyone meeting a 3-year residency 
requirement.  An abundance of cheap and easily-available land, he concluded, 
differentiated corrupt, venal, and tyrannous monarchies from virtuous and egalitarian 
republics.  Benton‘s greatest political asset was his skill in couching western grievances 
within a traditional Jeffersonian framework that trumpeted yeomen as the republic‘s 
source of virtue and prosperity.
42
 
 The public land historian Daniel Feller argues that Benton‘s reform crusade 
coincided with a ―veritable mania‖ for cheap western lands.  Between 1828-33 the 
legislatures of Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, and Missouri demanded that 
Congress place them on an ―equal footing‖ with the original thirteen states by ceding the 
remaining public lands within their borders.  Many of those states, as well as the 
territories of Arkansas and Florida, also supported graduation, free lands for settlers, and 
preemption rights.  Yet their requests fell on deaf ears.  As Feller explains:  ―in the East 
graduation [and cession] found no friends.  Benton spoke of liberating the surplus 
population of the East, but no one there could see any surplus.  Rather, they saw deserted 
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farmers, declining property values, glutted crop markets, and stunted manufactures, all 
attributable to the lure of fertile Western soils.‖43 
 In 1826, Benton made a last ditch effort to secure additional concessions.  He 
introduced another graduation measure and, in May, took to the Senate floor to lambaste 
some unidentified eastern conspiracy putting large chunks of the public domain off 
limits.  As soon as Benton recognized that easterners were unlikely to cede the public 
domain, he floated an apparent compromise.  In March 1826, he asked the General Land 
Office (GLO) to report on the location and quantity of public lands in Missouri and 
Illinois that ―may be unfit for cultivation on account of being wet and marshy, or subject 
to inundation from the overflowing of the rivers, or covered with standing water in ponds 
or lakes.‖44  The perspective of hindsight, along with the ongoing sectional fracas over 
public land disposition, yields clues as to Benton‘s motivations.  Recognizing that the 
prospects for outright cession were doubtful, he hoped to convince Congress to give the 
states its public swamp and overflow lands ―unfit for cultivation.‖  Wetlands cession was 
thus a bargain for both the federal government and the states.  The national government 
would dispose of wastelands incapable of generating revenue while the states would gain 
a more equitable share of the public domain.
45
 
 The GLO dashed Benton‘s dim hopes for a compromise.  In the winter of 1826-7, 
the GLO‘s W. McRee responded to Benton‘s resolution by concluding that it was 
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impossible to evaluate the quantity of public wet or inundated lands ―unfit for 
cultivation‖ because of ambiguous public land survey laws.  Laws required surveyors to 
note the distance across ―swamps, marshes, or inundation tracts‖ but not to run lines over 
them unless they intersected with a section or quarter section line.  As a result, the only 
swamps, marshes, small ponds, or inundated lands recorded in surveyor notebooks were 
those overlapping section or quarter section lines.  Moreover, the precise size of those 
tracts could not be determined unless they intersected a second reference point (such as 
another section or quarter section line).  To conserve time, McRee studied the field notes 
of the 250 townships bordering the Wabash, Ohio, Mississippi, Illinois, and Missouri 
Rivers and estimated that they contained 1096 ―lakes and ponds, or separate tracts of 
swamps, marshes, &c.‖ covering an area of 330,414 acres.  McRee‘s report emphasized 
the manifest difficulty of determining what constituted a wetland ―unfit for cultivation‖ 
and where they were located without costly new surveys, forcing Benton to abandon his 
proposal.
46
 
  
Grassroots Dissension and the Passage of the Swamp Land Acts 
 Scholars have generally cited five general reasons for the passage of the Swamp 
Land Acts of 1849, 1850, and 1860, which fulfilled Benton‘s vision of public wetlands 
cession.  First, Margaret Beattie Bogue, Daniel Clynch, and Matthias N. Orfield interpret 
the laws as the culmination of an attempt by crafty policymakers from public land states 
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to secure a larger portion of the public domain for their constituents.
47
  Second, Ann 
Vileisis describes the acts as a sincere effort to perpetuate an ideology of agrarianism by 
converting uncultivable lands into farms.
48
  Third, William J. Mitsch and James G. 
Gosselink argue that the Swamp Land Acts were ―designed to decrease federal 
involvement in flood control and drainage by transferring federally owned wetlands to 
the states.‖49  Fourth, John M. Barry frames the laws from the perspective of the 
antebellum period‘s discordant sectionalism.  He claims that ―eastern politicians acceded 
to the demands‖ of Upper Missouri Valley legislators for public wetlands cession to 
prevent them from ―forging a political alliance with the South.‖50  Finally, Hugh Prince, 
Benjmain Horace Hibbard, and Paul Wallace Gates portray the Acts as the product of a 
combination of historical factors that included Congress‘s desire to enhance the value of 
allegedly ―worthless‖ land, improve the atmosphere, and rid itself of lands unlikely to be 
sold as long as good lands remained abundant and cheap.
51
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 Except for the third and fourth explanations, all of these reasons have enriched 
our understanding of the events surrounding the passage of three of the most important 
natural resource laws in American history.  The contention of Mitsch and Gosselink that 
the laws symbolized an attempt to ―decrease‖ the federal government‘s role in drainage 
and flood control is historically inaccurate since Congress deferred to local communities 
in these matters prior to mid-century.  Barry‘s suggestion is baseless and uncorroborated 
by the historical record.  An analysis of the roll call votes for the Swamp Land Acts and a 
close reading of the congressional debates reveal that eastern congressmen were the 
primary opponents of federal wetlands cession.  In any case, the historiography of 
national wetlands policy has largely overlooked the initial impetus for the Swamp Land 
Acts:  grassroots anger over the interference of federal landownership with local water 
management.  From 1827-1849 unaffiliated southern and western communities argued 
that Congress‘s dilatoriness in disposing of publicly-owned wetlands imposed undue 
financial and medical hardships on their communities and put them at a competitive 
disadvantage in recruiting settlers with eastern states where drainage was not encumbered 
by federal land ownership.  Since farmers and plantation owners sometimes invested their 
own time and money in building drainage ditches and levees on federal land, they argued 
that Congress should cede all public wetlands as compensation for their efforts. 
 Louisiana was the first state to express outrage over the state of affairs.  In 1828, 
angry state legislators demanded that Congress explain why half of the public lands in 
Louisiana remained unsurveyed and unsold.  The ―peculiar‖ situation inhibited 
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Louisiana‘s settlement, impeded the production of agricultural commodities, and 
burdened landowners with ―great losses‖ and ―inconveniences.‖  Forced to build levees 
on adjacent public lands to protect their own property, riparian plantation owners 
deserved relief: 
In order to protect their own plantations from inundation, [riparian proprietors] 
have had to raise and keep in repair, embankments in front of the public lands that 
lie on the margins of water-courses; to procure the necessary intercourse between 
the different parts of the State, and to communicate with their home markets, they 
have been obliged to build bridges and open public roads on those lands, and 
more than one-half of the whole male population of Louisiana, from sixteen to 
forty-five years, have, for the last ten years, and at this time do work at least five 
days in the year to the making and repairing of those roads, bridges, and 
embankments on the public lands alone.
52
 
 
Within a decade, local communities from other public land states joined the angry chorus 
of discontent.  The small trickle of petitions to Congress that demanded some form of 
assistance with drainage and flood control quickly turned into a flood.  During the late 
1830s and 1840s, nearly four dozen petitions and resolutions from state legislatures, 
counties, local drainage conventions, and private citizens poured in to Congress from 
Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, and 
Wisconsin.  The petitions most commonly asked for Congress to subsidize drainage in 
public land states by ceding its ―worthless‖ and ―refuse‖ wetlands so the states or 
counties could sell them and then invest the revenue in building their own drainage 
projects.  Other petitions favored the creation of a national drainage program, sharp 
reductions in the price of unsold swamplands, or congressional authorization to build 
drainage works on federal lands.
53
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 Petitioners routinely emphasized how unsold public wetlands represented a 
menace to everyday life.  Wetlands impeded commerce, disrupted travel, complicated 
road construction, locked otherwise arable land out of agricultural production, saturated 
the atmosphere with miasmas, and provided sanctuary for vicious predators that preyed 
on livestock and other domestic animals.  In 1841 and again in 1842, for instance, 
citizens of Scott County, Missouri, asked Congress for an appropriation ―for the purpose 
of draining certain marshes … belonging to the United States, and situated in their 
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immediate vicinity.‖54  Two 1844 petitions from Indiana citizens implored Congress to 
pass ―some regulation for the drainage of the wet lands‖ in Fort Wayne and Winnamac 
land districts.
55
  In 1848, St. John‘s County, Florida, settlers asked Congress to give them 
a land grant to defray the cost of draining the ―Twelve-mile Swamp.‖56  The following 
year Winnebago County, Wisconsin, residents implored the national government to 
subsidize the drainage of a shallow lake with a land grant.
57
 
Missouri‘s General Assembly spearheaded the push for cession.  Assemblymen 
deplored the extensive overflow lands in the Southeast Missouri Lowland counties of 
Cape Girardeau, New Madrid, Scott, Stoddard, and Wayne.  Periodic overflows from the 
St. Francis River and smaller streams flanking the eastern side of the Ozark Mountains 
inundated the lower-elevated counties, creating a patchwork of scattered swamps, lakes, 
and marshes.  The Assembly complained that the submerged lands retarded settlement, 
rendered potentially fertile tracts uncultivable, depreciated the value of adjacent property, 
hindered travel, and injured public health.  Local newspapers supported the Assembly‘s 
grievances.  In 1845, the St. Louis New Era editorialized that the federal government, by 
leaving large blocks of public wetlands undeveloped or unsold, was indirectly culpable 
for killing ―hundreds‖ of Missourians: 
The Great Swamps that extend over many counties in south east Missouri … are 
well worthy of the serious consideration of members of Congress.  It is very clear 
that those extensive swamps have an evil influence on the health of several States, 
and prevent much rich land from being cultivated and improved.  The lives of 
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hundreds of excellent citizens are annually lost, by reasons of the exhalations 
from these morasses.
58
   
 
In 1840 and again in 1843, the Assembly memorialized Congress to donate all ―marshy 
lands‖ to the five counties on the condition that they immediately sell the lands and invest 
the revenue in drainage.  By 1847, the Assembly applauded its own efforts and 
anticipated that federal wetlands cession was inevitable.  In preparation for receiving 
federal land subsidies, assemblymen created county boards of internal improvements 
with the eventual responsibility of draining swamps, marshes, and other lowlands using 
revenue obtained from selling or leasing donated public lands.
59
 
 Preoccupied with debates over the expansion of slavery into western territories, 
preemption, internal improvements, and the fate of Texas, Congress waited a full year to 
respond to the Assembly‘s initial memorials.  After evaluating GLO records, the House 
Committee on Public Lands issued a seminal report, written by Missouri Democrat John 
Jameson, estimating that 3/5 of the 90 townships in Cape Girardeau, New Madrid, Scott, 
Stoddard, and Wayne counties were too swampy and unhealthy for settlement—a 
wasteland incapable of providing anything but a ―precarious subsistence‖ for hunters and 
trappers pursuing bison, elk, and deer herds.  The Jameson report doubted that public 
land sales could offset the costs of necessary new surveys.  The issue was one of supply 
and demand.  As long as productive lands remained elsewhere, settlers had little incentive 
to settle on marginal lands and Congress had little reason to subsidize drainage.
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 Constitutional questions weighed just as heavily on Jameson as fiscal politics.  
Jameson never called federal drainage ―unconstitutional,‖ but his conclusion that it was 
―not good policy for the General Government to enter upon this improvement‖ indicated 
his preference to avoid a contentious, bitter, and lengthy constitutional debate on the 
propriety of nationalizing drainage.  At the same time, Jameson rejected the idea that 
Congress could continue to depend solely on local communities to remove surface water.  
National policymakers had the authority to subsidize wetlands drainage with land grants 
just as it did canals, roads, and other internal improvements.  Since wetlands interfered 
with travel and the efficient movement of goods, drainage projects were no less deserving 
of liberal subsidies.  Like the vast majority of antebellum Americans, Jameson viewed 
wetlands drainage as an indispensible component of wise environmental stewardship.  It 
was thus necessary, appropriate, and just for Congress to ensure that its land policies did 
not hamper wetlands conversion in any American community. The Jameson report‘s final 
recommendation that Congress transfer alternative sections of public land in the five 
counties to Arkansas and Missouri (but not the counties, as the Assembly requested) ―for 
the purpose of draining the swamp‖ was predictable given cultural prejudices towards 
wetlands and constituted Congress‘s first definitive statement on national wetlands 
policy.
61
 
 
Congress Yields to Grassroots Pressure 
In the 1840s, mounting grassroots enthusiasm for national wetlands cession 
coincided with a campaign orchestrated by Mississippi Valley communities clamoring for 
federal aid for river improvements.  Organized by civic commercial associations and 
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local governments, river aid advocates insisted that federal river and harbor 
appropriations disproportionately favored the northeast, that Congress had a 
responsibility to promote commerce through the improvement of interstate rivers, and 
that flood control deserved federal funding to keep rivers from shifting courses and 
disrupting travel, agriculture, and public lands disposition.  Politicians, civic leaders, 
landowners, levee district managers, steamboat corporations, and local businessmen 
organized and attended river improvement conventions in Cincinnati (1842), Memphis 
(1844, 1845, and 1846), Chicago (1847, 1850), Evansville, Indiana, (1850), and 
Burlington, Iowa, (1851) prior to the Civil War.  Along with a series of devastating 
Mississippi River floods during the 1840s, southern and Midwestern river aid advocates 
attracted the attention of many prominent and local congressmen.  Senator John C. 
Calhoun of South Carolina and Congressman Abraham Lincoln attended conventions 
while former President Martin Van Buren, Henry Clay, and Daniel Webster sent letters 
endorsing more assertive federal action.
62
 
Following the conclusion of the Mexican War (1846-48), Congress bowed to 
public pressure and revisited the issue of public wetlands cession.  In the summer of 
1848, the Senate considered the proposal of Sen. Solon Borland, an Arkansas Democrat 
and physician, to ―grant to the State of Arkansas certain unsold lands subject to overflow, 
for the purposes of internal improvement, education, and for other purposes.‖63  Demands 
from other Senators persuaded Borland to expand the bill‘s scope to ―useless lands in the 
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adjoining States.‖64  Democratic southerners commended the measure for promising to 
transform miasmatic wastelands into productive farms at no cost to the federal treasury.  
Florida‘s James Diament Westcott, Jr., endorsed cession as the best strategy for 
eliminating wetlands since a federal program would ―require ten regiments of 
topographical engineers, and a hundred millions of money.‖65  Two of Westcott‘s fellow 
Democrats, Jefferson Davis of Mississippi and William Rufus de Vane King of Alabama, 
agreed that drainage was beyond the means of Congress or private enterprise.  Only the 
states had the constitutional authority, resources, and financial incentive to carry out the 
plan.  ―If the States would do this,‖ King concluded, ―it was the only way in which the 
lands could be made valuable.‖66  Henry Johnson, a Louisiana Whig, insisted that 
drainage was vital to his constituents‘ welfare since miasmas generated by periodic 
floods and swamps compromised Louisiana‘s atmospheric quality. 
 The initial bipartisan efforts attracted little support and Borland‘s bill languished 
without an up or down vote.  Reevaluating their strategy, proponents of cession rallied 
behind a bill only applicable to Louisiana.  Louisiana offered a unique test case since its 
residents, having invested large sums of money in building levees on federal land, could 
claim a legitimate grievance.  In early 1849, Louisiana Rep. John Henry Harmanson 
requested a vote on a proposal to donate all public wetlands in Louisiana to the state so it 
could sell them to raise revenue for ―the necessary levees and drains.‖67  Praising the 
Herculean flood control efforts of plantation owners, he argued that Congress owed them 
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the remaining public swamplands as ―compensation for the cost of reclaiming them.‖68  
According to Harmanson, other states benefitted from Congress‘s liberal policy of 
granting public lands to construct internal improvements.  Ohio (1.26 million acres), 
Indiana (1.47 million acres), Wisconsin (858,000 acres), and Iowa (825,000 acres) had up 
to that time received lavish grants for canal, road, and turnpike construction.  Since 
wetlands obstructed travel and commerce, drainage represented an internal improvement 
no less deserving of federal land subsidies.  In Harmanson‘s opinion, there was no reason 
for representatives from states benefitting from congressional largesse to block 
Louisiana‘s request, especially since ―the grants made to the above named States were 
choice lands, while those now asked for by Louisiana are utterly worthless.‖69 
The House Committee on Public Lands endorsed Harmanson‘s arguments.  The 
committee‘s chairman, Rep. Richard Brodhead of Pennsylvania, marveled at the debt 
incurred by Louisianans in building levees.  By the beginning of 1848, they had erected 
1400 miles of levees along the Mississippi River‘s west bank and tributaries at a princely 
sum of $2,464,000.  The average levee measured 10 feet wide at its top, 30 feet wide at 
its base, and 4 ½ feet in height, totaling an aggregate of 24,640,000 cubic yards of soil.  
Brodhead wildly speculated that Louisianans‘ had reclaimed 2.7 million of the state‘s 5.4 
million acres of wetlands.  Since the public domain comprised most of the improved land, 
the levees enhanced the marketability of federal lands at no cost to Congress.  Brodhead 
concluded that Louisiana was ―equitably entitled‖ to a grant of all the public swamplands 
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within its boundaries as reimbursement.  The chairman also suggested that, in time, 
Congress should expand the program to other public land states.
70
 
 Opponents of public wetlands cession lambasted the plan‘s ambiguity and 
unprecedented magnitude.  Whig Rep. Samuel F. Vinton of Ohio objected because 
Congress had not precisely defined what constituted a ―swamp land unfit for cultivation.‖  
The most prescient and informed skeptic of public wetlands cession, Vinton understood 
that ―swamplands,‖ ―inundated lands,‖ and ―overflow lands‖ were imprecise and vague 
terms subject to multiple interpretations.  Could Louisiana claim a valuable piece of land 
as a ―swampland unfit for cultivation‖ if it was subject to an hour-long inundation while a 
river was in spate?  No one knew and the bill‘s ambiguous terminology made Congress 
vulnerable to the machinations of rapacious speculators and dishonest state officials.  
Vinton prophetically predicted that cession threatened to ―arrest all the sales of the public 
lands‖ in Louisiana if disputes between it and Congress over whether a tract qualified for 
cession lingered.
71
  At the very least, the program would require Congress to underwrite 
expensive new surveys to determine, with precision and clarity, which lands met 
Congress‘s criteria or the system of public land disposal might be thrown into chaos and 
shut down. 
 Vinton‘s second objection focused on the propriety of transferring so much land 
to the states.  Donating public wetlands to Louisiana would establish a ―principle‖ that 
other public land states (and newly-admitted states) would invoke to pry as much land as 
possible from Congress.  Certain that Congress would expand cession to other public land 
states—as Borland‘s bill actually envisioned—Vinton emphasized that ―three-fourths of 
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all the public lands in Florida, Alabama, Arkansas, and perhaps other states were unfit for 
cultivation.‖  It was foolish, shortsighted, and wrongheaded for Congress to divest itself 
of public wetlands ―without knowing anything about the[ir] extent.‖  The law threatened 
to turn the nation‘s centripetal land policy centrifugal and empower the states at the 
federal government‘s expense.72 
 Vinton‘s warnings fell on deaf ears.  On February 24, 1849, the House passed 
Harmanson‘s bill by a largely sectional vote of 100 to 61.73  Democrats (65 affirmative 
votes) and Whigs from states with significant quantities of public wetlands (12 
affirmative votes) provided the bulk of the bill‘s support.  Opposition clustered around 
Whigs (49 negative votes) and Democrats from nonpublic land states (12 negative votes).  
Approved by the Senate and signed into law by President James K. Polk on March 2, the 
―Act to aid the State of Louisiana in draining the Swamp Lands therein‖ dedicated all of 
the ―swamp and overflow lands‖ that ―may be or are found unfit for cultivation‖ to 
Louisiana so it could sell the lands and invest the revenue ―exclusively‖ in building 
ditches and levees.
74
  As Vinton had warned, congressmen from Mississippi, Arkansas, 
Missouri, and Indiana immediately maneuvered to capitalize on the positive sentiment.
75
  
Faced with such pressure, the Senate agreed to take up Borland‘s new proposal to transfer 
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public wetlands to Arkansas so it could use the revenue from those lands to ―execute a 
system of embankments … for the protection of said lands from overflow and 
reclamation from their present valueless condition.‖76  Before favorably reporting the bill, 
the Senate Committee on Public Lands extended its provisions to ―other States of the 
Union in which such ‗swamp lands‘ … may be situated.‖77 
 As a leading proponent of expanding the program, Borland mocked the idea that 
Congress‘s power over the nation‘s waters began and ended with those deemed 
―navigable.‖  As he explained to incredulous easterners, who increasingly viewed cession 
as a gigantic land grab, the Commerce Clause justified federal intervention in the West: 
Our western rivers have soft, alluvial, sandy bottoms, easily and frequently 
changing, alternately, into channels and bars, under the action of the current, 
especially during floods and overflows.  They have also soft, alluvial banks, 
which, when overflowed for any length of time … become saturated with the 
water, and, yielding to the combined force of the weight and rapidity of the 
current, are broken down and swept off.  How often are these occurrences 
witnessed!  How disastrous have they not proven, alike to the planters on the bank 
of the river and to the vessels which navigate it!  Not a flood has ever come and 
gone without changing … the channels of the rivers—often in a manner to defy 
the skill of the most experienced pilots.
78
 
 
Unpredictable and capricious, western rivers disrupted commerce on water and land by 
overflowing their banks, changing courses, and inundating adjacent floodplains.  Western 
steamboat operators suffered significant financial hardships since their insurance rates 
were double those of eastern competitors.  Furthermore, once waters escaped the banks of 
rivers, they diffused over the surface of the land, ruining crops, impeding the movement 
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of goods and products, and releasing ―miasmatic exhalations‖ into the atmosphere that 
―spread over all the adjacent country, for many miles around.‖79 
 According to Borland, the Property Clause offered another potential avenue for 
federal intervention.  In his thoughtful study of the Property Clause, the legal scholar 
Peter A. Appel argues that courts and legislators have traditionally applied the clause 
broadly:  ―The federal government possesses both proprietary and sovereign powers over 
its property, can regulate activities on privately owned lands that affect its lands, and 
exercises the equivalent of the police power in this area.‖80  Borland insisted that the 
Property Clause conferred sweeping authority on Congress to improve the public domain:  
the ―authority of the government to execute the proposed work of reclaiming these 
lands…will hardly be questioned.  That such authority, as a general power, attaches to the 
government, as a land proprietor, will, it is believed be admitted by all.‖81  As a 
landowner, the national government enjoyed the same rights and privileges to improve its 
property as individual landowners. 
 Public health improvement also justified federal involvement.  By eliminating the 
source of unwholesome miasmas, drainage benefitted the health of rural and nearby 
urban communities and, in Borland‘s words, ―promote[d] the general welfare.‖  The 
physician and Senator did not elaborate on this statement, but it suggests that in his 
reading of the Constitution the General Welfare Clause justified a national drainage 
program.  Atmospheric reform had finally been taken up in the halls of Congress.
82
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 Prevailing nineteenth-century explanations for disease armed proponents with a 
powerful weapon.  It was bad enough, westerners and southerners emphasized, that the 
glut of federal land slowed population growth in their sections.  But the threat posed to 
public health by vacant and undeveloped wetlands was even more terrifying.  Miasmas 
and malaria discharged by swamps and overflow lands sickened nearby communities, 
depressed the values of neighboring plantations and farms, and, in the opinion of 
Mississippi Sen. Jefferson Davis, rendered adjacent lands ―so unhealthy that lands 
susceptible of cultivation cannot be occupied.‖83  During the Senate debate on Borland‘s 
bill, proponents invoked prevailing medical ideas to frame the discussion from the 
perspective of public health.  Champions of cession demonized swamps and riparian 
lands subject to flooding as ―a fertile cause of disease‖; ―generative of noxious influences 
which were injurious to human health‖; ―prolific source[s] of disease‖; ―fruitful 
promoters of disease and death‖; and ―pestilential to the people of the country.‖84  Since 
the destruction of wetlands was a matter of life or death, congressmen had an ethical 
obligation to act.  On June 13, 1850, the Senate agreed and passed Borland‘s measure.85 
 No Congressman or Senator seriously challenged the premise that all of the 
nation‘s wetlands should be drained.  The only unanswered questions were whether 
wetlands drainage outside of Louisiana warranted federal land subsidies like canals, 
roads, and railroads and whether it was appropriate to donate such a large and indefinite 
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quantity of land to the states.  Before considering the Senate version of the bill, the House 
of Representatives asked its Committee on Public Lands to study the question.  In 
explaining his committee‘s favorable report, James B. Bowlin, a Missouri Democrat who 
a few years earlier participated in local drainage conventions in his home state, described 
why drainage was meritorious of federal subsidization.
86
  Bowlin recognized that the 
primary question involved was one of power and taxation.  Draining swamps and 
marshes in the original thirteen states, he explained, encountered few jurisdictional 
difficulties as long as legislatures passed appropriate laws that collectivized the costs and 
responsibilities of drainage.  In public land states, the patchwork of federal, state, and 
private land ownership undermined surface water removal since states could not forcibly 
include federal property within levy districts, ditch enterprises, or commissions of sewers.  
―The people of the [public land] sections affected by‖ wetlands, Bowlin explained, 
―cannot reclaim them, alike from the wants of means and that legitimate organization so 
essential to the prosecution of a great work.‖87  Even if citizens in public land states 
mobilized the capital and ―legitimate organization‖ necessary to build drainage and flood 
control projects, the fruits of their labor would unfairly benefit an absentee landowner—
the federal government—and settlers who later purchased those lands from Congress.  
Bowlin found this arrangement intolerable because it violated the unstated principle of 
proportionality holding that land conservation costs should be shared proportionally by 
all benefitting landowners.  In Bowlin‘s opinion, forcing citizens to improve public land 
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without direct compensation or some form of subsidization was inequitable, unjust, and 
discriminatory. 
The case [of drainage] is wholly different in the new States, where the land is 
owned, and its primary disposal regulated by a Government separate, in some 
respects, to that which enjoys the possession of the soil.  There, if [farmers] 
reclaim [wetlands], the profits of their own labor do not inure to their own benefit, 
but to the benefit of others who contribute nothing to produce it… It is true, that if 
this Government will cling to [public wetlands] with a miser‘s grasp, that in the 
course of time necessity will compel the States, in preserving the health of their 
citizens, to reclaim them, and this Government will be able to make a profitable 
speculation upon their labor; but such a course is too obviously unjust to merit a 
consideration for a moment … [A]nd yet, by inactivity upon this subject, and 
slumbering quietly over the frequent applications of the States interested to do 
something in this matter, we are daily, by non-action, carrying out the obnoxious 
doctrine.
88
 
 
 Sympathy for rural Americans in public land states inspired Bowlin‘s favorable 
report.  The chairman singled out the industry of Ohio farmers and Louisiana plantation 
owners.  Ohioans had drained a tremendous quantity of public lands without receiving 
any compensation while the costly erection of levees by Louisianans had ―necessarily 
reclaimed millions of acres, which were subsequently surveyed and sold by this 
Government.‖89  Bowlin insisted Congress had two options:  create a national program to 
drain the public domain or cede them to the states.  Although Bowlin and a handful of 
other congressman favored nationalization, the objections of skeptical colleagues 
persuaded him to support cession since a constitutional debate on the issue ―would keep 
[federal drainage] forever an open question, whilst the people would be left to suffer all 
the inconveniences.‖90  Little wonder Bowlin recommended the speedy passage of the 
Senate bill.  ―All [the states] ask,‖ the Missourian explained, ―is [for] the assurance that if 
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they spend their means in reclaiming lands utterly worthless in their present condition … 
that they shall have, as a source of reimbursement in part, all the lands they redeem from 
the water and render fit for habitation and cultivation.‖91 
On September 17, 1850, the House of Representatives passed the second Swamp 
Land Act by a wide margin of 120-53.  Opposition was bipartisan (19 Democrats, 32 
Whigs, and 2 Free Soilers) and confined almost exclusively to congressmen representing 
eastern states.  Indeed, only three representatives from public land states that eventually 
received federal swampland grants dissented (Vinton, Ohio; Nathan Evans, Ohio; and 
Jacob Thompson, Mississippi).  The law ceded ―the whole of those swamp and 
overflowed lands, made unfit thereby for cultivation‖ to Arkansas, Alabama, California, 
Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin on 
the condition they ―exclusively‖ dedicate the revenue raised from the sale of those lands 
to building drainage projects.
92
  In 1860, Congress passed the third and final Swamp 
Land Act, extending the program to Minnesota and Oregon.
93
  Envisioning a partnership 
between the federal and state governments, the Swamp Land Acts intended to ensure that 
Americans in public land states would never again bear responsibility for draining 
wetlands or building levees.  The federal government contributed the funding, in the form 
of public land subsidies, and the fifteen states would create the administrative machinery 
necessary to carry out Congress‘s drainage mandate.  The GLO, the agency supervising 
the states‘ selection of public ―swamp and overflowed lands,‖ instructed states to choose 
one of two methods to make their selections.  First, they could use the original field notes 
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of government surveyors.  Any lands designated as swamps on the notes could be 
claimed.  Second, the states had the option of employing their own agents to determine 
the precise location of ―swamp and overflowed‖ lands within their boundaries.  Not 
surprisingly, most states hired their own agents and, as will be discussed, used dubious 
strategies to acquire millions of acres that were productive, valuable, and in no way 
―swamp and overflowed.‖ 
 
Historians and the Swamp Land Acts 
 Studies of national wetlands policy focus narrowly on the pervasive fraud and 
graft that accompanied the Swamp Land Acts‘ administration.  It is indisputable that the 
laws enabled cattle barons, speculators, state and national officials, timber companies, 
and lawyers hired by states to select swamplands to perpetuate one of the most egregious 
and criminal land thefts in American history.  Loopholes in the Swamp Land Acts 
permitted swindlers to secure title to extensive stretches of the public domain that were 
perfectly dry, arable, and productive.  In one of the most notorious examples, western 
cattle baron Henry Miller, the co-proprietor of the Miller and Lux Corporation, attached a 
boat to the top of an overland wagon pulled by mules and rode over choice sections of the 
Oregon countryside.  Since he had ―sailed‖ over the lands in question, Miller claimed that 
they were ―swamp and overflowed‖ and thus available for public auction.  Some of the 
most poorly-written laws in American history, the Swamp Land Acts symbolized 
congressional incompetence and ineptitude.  By failing to define what constituted 
―swamp and overflow‖ lands or making states demonstrate a record of compliance before 
applying for additional grants, Congress enabled land grabbers and hucksters like Miller 
129 
 
to defraud the federal government of millions of acres.  In 1868, a congressional 
investigation revealed that at least half of the lands ceded under the Swamp Land Acts 
were in the hands of speculators.  In 1871, Indiana Rep. George Washington Julian, the 
chairman of the House Committee on Public Lands, summarized the program‘s sordid 
track record:   
I was in Congress when the [Swamp Land] act of 1850 was passed ... It was said 
that these swamp lands, which were then supposed to be located mainly in the 
South, would be used in repairing the levees of the Mississippi, and in rendering 
that section of our country healthy and salubrious by draining off the water; but 
while the levees have not been built, nor the country rendered healthy by 
drainage, millions of acres of dry and excellent land have been bought from the 
States as swamp, at prices next to nothing, through the machinery of the swamp-
land laws, and are held as great monopolies to-day by men who will neither sell 
the land to those who want homes nor till it themselves.  It was said that no 
difficulty could arise in distinguishing swamp and overflowed from dry lands … 
but this assertion was based upon the extremely violent presumption that 
Government surveyors would prove to be honest and incorruptible men, who 
would not take bribes from thieves.
94
 
 
Julian‘s bill to streamline the process of swampland selection by defining what 
constituted a ―swamp and overflowed‖ parcel failed, and Congress did not seriously 
consider reform again until 1906. 
As appalling, scandalous, and reprehensible as the conduct of speculators and 
corrupt state government officials was, the troubled disposition of the nation‘s wetlands 
was symptomatic of larger structural flaws in the administration of nineteenth-century 
public lands.  Indeed, the most surprising thing about scholars‘ indignation is that they 
have been surprised at all.  As Paul Wallace Gates, the eminent public lands historian, 
puts it:  ―The early experience of the states in land administration reflect[ed] little vision 
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or long range planning, a tendency to rush into leasing or selling without proper 
consideration of the effects of policies being adopted, and careless management of the 
funds received from sales and leases.  Too frequently, legislatures and public officers 
appeared to shape policies that would enable them to profit personally.‖95  In short, there 
is no denying the tremendous fraud and criminal conspiracies committed by state, federal, 
and local officials and speculators.  The real victims in this shameful chapter of American 
history were the future generations of homesteaders pushed onto marginal lands and 
robbed of the opportunity to take up a fertile piece of land. 
  Nevertheless, the narrow focus on the fraudulent disposition of the nation‘s 
swamplands has blinded many historians to the laws‘ broader impact on water resource 
administration, state building, and American federalism.   One of the notable exceptions 
is Ann Vileisis‘s historical survey of American wetlands.  Vileisis argues that the Swamp 
Land Acts were ―revolutionary‖ because they compelled Americans to ―accept a whole 
new vision of the proper role of state government.‖96  While it is true that the Acts 
envisioned a new form of water resources management in public land states, most states, 
with the exception of Louisiana and Arkansas, never created the administrative 
machinery necessary to comply with Congress‘s drainage mandate.  Instead, most states 
used their swamp land grants for every purpose but draining swamps.  The wetlands paid 
for public schools, seminaries, benevolent institutions, harbor improvements, and 
railroad, bridge, road, and public building construction.  The misappropriation of funds 
reveals that in clamoring for cession, state policymakers, unlike the local communities 
they represented, sought to extract their pound of flesh from a central government whose 
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land policies they perceived as venal, inequitable, and inimical to their interests.  They 
judged the building up of local public infrastructure as a higher priority than draining 
miasmatic wetlands.  In any case, the failure of most states to live up to their 
responsibilities eventually reverted authority for land drainage back to local communities. 
The Swamp Land Acts were ―revolutionary‖ more in theory than in effect.97 
 The failure of individual states to comply with Congress‘s mandate is just as 
much a part of the Swamp Land Acts‘ troubling legacy as the actions of speculators and 
venal public officials.  The next section provides a brief overview of how program states, 
excepting Louisiana and Arkansas, evaded their responsibilities and used their grants for 
every purpose but drainage. 
 
Indiana 
Under the 1850 Swamp Land Act, Indiana secured title to 1,254,271 acres of 
―swamp and overflowed‖ lands.98  The bulk of the grant was located in the state‘s flat 
northwestern corner, where the Kankakee River, following an aimless course, overflowed 
sections of Fulton, Jasper, Newton, Porter, Pulaski, and St. Joseph counties.  Corruption, 
graft, and fraud plagued Indiana‘s grant disposal and administration. 
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 Legislators‘ initially interpreted the grant as a source to pay down the debt 
Indiana accumulated while publicly financing canal construction during the 1840s.  In 
1851, the state‘s new constitution terminated the practice and made compliance with 
Congress‘s mandate a priority.  Section 2 of Article VIII dedicated revenue generated 
from swampland sales to building reclamation projects.  (The constitution decreed that 
surplus money was to be funneled into the Common School Fund).  To commence the 
process, the legislature empowered the governor to appoint a swamp land commissioner 
for every county to oversee project construction.  Giving responsibility to the counties 
proved disastrous.  Commissioners routinely accepted the bids of friends or higher 
government officials—including, in one instance, a governor‘s son—who had no 
intention of carrying out the proposed work.  The handful of honest commissioners 
discovered that the original cost estimates were too low and that most contractors were 
incompetent.  The state legislature complicated the matter by passing legislation, without 
the knowledge of county officials, transferring money from swampland sales to state 
benevolent institutions, abruptly suspending work on unfinished projects.  To revive the 
program, Governor Joseph A. Wright endorsed a plan allowing citizens to trade labor on 
drainage projects for land scrip.  Corruption plagued the labor-for-land program.  
Speculators with no intention of fulfilling labor obligations gained title to extensive 
tracts.  In 1861, a committee investigating swampland frauds concluded that only 10% of 
contracted projects were ever completed, that finished projects were poorly constructed, 
and that many commissioners colluded with speculators and embezzled $100,000 from 
swampland sales.  Not until the legislature passed local drainage district laws would 
drainage occur on a scale originally envisioned by Congress.  In the apt judgment of 
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Charles Kettleborough, collusion between contractors and county officials, speculation 
by politicians, and state employees‘ ―scandalous‖ embezzlement of swampland funds 
rendered Indiana‘s swampland administration ―one of the most sordid and uninspiring 
chapters in [Indiana‘s] history.‖99 
 
Michigan 
 Michigan was the recipient of 5.66 million acres, the fourth largest swampland 
cession.  To drain the state‘s wetlands, which covered one-sixth of the upper and lower 
peninsulas, policymakers devised a strategy based on road construction.  Building roads 
would hasten drainage since it required filling, bridging, clearing, draining, and ditching 
lowlands and swamps.  Convinced of the plan‘s imminent success, politicians subsidized 
road construction with lavish grants:  companies received 640 acres of swampland for 
every mile of road they laid in the Lower Peninsula and up to 1,280 acres per mile in the 
Upper Peninsula.  Enacted with lofty expectations, the plan failed as contractors bypassed 
densely timbered swamps, built around lowland marshes, and followed existing 
settlement areas rather than blazing new trails as policymakers had envisaged. 
 Michigan also promised 80 acres of swamplands to any settler who improved a 
plot of land and fulfilled a five-year residency requirement.  The legislature also adopted 
a ―time-payment plan‖ that required settlers to put 25% down before taking possession of 
a tract.  Unscrupulous capitalists exploited the program to secure choice timberlands.  
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They put up their 25%, clear cut the timber, abandoned their plot, and moved on to 
another well-wooded parcel.
100
 
 In 1869, the legislature decided to subsidize private railroads with swampland 
grants.  Apparently, the legislature assumed that railroads would have an incentive to 
drain the land.  By 1874, Michigan policymakers had approved the transfer of nearly 1.7 
million acres of ceded swamplands to four railroad companies in return for pledges to 
construct 500 miles of track.  Swampland cessions were also used to pay for 
improvements to 24 rivers, 6 bridges, and one harbor.  Eager to subsidize public works 
with swampland grants, Michigan policymakers elevated infrastructure development and 
local economic growth above land drainage.
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 In Michigan, the state took large tracts of former ―swamp and overflowed lands‖ 
off the market in the 1890s to establish conservation areas.  In 1891, the State Land 
Department persuaded the legislature to bar additional entries, grants, or sales of wetlands 
in Huron County‘s Wild Fowl Bay.  The legislation‘s enabling act described the area as a 
―public shooting or hunting ground for the benefit and enjoyment of the people.‖  Eight 
years later the legislature set aside an additional 200,000 acres of state-owned wetlands as 
forests reserves and established a supervisory Forestry Commission.  The draining and 
filling of ecologically rich wetlands was one of the darkest chapters in nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century American environmental history.  Farsighted Michigan legislators, 
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pressured by sportsmen, provided one of the few bright spots in this legacy of 
destruction.
102
 
 
Iowa 
 Speculators, swindlers, county governments, and railroad corporations profited 
handsomely from the disposal of Iowa‘s swampland grant.  Iowa was one of three states 
to cede control over its donated swamplands to the counties, which used them for every 
purpose but building drainage projects.  In a sampling of 32 Iowa counties, one scholar 
found that only 2 of them used their federal grants for drainage purposes.  The other 30 
counties funneled revenue from grant sales into bridge, school, courthouse, road, and 
railway construction.  After 1865, two counties provided land bonuses to Civil War 
veterans with swamplands.
103
 
 In 1855, Iowa‘s legislature criminalized trespassing or cutting timber on unsold 
swamplands.  Squatters living on land claimed under the 1850 Act had the right to 
preemption for $1.25 per acre.  Unfortunately, the law allowed the claimant or an agent 
to enter for up to 160 acres.  Notorious speculators manipulated this provision by hiring 
dummy entrymen to file on claims scattered throughout the state.  Robert P. Swierenga‘s 
case study reveals the extent to which speculators monopolized Iowa wetlands:  in Boone 
County, 8 purchasers (out of 147 total buyers) gained title to 6,266 acres (one-third of the 
county‘s swampland grant); in Mahaska County, John A. L. Crookham, an infamous 
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speculator, seized control of 2,784 acres (one-half of the county‘s grant); and in Johnson 
County, five land grabbers obtained 1,731 acres (49% of the county‘s grant).  The largest 
swindler was the Hartford, Connecticut-based American Emigrant Company.  Conspiring 
with dishonest local officials, the company eventually attained 300,000 acres, or about 
1/3 of Iowa‘s total grant.104 
 
Illinois 
 In 1852, Illinois followed Iowa‘s lead and transferred its 1.5 million-acre grant to 
the counties.  County officials looked upon wetlands as an asset to build internal 
improvements and something to be disposed of as urgently as possible.  As Margaret 
Beattie Bogue has demonstrated, counties had little incentive to hold the grants since they 
did not collect property taxes if the lands remained unpatented.  Bogue‘s study of 
swampland disposition in eight Illinois counties reveals that ―an insignificant portion of 
proceeds from swamp land sales were used for drainage.‖105  County administrators saw 
public education and bridge, courthouse, and road construction as higher priorities than 
drainage. 
 Speculators and absentee owners gobbled up Illinois‘s grant.  From 1857-63, the 
period when counties disposed of the bulk of their donations, a series of poor harvests 
and depressed grain prices discouraged prospective buyers.  Only speculators and 
livestock raisers possessed the necessary capital to buy swamplands during the troubled 
                                                          
104
 Robert P. Swierenga, Pioneers and Profits:  Land Speculation on the Iowa Frontier (Ames:  
Iowa State University Press, 1968), 72-9; and Clynch, ―An Introduction to Swamp Land Disposal in Iowa,‖ 
57-69. 
 
105
 Bogue, ―The Swamp Land Act and Wet Land Utilization in Illinois,‖ 169-80, quote at 174.  
Paul Wallace Gates concurred with Bogue‘s appraisal:  ―Practically no effective work was done in drainage 
[Illinois‘s] wet lands.‖  See Gates, ―The Disposal of the Public Domain In Illinois, 1848-1856,‖ Journal of 
Economic and Business History 3 (February 1931):  219. 
137 
 
economic period.  Eager to dispose of their grants, the counties had no qualms about 
selling to such individuals.  At least half of the original swampland grant in Champaign, 
Ford, Iroquois, Kankakee, Livingston, McLean, Piatt, and Vermillion counties ended up 
in the hands of large landowners.  Backroom deals greased the wheels of disposition.  In 
Iroquois County alone, George C. Tallman from Utica, New York, purchased 45,500 of 
the county‘s 61,000-acre grant at the average price of $0.90 per acre.  Enraged local 
residents accused Tallman, a close friend of the county judge who arranged the sale, of 
receiving preferential treatment since he rewarded the judge with a 4,250-acre kickback.  
During the next 15 years, Tallman sold his unimproved grant for $2 to $4 per acre.
106
 
 
Florida 
 The federal swampland donation to Florida, which surpassed 20 million acres and 
constituted about 1/3 of the federal ―swamp and overflow‖ grant following the 1903 
cession of the Everglades, was the largest grant of public land to any state in American 
history.  In 1855, Florida policymakers created an Internal Improvement Fund (IIF), 
composed of the governor and his cabinet, to oversee the subsidization of railroads, 
canals, and drainage projects using land grants.  As one scholar explains, Florida‘s 
swampland grant enriched corporations and speculators but drained few swamps:  ―If the 
state had to give away swampland to attract railroads … it seemed a small price to pay 
for growth and development.‖107  Up to 1881, when William D. Bloxham became 
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governor, the IFF had disposed of a trifling 1.7 million acres of ―swamp and overflowed 
lands.‖  Lingering economic problems triggered by the Civil War and Reconstruction 
forced several railroads into receivership.  Since the IIF had backed insolvent railroads‘ 
bonds in addition to giving them lavish grants, it, too, faced grim financial prospects. 
 Bloxham recommended saving the IFF by rapidly selling off the state‘s wetlands.  
Before the end of 1882, the IIF had given away or sold 4.5 million acres.  The largest 
purchaser was Hamilton Disston, the son of a wealthy Pennsylvania saw-maker, who paid 
25 cents for each of the 4 million acres he purchased.  Disston‘s purchase allowed the 
agency to escape bankruptcy and restart operations.  By 1904, the IIF had transferred (or 
sold) 8.3 million acres to railroads, 2.3 million acres to canal companies, 4 million acres 
to Disston, and 2.6 million acres to other individuals, totaling 17.1 million acres of the 
20.2 million acres eventually attained under the 1850 law.  Too ambitious in fulfilling its 
duties, the IFF had promised an additional 5.4 million acres to railroad companies, 
leaving Florida more than 2 million acres in debt.  Not even the reforms of Progressive 
governor William Jennings (1900-05), including pledges of full compliance with the 
Swamp Land Acts, saved the state from a painful, embarrassing, and bitter struggle with 
the railroads over the balance of the promised lands.  In 1903, the deficit forced Bryan to 
ask Congress for an appropriation of $1,000,000 to drain the Everglades.  The request 
was a direct admission that Florida had failed to live up to its responsibilities under the 
1850 Swamp Land Act.
108
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California 
 California was one of two states west of the Missouri River that participated in the 
swampland program.  Subterfuge committed by federal and state officials plagued 
California‘s administration of its grant.  In one instance, J. F. Hough, the Surveyor 
General of California, colluded with the son of the U. S. surveyor general of the state to 
sell a fertile 16,000-acre tract of dry land as ―swamp and overflowed.‖109 
 In 1851, California‘s legislature took the first step toward disposing of its 2.12 
million-acre grant by selling 640 acres on an island in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta 
to John F. Booth and David Calloway.  The terms of the sale required Booth and 
Calloway to drain and cultivate the parcel.  Another act in 1855 stipulated that 
individuals could purchase up to 320 acres of swampland for $1 per acre if they paid off 
their balance within five years and reclaimed at least half the land.  In 1858, a new law 
eliminated credit sales, did away with the drainage obligation, and required that an 
upfront purchase price of $1 per acre be deposited in a General Swamp Land Fund, which 
the legislature intended to use to comply with the terms of the grant.  In 1859, another act 
increased the maximum purchase size and extended more liberal payment terms.  
Conflict between California and the federal government about the location and extent of 
California‘s ―swamp and overflow land,‖ however, discouraged potential buyers.110 
 Dissatisfied with lagging sales and the leisurely pace of drainage, California‘s 
legislature voted  in 1861 to create a new commission.  The Board of Swamp Land 
Commissioners, consisting of five people elected by the legislature, could use the General 
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Swamp Land Fund (the law pumped $200,000 into the fund) to carry out drainage 
projects.  When one-third of the owners of any tract of land susceptible of drainage 
petitioned the Board for assistance, the commissioners dispatched engineers to conduct 
surveys, develop construction plans, and ensure that the project‘s costs remained below 
$1 per acre.  In 1862, policymakers authorized county boards of supervisors to levy 
reclamation taxes on districts and created a special fund from swampland sales in each of 
the 28 districts.  Chronic problems plagued the program.  First, the districts never 
produced enough revenue to cover drainage costs.  Second, settlers with semidry tracts or 
narrow riparian frontages opposed inclusion in the districts.  Finally, ranchers and 
farmers in the Sacramento Valley, where much of the state‘s wetlands existed, saw 
drainage as inimical to their interests since they depended on the river‘s periodic 
overflows to produce the hay and tules their cattle, hogs, horses, and sheep foraged upon.  
Discouraged and frustrated, the legislature in 1866 abolished the commission and 
transferred drainage responsibilities to individual counties.
111
 
 
Oregon 
Encompassing fewer than 265,000 acres, Oregon‘s swamp land grant was the 
program‘s second smallest (Ohio‘s 26,000-acre donation was the smallest).  The 
administration of Oregon‘s grant was unexceptional since the state did little to comply 
with the law.  What made the grant‘s disposition noteworthy was how cattle barons in 
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southeastern Oregon manipulated the terms of the Swamp Land Act to secure title to 
valuable water rights.  As the historian Nancy Langston sardonically puts it, the Swamp 
Land Act might have been ―designed to fulfill a national vision of transforming wasteful 
wetlands into prosperous farms, [but in Oregon] this act instead fostered an empire not of 
turnips but of cows.‖112 
Under Oregon‘s doctrine of riparian rights, an individual could not divert water 
from a river or stream unless he or she owned land abutting the watercourse.  The right to 
divert water for agricultural or livestock purposes, then, attached to riparian 
landownership.  Oregon cattle magnates such as Peter French viewed the acquisition of 
riparian meadowlands as a prerequisite for financial success since they supplied an 
invaluable source of forage and, even more significantly, access to scarce fresh water.  
By 1877 French had secured title to at least 48,570 acres previously acquired under the 
Swamp Land Acts that were rich in hay and conferred water rights.  Between 1882 and 
1889 French consolidated his ownership of riparian southeastern Oregon lands by 
instructing employees to file homestead claims alongside rivers and streams and then 
selling them back to French.  W. B. Todhunter, a Harney County cattle baron, used the 
Swamp Land Acts to secure title to 40,332 acres of such lands on the shores of Marlheur 
and Harney Lakes.  In 1849, 1850, and 1860, Congress ceded the nation‘s ―swamp and 
overflow‖ lands in part because they were deemed ―worthless‖ and ―useless‖ without 
drainage.  As a vehicle for cattle magnates to monopolize southeastern Oregon‘s scarce 
waters, riparian wetlands emerged as a lucrative commodity.
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Arkansas 
 Arkansas was one of two states that attempted, albeit temporarily and 
unsuccessfully, to comply with Congress‘s drainage mandate.  Under the 1850 grant, 
Arkansas received 7.7 million acres, the program‘s third largest donation.  In 1851, 
legislators heeded Governor John S. Roane‘s suggestions to centralize the selection, 
disposition, and management of ceded wetlands by creating a three-member Board of 
Swamp Land Commissioners.  The law empowered commissioners to set the price of 
swamplands, select the best locations to build levees and drainage ditches, solicit 
construction bids, and reimburse contractors with swampland scrip.  After dividing the 
state into three districts, commissioners oversaw the erection of 109 miles of levees 
during the Board‘s first two years.  Troubled by commissioners‘ shoddy accounting and 
recordkeeping practices, new Governor Elias N. Conway proposed to involve the State 
Land Agent, Auditor, and Treasurer.  In 1853, the legislature heeded the governor‘s 
recommendations, authorizing the State Land Agent to supervise swampland sales and 
directing the State Treasurer to issue scrip but only upon the auditor‘s approval.  The 
inefficient system threw the program into disarray; created friction between the Board of 
Swamp Land Commissioners and the Land Agent, Auditor, and Treasurer; and 
fragmented authority so badly that drainage work slowed to a crawl.  In 1856 and 1857, 
new legislation abolished the Commission, transferred its responsibilities to the governor, 
permitted him to establish a new position—the Swamp Land Secretary—to supervise 
swampland disposition and drainage work, and replaced scrip with specie as the means of 
satisfying outstanding debts.  Despite chronic administrative problems and extensive 
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frauds perpetuated by state officials to secure title to swampland tracts, the state erected 
13,165,466 cubic yards of levees at a cost of $2.5 million before the Civil War.  Poor 
oversight resulted in shoddy workmanship as contractors were more interested in turning 
a quick profit than building durable levees.
114
 
 Arkansas‘s compliance efforts proved ephemeral.  During the Civil War, 
advancing Union troops sabotaged the levees, recurrent floods obliterated what was left 
standing, and land sales stagnated.  In 1869, the legislature replaced the Board of Swamp 
Land Commissioners with the Commissioner of Public Works and Internal 
Improvements.  The new agency undertook few new drainage and flood control projects 
and only halfheartedly attempted to repair damaged levees.  When railroad mania swept 
Arkansas during the early 1870s, the legislature transferred most of the remaining grant 
to four railroad corporations.
115
 
 
Louisiana 
 The ink was barely dry on the first Swamp Land Act before Louisiana‘s 
congressional delegation demanded additional public land cessions.  Sen. Solomon 
Weathersbee Down insisted that Louisiana‘s swampland donation, which eventually 
surpassed 9.3 million acres, was inadequate.  In 1851, Downs introduced legislation 
providing for the complete cession of public lands in Louisiana ―to aid … in preventing 
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the overflow of the Mississippi river, and in reclaiming the overflowed lands therein.‖116  
Levees built by plantation owners reclaimed a tremendous quantity of federal lands and 
supposedly brought the federal treasury a $3 million windfall.  Down‘s pleas fell on deaf 
ears as Congress insisted that the Swamp Land Acts, which constituted Congress‘s most 
liberal public land donation to the states, was sufficient. 
 Louisiana did more than any other state to comply with the law.  As Martin Reuss 
argues, the Swamp Land Acts provided a unique opportunity for state governments to 
expand in matters related to water resource management.
117
  In 1852, Louisiana took its 
first steps towards implementation when it instructed the State Treasurer and Registrar of 
the State Land Office to offer land warrants for 1 million acres of ceded swamplands for 
sale.  Regulations prohibited the warrants from exceeding 640 acres or comprising less 
than 40 acres and fixed the price at $1.25 per acre.  Revenue generated by warrant sales, 
which surpassed $110,000 by 1853, was funneled into a levee construction fund.
118
 
 The next year state policymakers created a Board of Swamp Land 
Commissioners.  The enabling legislation divided the state into three levee districts that 
ignored natural hydrographic boundaries.  One commissioner supervised each district, 
served on the 3-person Board of Swamp Land Commissioners, and submitted annual 
                                                          
116
 CG, 31
st
 Congress, 2
nd
 Session, February 27, 1851, 738-42, quote at 738. 
 
117
 Reuss discusses how the Swamp Land Act altered the state government‘s relationship to its 
rivers, streams, and swamps:  ―Before 1850, the state devoted its efforts to clearing streams and improving 
navigation.  However, the Swampland Acts forced the state to address reclamation problems … and state 
government assumed the leading role in planning and developing an integrated levee system.  Although this 
burden involved the Louisiana legislature in the usual political disputes over the distribution of funds, the 
politicians did provide for ongoing inspections and funding for the system.‖  See Reuss, Designing the 
Bayous, 46.  Scholars interested in a thorough and exhaustive treatment of Louisiana‘s compliance efforts 
should consult Robert W. Harrison, Swamp Land Reclamation in Louisiana, 1849-1879:  A Study of Flood 
Control and Land Drainage in Louisiana Under the Swamp land Grant of 1849 (Baton Rogue, 1951).  
 
118
 Harrison, Alluvial Empire, 1:72; Mims, ―Louisiana‘s Administration of Swamp Land Funds,‖ 
285; and Reuss, Designing the Bayous, 44. 
145 
 
recommendations to the legislature regarding the location, extent, and costs of future 
works.  The creation of the Board of Swamp Land Commissioners symbolized a sincere 
effort to shift responsibility for flood control from plantation owners to state 
administrators although the Board retained the power to call out the slaves of riparian 
land owners during emergencies (a levee breach, high water, and so forth).  Plantation 
owners were to be compensated $1.50 per slave for each day they worked on the levees.  
Owners refusing slave requisitions incurred a $5 per day fine.  The Board of Swamp 
Land Commissioners administered Louisiana‘s flood control and drainage activities until 
1859 when the legislature shifted its responsibilities to a Board of Public Works, whose 
operations were suspended following Louisiana‘s secession from the Union. 
 During the Civil War, union soldiers dismantled miles of levees on the 
Mississippi, Red, and Atchafalaya Rivers and along the Bayous Teche and Lafourche.  
Faced with the daunting task of repairing levees with scarce funds, Louisiana‘s post-war 
levee management broke down.  In 1867, the cash-strapped state authorized a new Board 
of Levee Commissioners to sell $4 million in bonds.  Louisiana‘s credit was so poor that 
the commissioners seldom received more than $0.50 or $0.60 on the dollar.  The next 
year the legislature revitalized the Board of Public Works, charging it with building 
levees, draining swampland, and constructing internal improvements in five separate 
districts.  In 1871, the Board of State Engineers, comprised of a head engineer and two 
engineers appointed by the governor, replaced the Board of Public Works.  Its tasks 
included drainage, flood control, and navigation improvement.  In the same year, the 
legislature gave the Louisiana Levee Company (LLC), an inefficient and corrupt 
company owned by carpetbaggers, a 21-year monopoly on Louisiana levee construction, 
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undercutting the Board of State Engineer‘s autonomy.  It then created a ―Commission of 
Persons on the Levees of Louisiana‖ to supervise the LLC.  Two people selected by the 
LCC and the state sat on a Commission of Engineers, which evaluated and chose levee 
locations and designs.  In the late 1870s, additional legislation further fragmented 
drainage and flood control efforts before the legislature turned over responsibilities in 
1879 to a Board of State Engineers.  ―The overlapping functions, the lack of clear 
centralized authority, and widespread corruption,‖ concludes Reuss, ―nearly 
overwhelmed the task of levee construction.‖119  Towards the close of the 1870s, 
Louisiana‘s obsessive compliance efforts with the Swamp Land Acts ironically proved 
just as paralyzing as other states‘ blatant disregard of the law. 
 The fragmentation of state administration led Louisiana‘s policymakers to 
continue to plea for federal assistance.  Throughout the period of Reconstruction, 
Congress demurred since levee construction would benefit private landowners and 
specific communities.  Nonetheless, opponents of increased federal involvement could 
not deny that the practices of flood control and navigation were closely related.  The 
popular belief that levee construction intensified the velocity of water within a 
watercours, causing the current to ―scour‖ a river‘s bottom and normalize stream flow, 
linked levee projects directly to Congress‘s undisputed authority over interstate 
navigation.  In any case, the 1879 creation of the Mississippi River Commission 
symbolized that the future of flood control lay with federal institutions.  Composed of 
members of the Army Corps of Engineers, the Coast and Geodetic Survey, and three 
civilians, the Mississippi River Commission oversaw the creation of plans to improve 
navigation, flood control, and the promotion of commerce on the Mississippi River.  In 
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the coming decades, the Mississippi River Commission worked closely with levee 
districts in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas to coordinate the repair of faulty levees 
and administer other river-related improvements.  The establishment of the Commission 
acknowledged that the Swamp Land Acts proved insufficient to solve the thorny 
financial, administrative, and jurisdictional problems associated with drainage and flood 
control. 
 
The Abortive Experiment in State Administration: 
 The brief interlude in states administration was a colossal failure.  The decision of 
most states to use revenue generated from ceded wetlands for every purpose but drainage 
led them to devolve authority for surface water management back to local communities in 
the form of drainage district legislation.  According to Vileisis, drainage districts, ―with 
their taxing and land condemnation powers, were a radical concept.  There was little 
precedent for creating such layers of local government, except for boards some states had 
started to implement the Swamp Land Acts.‖120  As the descendents of colonial 
commissions of sewers, which exercised land distrainment and taxing powers, drainage 
districts were not, as Vileisis maintains, a ―radical‖ and unprecedented institutional 
innovation.  Drainage districts were autonomous and quasi-corporate entities authorized 
by state legislatures to enable groups of farmers to drain their lands.   By collectivizing 
costs and creating an administrative structure to supervise construction and maintenance 
of drainage works, drainage districts allowed farmers to overcome the prohibitive price of 
drainage, the difficulties involved in securing right-a-ways across other proprietors‘ 
property, and the strict rules for surface water disposal implemented by civil law states.  
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Legislation authorizing the formation of districts permitted them to incur bonded 
indebtedness to finance construction, to coerce the participation of minority landowners, 
and to determine proportional assessments based on the potential benefits inhering to 
landowners.  The ability to incur bonded indebtedness constituted one of districts most 
important powers.  Furthermore, drainage districts possessed eminent domain powers, 
allowing them to seize and condemn lands to fulfill their stated mission.
121
 
 The complicated labyrinth of laws regarding drainage district formation and 
operation defies any simple overview.  Laws authorizing drainage districts varied greatly 
between states and were regularly amended, revised, and superseded by new statues or 
modified, pared back, and sometimes struck down by state courts.  Nevertheless, two 
general principles seem to have been adopted across state lines.   As a prerequisite of 
district formation, most states required petitioners to demonstrate that the estimated 
financial benefits generated by the proposed improvement would exceeded anticipated 
costs and provide a public benefit (such as public health, utility, and welfare).  Initiating 
the process of district formation straightforward.  In general, laws mandated that a 
specific proportion of landowners in the area proposed to be improved submit a signed 
petition to a specific governing entity (usually courts or state legislatures).  In most cases, 
the signatures of one-third of the landowners owning more than 50% of the land or the 
approval of a majority of landowners owning at least one-third of land to be improved 
were required.  In a few Mississippi Valley states, districts could be organized if one-
fourth of the landowners consented—regardless of the size of their holdings.  In even 
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rarer cases, states required only the consent of landowners whose property comprised a 
simple majority of a plot to be drained. 
Once the petitioners met the minimum requirements, the supervising entity (the 
courts or legislatures) received the petition, posted public notices about the time and 
location of hearings to determine its merits, and appointed a disinterested ―board of 
reviewers.‖  Reviewers‘ responsibilities included surveying the land, levying proportional 
assessments based on anticipated benefits, designing construction plans and maps, 
estimating future maintenance costs, and, if necessary, hiring an engineer to help 
overcome difficult topographical problems.  If the superintending entity approved the 
petition and established a drainage district, the special assessments were collected in the 
customary manner as other taxes.  Many state drainage laws provided for elections of 
leaders so they could make determinations about the issuance of bonds, evaluate 
complaints regarding assessments, supervise project maintenance, and decide about the 
inclusion of outlying properties.
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 Although the heyday of drainage district formation occurred between 1905-1919 
(see chapter 5), anecdotal evidence suggests that the intervening period between the 
conclusion of the Civil War and 1900 witnessed an uptick in drainage district formation 
and county drainage projects west of the Appalachians with the largest overall amount of 
wetlands losses concentrated in the states of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois.  During the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, technological innovations quickened the pace of 
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wetlands conversion and drainage district formation.  Giant horse-and oxen-drawn 
excavators and steam-powered trenchers facilitated rapid and efficient drainage ditch 
construction.  The growth of the clay tile industry promoted better subsurface drainage.   
Buried below the surface of fields, horseshoe-shaped clay tiles channeled subsurface 
water into larger drainage ditches, rivers, and creeks.  Seeking to keep down distribution 
and delivery costs, tile manufacturers usually built new factories near areas undergoing 
rapid agricultural development.  The number of factories that manufactured tiles steadily 
climbed in the decades following the Swamp Land Acts:  in 1859, 66; in the 1860s, 234; 
in 1879, 840; and in 1882, 1,140.  Of the 1,140 factories operating in 1882, 90% were 
located in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, the epicenter of pre-twentieth century wetlands 
drainage.
123
 
 Farmers participating in drainage enterprises usually received a good return on 
their investment in the forms of better crop yields and enhanced property values.  Up to 
1900, drainage enterprises invested a mean sum of $4.22 for every acre under their 
jurisdiction.  In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the 500% increase in the 
value of drained lands dwarfed the 40% rise in the value of other lands and farm 
improvements.  In some rural Illinois communities, artificial drainage increased the price 
of land between 25-50% in the seven-year interval between 1880 to 1887.  In 1885, the 
tax valuation of an 80-acre farm in Harrison Township in Henry County, Ohio, was $14 
per acre.  Valuations jumped as farmers drained the land surrounding the Maumee River 
and its tributaries.  In 1910 and 1920, the valuation of Harrison Township lands 
respectively soared to $25 and then to $50.  Henry County‘s Bartlow and Richfield 
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Townships experienced an even higher drainage-related increase in valuations.  As a 
dense and sometimes impenetrable swamp, portions of Bartlow and Richfield Townships 
were some of the last places in Henry County—as well as Ohio—to be settled.  In 1885, 
80-acre farms in both townships were assessed at $5 per acre.  By 1920, after drainage 
had boosted agricultural production and slow settlement, Bartlow Township farms were 
assessed at $66 per acre while Richfield farms reached a $75 per acre taxable value.
124
 
 The historian William B. Meyers argues that drainage districts served as the 
―indispensible engine‖ of American wetlands drainage.125  By the close of the nineteenth 
century, land conservation by drainage was firmly under the control of local districts and 
county governments.  Communities set their own policies, determined rate assessments, 
supervised the maintenance and repair of drainage works, and often held meetings to 
resolve disputes and craft new regulations.  It makes more sense to see American land 
conservation on the verge of the twentieth century as a series of discrete grassroots 
movements—which were initiated, organized, and carried out by ordinary citizens—
rather than as a single movement controlled and directed by national elites.   Rural surface 
water management was built from the ground up and favored the growth of local 
bureaucracies at the expense of the national state.  Until 1906, the federal government 
deferred to local communities in matters of wetlands management and was content to 
remain detached from the process of wetlands drainage.  Anonymous and faceless 
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farmers—and not national elites—were chief actors in the story of American land 
conservation before and after 1900. 
 Compared to other forms of land conservation such as flood control and arid land 
irrigation, drainage was less capital intensive, encountered fewer interstate problems, did 
not involve the lengthy adjudication of water rights, and rarely required the erection of 
large storage reservoirs or costly diversion canals.  Unlike levee districts, which were 
southern institutions devoted to building and maintaining levees alongside major rivers, 
the fate of individual drainage districts was not tied to the success or failure of nearby 
enterprises.  Requiring coordination, cooperation, and centralized planning on a more 
limited scale, drainage seldom demanded the intervention of provincial or national elites 
and could be handled by local institutions.  The next chapter is a case study of what 
happened when local institutions were incapable of handling drainage responsibilities on 
their own. 
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CHAPTER 4:  ―I AM NO SOCIALIST‖:  FARMERS, LAND DRAINAGE,  
AND RAILROADS IN THE VALLEY OF THE 
RED RIVER OF THE NORTH, 1879-1901 
 
The 1881 spring planting season passed without incident for Andrew Lommeland, 
a farmer in Minnesota‘s far western Clay County.  The widowed father of two young 
daughters, he planted 37 acres of wheat and 3 acres of oats.  In May 1877, Lommeland 
had moved to Clay County, filed for a homestead, plowed under the native prairie 
grasses, and put in his first small crop the next year.  Flat, low, and marshy, 
Lommeland‘s quarter section of land would have tested the skill and patience of even the 
most resolute yeoman.  Nonetheless, in 1883, Lommeland succeeded in ―proving up‖ his 
homestead and received title to 160 acres from the federal government.
1
 
 Life on the prairie was cruel, arduous, and frustrating for many settlers like 
Lommeland in the Valley of the Red River of the North, which forms the present-day 
boundary between Minnesota and North Dakota.   Born in Norway in 1823, Lommeland 
immigrated to the United States seeking a better life and an opportunity to secure cheap 
land.  Lommeland was not prosperous.  According to the 1880 agricultural census, he 
only owned three mules, a cow, a calf, and, for a brief time, three lambs.  He had little 
luck with the lambs.  Late in 1879, Lommeland slaughtered a lamb for food and then 
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watched in dismay as the other two died of a baffling disease, after producing only 12 lbs. 
of fleece.  Tragedy followed Lommeland everywhere.  Becoming widowed, selecting an 
inferior parcel of land, and watching the lambs succumb to a mysterious ailment were 
enough to shake the confidence of even the hardiest pioneer.  Yet Lommeland 
persevered.  Providing for his daughters, Sarra and Amalia, aged 12 and 8, was enough 
motivation for him to plow up more of the prairie each year and gradually expand 
production.  After planting 40 acres in 1881, Lommeland eagerly anticipated the fall 
harvest and expected his best crop to date.
2
 
 Misfortune struck again shortly after Lommeland‘s crops sprouted.  Sometime 
during the early spring of 1881, he awoke one morning to a distressing, unfortunate, and 
puzzling situation.  Looking out over his patchwork of cultivated fields and unimproved 
lowlands, Lommeland stared in disbelief as an enormous shallow lake of water covered 
the prairie as far as the eye could see.  Gently flowing over the land from the southeast, 
the 12-inch deep sea of water was a mysterious, uninvited intruder.  Lommeland and his 
neighbors in Moland Township struggled mightily to explain where the water came from.  
The nearby Buffalo River was not cresting.  There were no large dams near Moland that 
might have breached.  There had been no torrential thunderstorms.  Yet the unwelcome 
waters ruined Lommeland‘s crops and dashed his chances of getting ahead.3 
 It did not take long for the Moland farmers to unravel the mystery.  In October 
1880, the St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba (SPM&M) railroad, the predecessor of the 
Great Northern (GN), the last transcontinental to reach the Pacific coast during the late 
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nineteenth century, built a series of drainage ditches from Clay County all the way north 
to Crookston, Minnesota.  The drainage system was the brainchild of James J. Hill, a 
brilliant, headstrong, and occasionally ruthless railroad manager who, within a decade, 
was recognized as one of the Gilded Age‘s most successful and prosperous entrepreneurs.  
Hill and a group of associates took over the bankrupt St. Paul and Pacific railway and 
transformed it into the lucrative and efficient SPM&M by capturing the growing wheat 
market of the valley of the Red River of the North and rapidly disposing of the 
company‘s 3.8 million-acre land grant.  In the early 1880s, the combination of poor land 
drainage and the Valley‘s meandering rivers, which often overflowed their shallow banks 
and created large, sprawling marshes, constituted one of the principal obstacles to the 
company‘s financial revival.  Water on the prairie‘s surface washed out railroad tracks, 
kept large tracts of land out of cultivation, prevented the SPM&M from disposing of its 
land grant, complicated travel, and shortened the already brief northern growing season 
by delaying when a farmer could put in his crop.  Furthermore, the absence of 
government involvement in land drainage by Minnesota and Dakota Territory delivered a 
fatal blow to local communities.  As early as 1879, Valley farmers and newspapers 
implored the SPM&M to serve as a surrogate for the state and territorial governments by 
building main drainage outlets into which farmers could empty ditches from their own 
waterlogged fields.  Fascinated by the control of water, Hill agreed to help, launching the 
SPM&M‘s ill-fated drainage program that disastrously flooded the land of more than four 
dozen farmers like Andrew Lommeland.  After the SPM&M‘s abandoned its drainage 
program, Valley farmers and business leaders led a grassroots uprising clamoring for the 
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state of Minnesota finally live up to its responsibilities under the 1860 Swamp Land Act 
by appropriating funds for drainage. 
 The story of land drainage in the Valley of the Red River of the North provides a 
case study of the limitations of local power in the matter of wetlands drainage.  As 
Chapter 3 discusses, the breakdown of federal wetlands policy compelled states to 
devolve responsibilities for surface water removal to drainage districts and county and 
township governments.  Intended to release the collective energy of Americans against 
nature, local institutions such as those in the Red River Valley proved incapable of 
solving complicated surface water disposal problems.  The Valley‘s paucity of natural 
outlets, flat topography, and meandering, ill-defined rivers defied local control.  Indeed, 
counties, townships, and farmers discovered that without the construction of very long 
artificial outlets and the improvement and channelization of existing watercourses, they 
would have nowhere to dispose of the surface water that originated on their lands.  This 
chapter takes a brief look at how individual farmers, communities, and corporations in 
one part of the country responded to the failure of the Swamp Land Acts.  It argues that 
Minnesotans and Dakotans clamored for the expansion of government into wetlands 
management after the SPM&M retreated from its experiment of direct environmental 
planning.  In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, American farmers 
welcomed and applauded the intervention of local and state governments into their lives, 
farms, and communities if it produced a desirable environmental outcome such as a 
drained landscape.  The rapid growth of local and state governments dedicated to 
drainage is the great untold story of American environmental history and U. S. state 
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building.  Indeed, the expansion of local governments rivaled, if not surpassed, the 
growth of federal administrative and regulatory capacities.   
 
The Agricultural Transformation of the Red River Valley 
 Andrew Lommeland arrived in Clay County during the preliminary phase of what 
one scholar calls the ―Red River Boom.‖  In 1880, the Valley of the Red River of the 
North eclipsed Kansas and Nebraska as the epicenter of western settlement as American, 
Norwegian, Swedish, Finnish, and German land seekers poured into the area.  The so-
called Boom, which reached its apogee in 1882, transformed the Valley into one of the 
world‘s principal wheat producing regions.  During the 1880s, the Valley‘s population 
tripled from 56,000 to 166,000, the quantity of its land integrated into farms jumped from 
1.6 million acres to 5.4 million acres, and the ratio of farmland in crop soared from 22% 
to 65%.  Poor European wheat harvests coincided with the Boom and pushed prices 
above their 1870s median level although they leveled off after 1882.
4
 
 The complex chain of events that triggered the Red River Boom included the 
obsession of Minnesota‘s territorial leaders with railroads, the emergence of Minneapolis 
as a major milling hub, innovations in milling technology, and the financial collapse of 
the Northern Pacific Railroad (NP) during the Panic of 1873.  Beginning in the 1840s, the 
United States entered a cultural stage described by some scholars as ―railroad mania.‖  
By 1837, about 1,500 miles of railroad had been laid east of the Mississippi River by 
private companies.  The total jumped to 9,000 miles by the close of the 1840s and more 
than tripled  to 31,000 miles by 1860, dwarfing the 5,000 miles of canals and slack-water 
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navigation.  The power, size, alacrity, and ability of the iron horse to operate year-round, 
unlike seasonally frozen rivers and canals, captivated Americans.  The railroad‘s 
elimination of time and space captured the imagination of nationalists and social critics.  
In 1844, Ralph Waldo Emerson rhapsodized that "railroad iron is a magician's rod, in its 
power to evoke the sleeping energies of land and water."
5
  Not to be outdone, the poet 
Walt Whitman celebrated the sheer power, novelty, and technological prowess of the iron 
horse: 
Thy great protruding head-light fix‘d in front, 
Thy long, pale, floating vapor-pennants, tinged with delicate 
 purple, 
Thy dense and murky clouds out-belching from they smoke- 
 stack, 
Thy knitted frame, thy springs and valves, the tremulous 
 twinkle of they wheels, 
Thy train of cars behind, obedient, merrily following, 
Though gale of calm, now swift, now slack, yet steadily 
 careering; 
Type of the modern—emblem of motion and power—pulse  
 of the continent
6
 
 
 The tremendous growth of railroad mileage between 1850 and 1871 would not 
have been possible without federal land grants.  Federal subsidization of railroads with 
public land grants was one of Congress‘s most critical interventions into nineteenth-
century economic planning.  Up to 1871, when Congress suspended the practice of giving 
lavish grants to railroads due to popular indignation over the Crédit Mobilier scandal, the 
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national legislature gave 155,000,000 acres to over eighty railroad companies.  In 1850, 
the Illinois Central and Mobile and Ohio Railways became the first companies to benefit 
from congressional largesse.  Congress gave each railroad the odd-numbered sections of 
public land within a 6-mile strip of the right-of-way.  As the pet project of Sen. Stephen 
Douglass, the Illinois Central grant was particularly generous and comprised 2.6 million 
of the 11 million acres of public land in Illinois.
7
 
 Railroad mania influenced the leaders of Minnesota Territory.  On March 3, 1857, 
Congress acceded to the request of the territorial legislature for public land subsidies for 
railroads, giving the odd-numbered sections in six-mile wide corridors to railroads 
building according to a predetermined network.  For the sake of this study the two most 
important corridors extended from St. Paul in a westerly route and also followed a 
northwest line from the territorial capitol to the place where the Red River of the North 
intersected the international boundary.  The very same year Minnesota‘s legislature 
incorporated the Minnesota and Pacific railroad to construct a line from Stillwater to St. 
Paul all the way west to Breckenridge with a branch line connecting to Pembina on the 
49
th
 parallel.  The Minnesota and Pacific‘s chief engineer gloated about the company‘s 
potential and wildly forecasted that the 2,460,000-acre land grant, if disposed of at $8 per 
acre, would raise $20 million.  The Panic of 1857 intervened and dried up existing 
capital, sapped investors‘ enthusiasm for speculative ventures, and left prominent 
businessmen hesitant to invest capital in a vast territory with a sparse population of 
150,000 people.  In April 1858, the legislature authorized the state to issue bonds, not 
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exceeding $5 million, to fund construction.  Recognizing that the new state could not 
redeem the bonds, the 1859 legislature terminated their issuance at $2.3 million and the 
railroad failed to lay a single track.
8
 
 The Minnesota and Pacific‘s inauspicious beginnings paralleled the fate of many 
railroads that were conceived according to boosters‘ fantasies rather than business logic.  
In 1862, Minnesota languished without a single mile of operational railroad and the 
legislature incorporated a new line—the St. Paul and Pacific—to take over the franchises, 
possessions, and land grant of the Minnesota and Pacific.  Unlike the previous company, 
the St. Paul and Pacific made torturously slow progress and, by summer‘s end, completed 
a 10-mile line to St. Anthony.  Within a decade, the fledgling line had completed 283 
miles and, in October 1871, reached Breckenridge, located on the Boise de Sioux River, 
which forms the present-day boundary between central Minnesota and North Dakota.  
The St. Paul and Pacific‘s success in rapidly pushing west concealed its shaky financial 
status and incompetent leadership.  Despite receiving much of the initial 2,460,000 
million-acre land grant, the company was unable to manage its high debt load.
9
 
 The Saint Paul and Pacific was not the only Minnesota railway to benefit from 
congressional generosity.  In 1864, Congress chartered the NP to construct a 
transcontinental line from Lake Superior to Puget Sound.  Though Congress decided 
against subsidizing the NP with generous loans—as it had the first transcontinental 
railroad in 1862—it approved a liberal land grant encompassing 20 sections per mile in 
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states that it crossed and 40 sections per mile through territories.  In the summer of 1870, 
workers began laying the first tracks near Duluth, Minnesota.  Capital always proved 
more elusive for NP leaders than enthusiasm and extravagant predictions of quick wealth.  
Only 2,500 European-Americans called the region between Duluth and Bozeman, 
Montana, home when construction commenced.  Building in violation of Cornelius 
Vanderbilt‘s famous dictum—―you can‘t build a railroad from nowhere to nowhere‖—
the NP relied on financier extraordinaire Jay Cooke to provide the funding for the 
immense undertaking.  A brilliant banker who helped raise over one-quarter of the 
Union‘s Civil War finances, Cooke‘s support of the NP overextended his financial firm—
Jay Cooke & Associates—and threw the nation into the Panic of 1873, the most severe 
economic depression Americans had experienced to date.  In a few years, the Panic 
forced the NP into receivership and ultimately set in motion the chain of events that 
culminated in the Red River Boom.
10
 
 The Panic of 1873 did not derail Minneapolis‘s ascendancy as the United States‘ 
flour milling capital.  Minneapolis‘s nineteenth-century rise stemmed from its strategic 
location near the falls of St. Anthony, the discovery that hard spring wheat was well 
adapted to the short growing season of Minnesota and eastern Dakota Territory, and the 
Twin Cities‘ location as a major railroad hub.  Despite hard spring wheat‘s adaptability to 
northern climates, it posed problems for millers.  The wheat‘s bran—the hard, brittle 
outer layer of the grain—disintegrated during the milling process and obstructed the 
millstones.  Seeking a solution, Minneapolis millers appropriated an eastern European 
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process that employed a series of rollers, separated by diminishing gaps, which detached 
the germ and bran from the wheat‘s kernel.  After this initial step, a middlings purifier 
used a burst of air to separate the bran and germ.  The innovation enabled Minneapolis 
millers, including William Washburn and C. A. Pillsbury, to refine the type of grain best 
adapted to the city‘s agricultural hinterland.11 
 The voracious appetite of Minneapolis mills for hard spring wheat provided the 
NP with an opportunity to escape insolvency.  James B. Power, the NP‘s brilliant land 
commissioner, devised a program that gave NP bondholders the opportunity to exchange 
their notes for choice tracts of the company‘s giant land grant, which potentially included 
47 million acres, 10.7 million of which were in North Dakota.  The exchange program 
was an immediate success.  From September 1875 to August 1878, bondholders‘ 
exchanges for land accounted for over 70% of NP land sales.  Over half of the 1.2 million 
acres disposed of went to 40 people.  NP President George W. Cass and director 
Benjamin P. Cheney swapped their bonds for 13,400 acres of land north of present-day 
Casselton.  They received the land at a bargain price of 46 to 60 cents per acre.  John L. 
Grandin and his brother established a second large farm.  When Jay Cooke & Associates 
closed their doors, the Grandin‘s, who were involved in the banking, lumber, and oil 
industries, were left holding an $88,000 note.  During an 1875 trip to Fargo to investigate 
the Valley‘s agricultural potential, Grandin and his guide stumbled upon a farmer 
residing in a dugout cave near the Elm and Goose rivers.  The settler‘s small patch of 
wheat was of such an impressive size, color, and quality that Grandin immediately 
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exchanged his note for a 75,000-acre farm.  As a series of poor European harvests in the 
late 1870s elevated American commodity prices, additional bondholders exchanged their 
notes for large tracts of land that eventually became known as bonanza farms.
12
 
 Bonanza farms combined professional management, intense capitalization, 
advanced machinery, and seasonal labor forces to turn the tall grass prairie into uniform 
factory farms.  Reporters from across the county flocked to the bonanzas and wrote 
stirring stories about the wealth and success awaiting emigrants to the Red River Valley.  
In the late 1870s, Power sensationalized the bonanzas and extolled the Valley‘s 
agricultural productiveness in letters to the Country Gentleman, the New York Tribune, 
the Farmer’s Union (St. Paul, Minn.), and Pioneer Press (St. Paul).  The public exposure 
paid dividends.  Reporters from several national periodicals visited the bonanzas and 
publicized the cornucopia of wheat and grain.  Fascinated by the press‘s accounts, 
President Rutherford B. Hayes visited the Cass-Cheney bonanza farm in 1878.  Hayes 
marveled at the bonanzas‘ magnitude, efficiency, and productivity.  Hayes expressed 
―admiration and astonishment‖ regarding the 36 train cars of wheat shipped daily from 
the farm to Duluth and Minneapolis and the 40 steam threshers which extracted nature‘s 
bounty with factory-like precision.  By 1882, the Valley was home to 82 farms exceeding 
1,000 acres and a decade later 323 farms of that size.  During the 1870s, the NP and St. 
Paul and Pacific dispatched representatives to England, Germany, Holland, Iceland, and 
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Switzerland to recruit settlers.  Seeking to turn a quick and easy profit, waves of home 
seekers flocked to the Valley.
13
 
 
James J. Hill, the takeover of the SPM&M, and the Growth of the Red River Valley 
 
 Few historical figures towered over the agricultural, environmental, and economic 
development of a particular section of the country as James J. Hill did the Red River 
Valley.  Born on September 16, 1838, in Wellington, Ontario, a small town northwest of 
Guelph, Hill was the third child and first surviving son of James Hill, a Scots-Irishman 
who in 1829 relocated his family to Ontario, and Ann (Dunbar) Hill, a Scots-Irish 
Presbyterian whose family fled religious persecution in their homeland, arriving in 
Ontario in 1832.  After marriage and the birth of their children, the Hill‘s lived a typical 
hardscrabble frontier life.  Young James recalled gazing at the moon and stars through his 
parent‘s porous and dilapidated roof while lying in bed at night.  James and his younger 
brother, Alec, found solace retreating into the woods as they grew fond of hunting, 
fishing, and other outdoor activities.
14
 
 In 1856, Hill left his native Canada and immigrated to St. Paul, the bustling 
capitol of Minnesota Territory.  Hill‘s rise to prominence and prosperity within a few 
decades was meteoric, strikingly reminiscent of a Horatio Alger rags-to-riches character.  
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By the time Hill arrived in St. Paul, he had developed some of the personality traits that 
served him well in the rough and tumble frontier economy and later made him both a 
successful and loathed capitalist.  He was ambitious, hardworking, and indefatigable but 
also imperious, competitive, combative, and unreceptive of criticism.  Finding work on 
the Mississippi River‘s levees, the industrious Canadian learned the ins and outs of the 
fur trade, which dominated the city‘s economy.  In 1857, a year after Hill arrived in 
Minnesota, Canadian Metís traders hauled furs, skins, pemmican, dried buffalo meat, 
moccasins, and other Indian-crafted items to St. Paul from the region adjacent to the 
Valley of the Red River of the North amounting to the tune of $183,000.  After unloading 
their red river carts—famous for their five-foot high wooden wheels that could be heard 
screeching from several miles away as the ungreased axels and wheels grinded against 
one another—the Metís reloaded their carts with ammunition, clothing, dry goods, farm 
implements, glass, guns, hardware, liquor, pianos, staple groceries, and tools for the 
return trip north to Fort Garry (present-day Winnipeg).  Many of the furs and 
manufactured goods demanded by St. Paul‘s growing population passed through the 
levees and came into contact with the young Hill, who gained an intimate understanding 
of the efficient distribution and forwarding of goods.
15
 
 Hill was no idle spectator of the Red River Valley‘s transformation into 
Minneapolis‘s agricultural hinterland.  By the time new milling techniques increased 
demand for hard spring wheat and the bonanza farms attracted international fame, he was 
a respected and successful entrepreneur.  On the heels of the Civil War, Hill established 
the James J. Hill Company in St. Paul and maneuvered to become the St. Paul and 
                                                          
15
 Malone, James J. Hill, 10-4; Martin, James J. Hill, 36; and Rhoda R. Gilman, Carolyn Gilman, 
and Deborah M. Stultz, The Red River Trails:  Oxcart Routes between St. Paul and the Selkirk Settlement, 
1820-1870 (St. Paul:  Minnesota Historical Society, 1979), 14. 
166 
 
Pacific‘s primary forwarding agent.  Hill regarded the St. Paul and Pacific as a diamond 
in the rough that one day could become a lucrative enterprise if it captured the 
agricultural trade of the Red River Valley.  The railroad‘s financial shortcomings, he 
privately mused, had much more to do with its incompetent, inept, and listless 
management than anything else.  Hill also became involved in the steam boating business 
on the Red River.  He established the Hill, Griggs and Co. and later merged with his 
fiercest competitor, Norman Kittson, to form the Red River Transportation Company.  
Though Hill recognized that railroads provided a much more efficient mode of 
transportation than steamboats since the Red River lay frozen for half the year and 
followed a winding northerly route, his firm reaped enormous profits when railroad 
construction temporarily stalled after 1873. 
 In the late 1870s, Hill and a group of business ―associates‖ set their sights on 
seizing control of the St. Paul and Pacific from its Dutch bondholders.  Hill, John S. 
Kennedy, Kittson, Donald Smith, and George Stephen gained control of the line in 1878 
and, the next year, rechristened it the SPM&M to reflect the north-south emphasis they 
intended to pursue.  From the moment the associates gained control they pushed 
vigorously to meet construction deadlines imposed by the legislature to secure additional 
land grants in Red River Valley.  The most important of these deadlines centered on the 
so-called St. Vincent extension, a north-south line running on the Minnesota side of the 
Valley to St. Vincent, located where the Red River crossed the international boundary.  
On November 12, 1878, the SPM&M met the deadline by reaching the 49
th
 parallel and 
secured an enormously valuable land grant.  When it was all said and done, the 
SPM&M‘s land grant encompassed the odd-numbered sections for ten miles on both 
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sides of the track from Breckenridge to St. Vincent, making it the owner of 25% of the 
upper valley.  The acquisition of the grant belies the long-standing myth that the GN, 
which was the SPM&M‘s successor, built to the Pacific without the aid of a land grant 
unlike other transcontinental railroads.
16
 
 
The Remnant of a Glacial Lake 
 Hill recognized that one of the principal obstacles to the SPM&M‘s financial 
turnaround, which depended on the disposition of its 3.8 million-acre grant, was the 
Valley‘s poor drainage.  Surface water made much of the SPM&M‘s land grant 
unattractive to potential buyers, washed out railroad tracks, and impeded the agricultural 
efforts of the thousands of newly-arrived settlers.  The Valley‘s drainage problems 
developed during the last ice age, known as the Wisconsin glaciations (see Map1).  About 
20,000 years ago, glaciers reached their greatest southern penetration in North America, 
blanketing almost all of present-day Canada and the northern United States.  Covering an 
area the size of Antarctica, the North American glaciers were at least 50% larger than 
their European and Asian counterparts.
17
 
 Glaciers develop when winter snow and ice does not melt during the summer.  
Some scientists believe that complex 100,000-year astronomical cycles influencing the 
earth‘s climate promote intervals of glaciation.  Very warm summers and cold winters 
represent one of this cycle‘s extreme.  The other extreme is characterized by mild 
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summers and winters.  This unusual stage probably leads to glacier formation because the 
mean summer temperature was insufficient to melt winter snow and ice accumulations.  
During this phase, huge ice sheets slowly build up and expanded over earth‘s surface 
until the cycle reversed itself to the point when the mean seasonal temperatures vary 
considerably and, as a result, summer temperatures melt the ice accumulations.
18
 
As the Wisconsin Glaciation drew to a close 12,000 years ago, retreating glaciers 
in Canada blocked the northerly-flowing Red River of the North from draining into 
Hudson‘s Bay.  The blockage created an enormous glacial lake spanning 123,500 square 
miles with a depth of 400 feet.  Lake Agassiz, the largest of North America‘s glacial 
lakes, persisted in various forms for 4,500 years (see Map 2).  Covering much of present-
day Manitoba, Ontario, west-central Saskatchewan, and the entire Valley of the Red 
River of the North, Lake Agassiz‘s size exceeded contemporary Lake Superior, the 
world‘s biggest freshwater lake, by at least four times.  Before draining 9,000 years ago, 
 
Figure 1:  Wisconsin Glaciation 
The above map shows the furthest extent of the Wisconsin Glaciation from 100,000 – 
10,000 years ago.  Retrieved from the website of the Minnesota River Basin Data Center 
on October 1, 2009. 
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  Figure 2:  Glacial Lake Agassiz 
This map depicts the total surface area covered by Glacial Lake Agassiz.  Retrieved from 
the website of the Minnesota River Basin Data Center on October 1, 2009. 
 
Lake Agassiz had a tremendous influence on the Red River Valley‘s present-day ecology.  
Whipped up by winds, waves smoothed the floor of the lake, leaving a uniform and 
featureless surface.  Rivulets flowing into Agassiz transferred mineral matter from the 
glacial till into the lake, causing heavier clays to settle in the center of the lake, silts in 
shallower water, and sand in the shallowest portion near the lake‘s shores and beaches.  
As the lake drained, tall grass prairie colonized the former lakebed and an exceptionally 
rich soil accumulated at the rate of an inch per year until reaching a depth of five feet.
19
 
 Immature drainage systems are a primary characteristic of former glacial lake 
beds.  The recession of Lake Agassiz left in its wake a paucity of natural outlets such as 
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watercourses, creeks, or brooks.  On the Minnesota side of the Valley, the few rivers 
flowing from west to east followed meandering courses, had shallow and undefined 
banks, and often overflowed their banks while traversing the flattest portions of the 
former glacial lake‘s bottom, filling up shallow depressions with water and creating 
sprawling prairie marshes.  During the Red River Boom, Valley settlers in the United 
States and Canada described the process as the rivers having ―lost themselves on the 
prairie.‖20  In addition to the marshes fed by the Red River‘s tributaries, the Valley 
contained wide areas of wet prairie.  In the early 1950s, the historical geographer Leslie 
Hewes applied the term ―wet prairie‖ to an arcing strip of territory extending from the 
Red River of the North‘s Valley through southwestern Minnesota, most of Iowa, northern 
and central Illinois, and pockets of southern Wisconsin and eastern Indiana.  Wet prairies 
were seasonal wetlands created when spring snowmelt and late summer thunderstorms 
engulfed the prairie with more surface water than could soak into the stiff soils or find an 
outlet owing the scarcity of natural outlets and flat topography.  According to one 
estimate, wet prairies and marshes originally covered about 20% of the surface area of 
the Red River Valley.
21
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The Failure of National Wetlands Policy in Minnesota 
 Had Minnesota complied with the terms of the Swamp Land Acts, settlers 
arriving in the Valley during the Red River Boom would have encountered a drained 
landscape fit for immediate cultivation.  Few states showed such a reckless disregard of 
the conditions and terms of the Acts as Minnesota.  Under its 1860 donation, Minnesota 
received 4.7 million acres of ―swamp and overflowed lands,‖ the program‘s fifth largest 
individual grant.  In 1861, Governor Alexander Ramsey implored the legislature to use 
the state‘s grant to build insane asylums, institutes for the ―blind, deaf and dumb,‖ state 
prisons, normal schools, and roads.  Legislators endorsed Ramsey‘s plan with the caveat 
that ―swamp and overflowed lands‖ also subsidize railroad construction.  Soon thereafter 
the legislature promised the Lake Superior and Mississippi Railroad Company 694,000 
aces of ceded swampland to build a railroad between St. Paul and Duluth.  It pledged 
seven sections to the Taylors Falls and Lake Superior Railroad for every mile of railroad 
it laid between Wyoming, Minnesota, and Taylors Falls.  The St. Paul and Chicago 
Railroad (succeeded by the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul), Minneapolis and St. 
Cloud Railroad (succeeded by the Great Northern), Southern Minnesota, Minnesota 
Central, Duluth and Iron Range, and Sioux Falls and Dakota (succeeded by the Northern 
Pacific) also received lavish grants.  Policymakers ceded all of the wetlands in McLeod 
County (4,683 acres) to enable it to subsidize the construction of an agricultural college 
and later a seminary.  They initially donated 10,000 acres for the construction of a state 
road to Sioux Falls, South Dakota, 100,000 acres for an insane asylum, 100,000 acres for 
a ―deaf and dumb‖ institute, up to 225,000 acres for three normal schools, and 100,000 
acres for a state prison.  In 1881, public outrage over the giveaways prompted the 
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legislature to pass a constitutional amendment prohibiting additional grants to railroads 
and dedicating the balance of the state‘s 1860 grant to education and charitable 
institutions.  By this time, however, railroads held title to most of the 2.9 million acres 
given to private corporations (62% of the total grant).  In Benjamin Palmer‘s apt 
judgment, ―from the time of the acceptance by the legislature of the lands granted by 
Congress in 1860 no attention seems to have been given to the clause in the act by which 
the grant was made.‖22 
 Minnesota‘s noncompliance created a power vacuum in the Red River Valley.  
Like other states, Minnesota devolved authority for draining wetlands to local 
communities.  Between 1858-87 the legislature passed seven different laws authorizing 
the formation of local ditch associations, county and township drainage projects, and 
finally drainage districts.  In the Red River Valley, however, local institutions were 
incapable of draining the wet prairie independent of outside assistance for two reasons.  
First, the Valley‘s lack of viable outlets required the construction of very long and 
expensive ditches into which farmers and communities could convey surface water from 
their fields.  Second, in Minnesota, the Valley‘s meandering, ill-defined rivers, which 
often overflowed the surrounding prairie during their gradual descent into the Red River, 
sometimes made land drainage counterproductive.  It made little sense for one group of 
farmers to divert surface water into these rivers if such an action increased the volume 
and velocity of those watercourses to the detriment of downstream riparian proprietors or 
farmers living near the marshes.  Successful land drainage hence depended on the 
improvement of the Red River‘s tributaries so they could receive an influx of surface 
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water without enlarging marshes on the flattest portion of the Valley where the 
watercourses lost themselves on the prairie.  Apportioning costs for such modifications 
would be a difficult, protracted, and contentious process pitting communities and 
townships against one another.  Furthermore, improvements made drainage costs 
prohibitive for even cost-sharing entities, a fact that farmers, local newspapers, and 
community leaders recognized and deplored.
23
 
 The inability of local institutions to handle land drainage, the absence of action by 
Minnesota or Dakota Territory, and the short northern growing season put Boom farmers 
at nature‘s mercy.  First, the harsh northern climate left a small window for farmers to 
plant their wheat so they could harvest it before the first fall frost.  If heavy winter 
snowfall inundated the prairie and delayed when a farmer could plant in the spring, the 
crop was at increased risk of being damaged by fall frosts before it fully matured.  
Second, when late summer downpours caused water to accumulate on the prairie, a 
newly-arrived farmer might be unable to ―backset‖ his land.  Backsetting was an initial 
step farmers took to prepare their land for cultivation.  After farmers tore up the prairie in 
June and July, the land was backset—tilled in the opposite direction as the first 
breaking—in September or October to breakup large clumps and clods to streamline the 
spring seeding.  When water languished on the prairie in the late summer, farmers could 
not backset before the ground froze.  Third, surface water jeopardized the timely 
harvesting of wheat.   Unlike corn, wheat and other small grains are unprotected by a 
husk and, when mature, remain vulnerable to natural elements.  If surface water delayed 
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when a farmer could harvest his crop, the matured wheat, if subject to rain, wind, or hail, 
might tumble to the ground and spoil, diminishing annual yields.
24
 
 Arrivals to the Valley during the Red River Boom bemoaned how the short 
growing season conspired with surface water to hamper wheat production.  In September 
1879, George C. Reis, a newly-settled farmer in northwestern Minnesota‘s Polk County, 
stared across the prairie in disbelief.  It had been four weeks since the last rainstorm yet 
water still covered Reis‘s land.  The intolerable situation became bleaker with each 
passing day.  As long as water covered the prairie, Reis was ―not … able to put my Plows 
to backsetting.‖25  A strong-willed and resourceful man, Reis refused to let nature get the 
best of him; he briefly considered draining the prairie on his own.  But like many Valley 
farmers, he discovered that drainage was difficult on the level bottom of former Lake 
Agassiz.  The flat topography required farmers to determine correct levels so they could 
harness the power of gravity to convey water away from their fields.  Artificial ditches 
needed to maintain a uniform depth or even the smallest depression would cause the 
water to back up.  Unless a farmer‘s property abutted a creek, river, stream, or pond, 
drainage ditches were useless and could not be emptied.  Reis‘s brief experiences 
convinced him that is was impossible for any settler to ―do his own Draining especially if 
he can‘t tell which direction to go, or where the lowest place is.‖26 
 Discouraged but undeterred, Reis requested assistance from Hill, the reorganized 
SPM&M‘s general manager.  The railroad was one of the few institutions in northwestern 
Minnesota with the manpower, engineers, capital, and financial motivation to drain the 
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wet prairie.  According to Reis, it behooved the SPM&M to help build a series of 
drainage ditches since much of the company‘s land grant in Polk County languished in a 
similar condition as his own.  ―It will pay your Co. to look after this a little,‖ Reis 
explained to Hill, ―as your lands can‘t be Sold if left in present shape.‖27  In late 1879, 
Hill dispatched engineers to Polk County to build drainage ditches for Reis and other 
farmers, but their efforts proved unsatisfactory.  By the following May, Reis‘s 
desperation had turned to anger.  He had 500 acres of land broken and ready for seeding, 
but Reis feared that he did not have a single acre of land dry enough to seed.
28
 
 And then it rained.  ―Mud is king,‖ declared the Red River Valley News, the 
newspaper of the village of Glyndon, Minnesota, in early April 1880.  Every spring area 
newspapers deplored the detrimental impact of poor drainage on the Valley‘s reputation, 
crop production, and roads, but the years 1878 to 1885 witnessed unprecedented 
precipitation levels.  In 1880, the News reported that the abundance of surface water 
rendered county roads ―impassible,‖ meadows ―too wet‖ for cutting hay, and wheat crops 
―stunted‖ and ―yellow.‖29  Unless something was done, editors worried, emigrants and 
home seekers would find northwestern Minnesota to be a miasmatic wasteland instead of 
the country‘s breadbasket.  Back in Polk County, Reis‘s correspondence with Hill also 
took on an increasingly acrimonious tone.  Unless the SPM&M built ditches adjacent to 
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its roadbed for farmers to convey their surface water, Reis predicted his crops ―will all be 
drowned out … and it will be a very serious loss to me and a great draw back to this 
whole country—we need a good sized Canal cut towards Red River, can your Co. help us 
some how[?]‖  After visiting Polk County, Hill agreed to open some large ditches to 
relieve Reis‘s land and protect the SPM&M‘s roadbed from surface water.  Due largely 
to corporate self-interest, Hill had entered the drainage business.
30
 
 
Drainage as a Strategy of Enlightened Environmental Stewardship 
 Since the time of the early republic, Americans identified wetlands drainage as an 
important strategy of enlightened environmental stewardship.  Popularized by the 
Hippocratic revival, hostile attitudes towards wetlands changed little during the 
nineteenth century.  In the Red River Valley, newspapers served as clearinghouses which 
allowed editors and farmers to discuss the issues of drainage and frontier life.  In late 
1881, the editors of the Grand Forks Herald ran a series of articles explaining the 
historical background, benefits, and methods of land drainage.  Drainage, the editors 
explained, was one of the oldest forms of land conservation in human history, dating back 
to the times of the Roman Empire.  Since then, England and Holland had created 
innumerable new farms by draining bogs, fens, and coastal marshes by constructing 
ditches, levees, and pumping projects.  Unlike in Europe, however, the United States‘ 
abundance of cheap and easily available land slowed the progress of land drainage since 
it was easier for Americans who lived on farmers beset by drainage problems to relocate 
rather than drain.  As the nation‘s population soared due to natural increase and 
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immigration, the supply of arable lands would dwindle and conserving land from surface 
water would become indispensible.
31
 
Valley newspapers argued that ordinary farmers and local communities were 
incapable of draining the wet prairie and watercourse-fed marshes without assistance 
from the territorial, state, or federal governments.  ―Ordinary‖ and ―unfortunate‖ farmers 
did not have the capital, manpower, and expertise to dispose of surface water.  Cursed by 
an absence of viable outlets, the Valley afforded only a few fortunate farmers the luxury 
of having access to a watercourse on their property.   Land drainage would proceed in an 
uneven and sluggish fashion until the territorial and state legislatures intervened.  The 
editors of the Grand Forks Herald implored Dakota Territory to open up a series of 
―main‖ ditches through low, marshy places into which adjacent farmers could empty 
lateral ditches from their fields.  If the territory dug the main outlets or empowered 
county officials to dig them, farmers and local communities would incur little expense in 
draining their fields.  Unfortunately, the editors never answered who would pay for the 
mains or assume responsibility for their maintenance and upkeep.
32
 
 Editors emphasized that enlightened environmental stewardship included land 
drainage.  Saturated soils were notoriously cool, putrid, and difficult to cultivate.  
Drainage promised to warm the waterlogged soils—which the editors called ―sticky, 
heavy, sour and cold‖—by 10 degree Fahrenheit and boost their ability to withstand 
summer droughts.  By ―pulverize[ing]‖ topsoil and making it ―loose and porous,‖ 
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drainage drew moisture from the ―deep sub-soil‖ to the surface.  Pulverization also 
enhanced air circulation, which benefitted plant life.  Sodden soils undermined plant 
growth because they fostered the generation of fungi and parasites that sapped the 
strength and vitality of immature plants.  Editors concluded that drainage negated the 
harmfulness of these microorganisms by eliminating their breeding habitats.
33
 
 The final positive result of drainage had nothing to do with crop yields.  Building 
stable rural communities required healthy people in addition to healthy crops.  Dead 
farmers were inefficient farmers.  Since the American Revolution, Americans, both urban 
and rural, associated fetid stagnant waters with fevers known as the ague, autumnal fever, 
bilbous fever, black swamp fever, the chills, intermittent fever, malaria, typhoid, and 
typhus.  The supposed trigger for the outbreak of these ailments was ―miasmas,‖ 
mysterious vapors released into the atmosphere when the sun‘s rays came into contact 
with stagnant pools of water or decomposing animal and vegetable matter.  Most settlers 
and farmers who complained of fevers and the ague probably suffered from malaria.  Just 
before the turn of the century, scientists linked the spread of malaria to the bite of female 
anopheles mosquitoes, which prefer breeding in stagnant wetlands shielded from 
disruptive currents by vegetable growth.  Despite their confusion of cause and effect, 
farmers correctly understood that draining wetlands had a favorable impact on human 
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health.  As the Grand Forks Herald put it, draining the wet prairie would eliminate the 
―noxious and malarial vapors that arise from wet land.‖34 
 The first serious legislative attempt to create a drainage program for the Valley 
occurred in Minnesota.  In 1881, Bernard Sampson, a member of the Minnesota House of 
Representatives from Crookston, introduced legislation appropriating money for drainage 
surveys in the Valley.  The bill dedicated $1,000 for the governor to hire an engineer to 
survey the region and to submit a report outlining the best system for draining it.  
Sampson‘s proposal followed the scheme recommended in the Grand Forks Herald:  the 
state would dig main outlets into which farmers could convey surface water from their 
fields.  The Fisher (Minn.) Bulletin celebrated the plan, describing it as ―dig[ging] a huge 
ditch—almost a canal in fact—from the swamps on State land to the Red River, and then 
let the owners of adjoining property run laterals, at their own expense, into the main 
conduit.‖35  Nothing came about because of Sampson‘s proposition.  Nevertheless, the 
bill acknowledged that Minnesota would, in time, have to revisit its failure to comply 
with the Swamp Land Acts.  Local newspapers and a growing number of farmers 
believed that state government should take an instrumental role in promoting, directing, 
and funding land conservation.  They had few reservations about inviting the state (or 
territorial) governments to assert themselves in environmental management if it produced 
a result beneficial to their families and communities. 
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James J. Hill‘s Empire of Ditches 
 While policymakers in Minnesota and Dakota Territory wavered, Hill and the 
SPM&M organized and implemented a drainage program.  Since becoming the 
SPM&M‘s general manager, Hill believed his company would transform the valley from 
a barren, unproductive, and miasmatic wasteland into a verdant, productive, and 
salubrious garden—the breadbasket of the world.  In the early 1880s, Hill‘s motives for 
sponsoring drainage combined pragmatism and idealism.  First, he viewed increasing the 
SPM&M‘s carrying trade, defending its roadbed from washouts, and disposing of its land 
grant as fundamental to putting the company on a firm financial footing.  Second, Hill 
believed that it was humanity‘s duty to improve nature‘s shortcomings, which contained 
dualistic and contradictory qualities.  ―Nature,‖ he wrote later in life, ―holds out in one 
hand her horn of plenty and in the other her scourge.‖36  The fact that the environment 
―follows laws of its own‖ was most apparent in the allotment of water over earth‘s 
surface.  ―Man must adapt the distribution of water, by which the earth‘s productiveness 
is regulated, to suit his needs.‖37  Hill likened proper environmental management to 
bringing nature into a proper state of balance by moderating the excesses and surpluses of 
water.  Balance was achieved when water did not interfere with agricultural production.  
In places dominated by wetlands, it was the responsibility of people to remove surface 
water; in desert regions, it was the responsibility of people to transport water to the 
surface of the soil.  Utility served as Hill‘s yardstick for evaluating nature, which had no 
intrinsic value beyond satisfying humanity‘s basic needs.   At the end of the 1890s, Hill 
began to see the improvement of marginal lands as fundamental to preserving the 
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nation‘s agrarian heritage and preventing the massing of people in cities.  But in the 
1880s, reversing the SPM&M‘s poor financial outlook took precedence over promoting 
an antediluvian Jeffersonian social vision.
38
 
 In the summer and fall of 1880, Hill ordered the construction of a broad system of 
land drainage in Minnesota‘s Clay, Polk, and Kittson counties.  The system‘s primary 
purpose was to protect the SPM&M‘s roadbed from washouts during heavy rainstorms.  
The plan called for building ditches adjacent to both sides of the railroad bed to intercept 
water flowing across the prairie‘s surface from foothills situated on the eastern banks of 
the former glacial lakebed.  Railroad engineers later dug at least 15 additional ditches, 
totaling some 45 miles, extending perpendicularly and westerly from the roadbed along 
section lines towards the Red River of the North and its tributaries in Clay, Polk, and 
Kittson counties.  Company engineers intended the perpendicular ditches to divert water 
away from the parallel roadbed ditches so they did not overflow the tracks.  Although the 
historical record is sketchy, it suggests that SPM&M representatives received permission 
from farmers to cut the perpendicular ditches across their property on the condition that 
they could connect their own drainage ditches with the larger railroad outlets.  Farmers 
adjacent to the ditches praised them for draining their farms.
39
  Perceiving drainage as an 
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uncomplicated initiative, Hill boasted that the plan promised to ―drain that whole country 
away from the track‖ with a ―comparatively small outlay.‖  The Red River Valley News 
commended the SPM&M‘s investment and anticipated immediate results for railroad and 
farmer alike:  ―This enterprise, while serving well the company‘s interest, will also be a 
boon to settlers along the line, the lot of whom has this wet season been of special 
hardship.‖40 
 One of the SPM&M‘s most important perpendicular ditches extended for three 
miles across Moland Township in Clay County.  Hastily constructed and poorly designed, 
the Moland ditch drained an enormous quantity of water from the company‘s parallel 
ditches and adjacent farmers‘ fields.  Completed during the 1880-1 winter, the Moland 
Ditch‘s most glaring structural flaw was that it emptied into a small ―swail‖ or 
―depression‖ on the prairie‘s surface instead of a watercourse.  The swail was 20 yards 
wide, 12 to 18 inches deep, and ran for two miles from the ditch‘s mouth before gaining 
elevation and becoming indistinguishable with the prairie.  Company engineers 
apparently anticipated that surface water discharged onto the prairie by the Moland ditch 
would disperse and evaporate without harming anyone‘s property.  In an astonishing 
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error of judgment and act of negligence, SPM&M workers did not consider extending the 
ditch another 1.5 miles so it could empty into the nearby Buffalo River.
41
 
 The foolish decision to empty the Moland ditch onto the prairie proved disastrous.  
In April 1881, melting snow and precipitation filled the SPM&M‘s parallel ditches to 
capacity.  Capturing water from the parallel ditches, the Moland ditch also ran full and 
discharged large volumes of water into the swale.  Rather than dispersing across the 
prairie and evaporating, the water accumulated to a depth of 12-18 inches and covered an 
area three miles wide (east to west) and at least nine miles in length (north to south).  The 
shallow flood occurred just weeks after Clay County farmers saw their wheat and oat 
crops sprout.  Andrew Lommeland was but one of dozens of farmers whose farms, 
homes, and fields lay in the path of the shallow, yet destructive, torrent.  Lommeland 
recalled the water‘s swift and unexpected arrival.  One day in late April his crops had 
reached a height of about four inches when the water ―was coming just a rolling on the 
prairie.‖  The water stubbornly lingered for more than a month, nullifying the dim 
prospect that farmers could plow up their ruined fields and replant.
42
 
 Hogen M. Hogenson lived two miles from Lommeland and six miles from the 
Moland ditch‘s mouth.  Born in 1857 in Rock County, Wisconsin, Hogenson and his 
Norwegian parents, Peter and Sonva Hogenson, moved to Olmstead County in 
southeastern Minnesota when he was six years old.  After growing up and helping his 
parents establish a profitable homestead, Hogenson longed to settle a farm of his own.  
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The opportunity arrived in 1880.  Allured by stories of the Red River Valley‘s unrivaled 
fertility, Hogenson left home and filed for a homestead in Moland Township.  Arriving in 
summer, Hogenson worked hard to plow up the native tall grasses and backset his land 
before winter.  The 23-year-old American citizen was somewhat of an outsider in the 
multicultural and ethnically diverse township:  he was one of a handful of native-born 
Americans amongst the many Norwegian and Danish immigrants.
43
 
 The 1881 shallow torrent caught Hogenson off guard and destroyed his first crop.  
Unlike his skeptical neighbors, Hogenson never doubted the flood‘s source.  Probably 
during a trip to the nearby village of Glyndon, Hogenson witnessed SPM&M workers 
digging the Moland ditch.  Though he had never seen the ditch running full of water, he 
concluded it was the only possible source of the water.  Outfitting his draw animals one 
afternoon, Hogenson drove towards the ditch‘s outlet to test his theory.  His animals 
toiled mightily against the swift and steady current.  According to Hogenson, the animals 
―got tired of driving in the water,‖ and he was forced to turn back before reaching the 
ditch.
44
  Exhausted and angry, Hogenson circulated a petition among his neighbors 
addressed to Hill.  Though the petition is lost to history, it undoubtedly asked the railroad 
tycoon to dam the ditch or connect it to the Buffalo River.  The petition reached Hill‘s 
desk at a time when the SPM&M was busily engaged in extending its lines and dealing 
with similar surface water problems north of Fargo in Dakota Territory.  In a perfunctory 
and unsympathetic response, Hill promised that the matter would ―receive attention at the 
earliest possible moment.‖  After that curt reply, Hogenson, Lommeland, and their 
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neighbors seem to have been lost in the shuffle as SPM&M officials scurried to address 
similar flooding problems north of Fargo.  Several Dakota farmers had complained to 
Hill and other railroad executives that the railroad‘s embankment dammed the natural 
flow of prairie surface water after rainstorms and flooded their farms.  Preoccupied with a 
host of problems, Hill placed the Moland ditch low on the company‘s lists of priorities.45  
As 1881 drew to a close, the stage was set for a dramatic showdown between the 
SPM&M and Moland Township farmers.   
 
 
The Expansion of Railroad Drainage 
 Undeterred by the problems in Moland Township, Hill pressed forward with 
additional drainage plans.  In the summer of 1882, he instructed James B. Power, the 
SPM&M‘s land commissioner, to study drainage, interview Valley landowners, and 
prepare a plan.  Power was born on August 20, 1833, in Stockport, New York, to William 
and Catharine Power.  At the young age of sixteen, he took a job as a freight and ticket 
agent for the New York and Erie Railroad.  Power spent most of his life working as a 
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civil engineer and surveyor for railroads in New York, Missouri, and finally Minnesota 
and Dakota Territory when, in 1871, he became the NP‘s first land commissioner.  As the 
architect of the NP‘s bonanza farm scheme, Power played an integral role in the disposal 
of the company‘s land grant.  In the early 1880s, Power fell out of favor with NP 
management after they accused him of malfeasance in his acquisition of depreciated NP 
stock and his dilatory response in firing an employee accused of incompetence.
46
  Upon 
his ignominious dismissal, Power accepted an offer from Hill to head the SPM&M‘s land 
department.  Grateful for a second chance, Power developed a mutual affinity for Hill and 
shared his belief in nature‘s infinite malleability.  Both men agreed that two factors 
inhibited the maximization of profits for railroad and farmer alike.  One factor was 
farmers‘ stubborn refusal to diversify.  The other was the large amount of undeveloped 
wetlands in Minnesota.  The lack of drainage depressed land values, delayed the disposal 
of the SPM&M‘s land grant, and diminished the railroad‘s carrying trade.47 
 In an 1882 letter to Hill, Power laid out his vision for the SPM&M‘s role in 
promoting drainage.  After conferring with prominent landowners, he identified two basic 
problems.  First, the Valley‘s lack of natural outlets prevented farmers from getting 
surface water off of their fields and into natural watercourses.  Second, rivers on the 
Minnesota side of the Valley that flowed across the former glacial lake‘s bottom followed 
torturous and winding courses, had few tributaries, were choked with natural debris, and 
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regularly lost themselves on the flattest portion of their long descent into the Red River, 
creating sprawling marshes.  Water conveyed into these rivers from drainage ditches 
would raise their volume and velocity to such an extent that they might enlarge the 
marshes and endanger riparian proprietors‘ property. According to Power, a couple of 
bonanza farmers had improved a significant quantity of their land by putting in ―small 
and inefficient drains‖ at the expense of nearby settlers ―that are so unfortunate as to be in 
the line of the extra overflow from these reclaimed lands.  This I fear will be the result in 
every instance when individual owners attempt to reclaim their own lands and the 
drainage of these few large farms will in the end damage an area much larger than will be 
benefitted.‖ 48   
 In the absence of state or federal assistance, the SPM&M was the only entity that 
possessed the manpower, resources, and expertise to provide landowners with drainage.  
Power recommended ―opening a series of main drains‖ into which farmers could empty 
their field ditches.
49
  Once constructed, the main drains would connect with watercourses 
prepared by company engineers to handle the increased stream flow.  ―Effectual 
reclamation of the valley land,‖ Power emphasized, ―can only be accomplished by 
cleaning out the natural streams … of the obstructions now preventing free flowage and 
adding to the natural drains a number of artificial water ways.‖50  The land commissioner 
predicted a financial windfall if the company agreed to his plan.  Most of the SPM&M‘s 
unsold lands were ―practically useless‖ because of poor drainage.  In one section of Polk 
County, for instance, there were 312,000 acres—62,700 of which were owned by the 
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SPM&M—of uncultivable wetland.  Power predicted that the drainage of the lands would 
bring the railroad an ―additional carrying business of not less than $250,000 a year‖ and 
enhance the value of its unsold grant by at least $100,000.
51
 
The Keystone Farm provided an ideal opportunity for Power to test his drainage 
strategy.  Cooperatively owned by Springer Harbaugh of St. Paul, Minnesota, and 
Charles Lockhart of Pittsburgh, the Keystone Farm was a mammoth Polk County 
bonanza farm encompassing 9,200 acres.  The first bonanza operation established along 
the SPM&M‘s St. Vincent Extension, the Keystone Farm, as one visitor observed, 
resembled a small village.  By May of 1885, the farm encompassed 36 different 
buildings, ten granaries exceeding 80,000 bushels in capacity, nine barns, and a dairy 
equipped with cold running water to refrigerate bottled milk.  The Keystone‘s proprietors 
owned 140 horses and mules, 85 cattle, and cultivated 5,550 acres with wheat, oats, rye, 
barley, and timothy.
52
 
 The Keystone‘s agricultural success had been uncertain a few years earlier.  In the 
unprecedented wet seasons of 1880-1, water covered extensive stretches of the farm.  The 
situation grew especially dire in the summer of 1881.  Hundreds of seasonal laborers 
stood idle as surface waters prevented them from putting their plows and reapers into the 
fields.  Displeased with the land‘s quality, which they purchased from the SPM&M, 
Harbaugh and Lockhart agreed to allow Power to arrange a system of land drainage after 
his visit in September 1881.  Obsessed with the maximum exploitation of nature, Power 
ordered railroad engineers to construct a 14-mile long main ditch across the Keystone 
                                                          
51
 Ibid. 
 
52
 St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Manitoba Railroad Company, Letters from Golden Latitudes (St. 
Paul:  n. p., 1885), 15-6; and Murray, The Valley Comes of Age, 135-6. 
189 
 
farm connected to dozens of smaller feeder ditches.  Power enthusiastically predicted that 
the ditch would drain thousands of acres of land on the Keystone farm and large blocks of 
adjacent railroad property.  The editor of the Fisher Bulletin anticipated that the project, 
if successful, would convince farmers throughout the Valley to cooperate in land 
drainage.
53
 
 In the spring of 1882, the Keystone Farm‘s new drainage ditches failed 
abysmally, flooding the fields of neighboring farmers, the railroad‘s unsold lands, and 
some federal lands.  Undeterred and undiscouraged, Power directed SPM&M engineers 
to provide relief for the damaged farmers.  By the end of the summer, railroad engineers 
went to work on a mammoth, 22-mile ―canal‖ intended to drain 30 square miles of 
railroad, Keystone, and overflowed land into a tributary of the Snake River.  Filled with 
brush, decaying logs, and thick weeds, the Snake‘s tributary proved unable to carry away 
the surface water diverted into it.  Clearing watercourses of debris had been the second 
phase of Power‘s drainage plan, but it was apparently ignored on the Snake River.  In any 
case, the Snake River, swelled by the influx of water, overflowed its narrow banks and 
inundated thousands of additional acres.
54
 
 Unwavering confidence in man‘s ability to dominate nature influenced Hill and 
Power‘s approach to drainage.  The events in Moland Township and in the vicinity of the 
Snake River should have served noticed that nature sometimes pushes back against 
outside intervention.  Human mastery of the environment has been more elusive and 
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ephemeral than absolute and ongoing.  Hill and Power‘s conceited belief that the Valley‘s 
wet prairies would yield to humanity‘s will, despite overwhelming evidence to the 
contrary, testified to their arrogance and contributed to corporate hubris as they expanded 
the company‘s drainage program in 1883, 1884, and 1885. 
 
Legal Showdown 
 Farmers from Moland Township and in the Snake River‘s vicinity learned a 
valuable lesson in the early 1880s:  the power to control water is the power to dominate 
people.  In many human societies, entities controlling the distribution and disposal of 
water for reasons related to agriculture, industry, and human consumption wield 
tremendous, if sometimes overlooked, social and political power.  Struggles over water 
are fundamental to environmental history because the power to allocate, withhold, 
impound, or set the price of water confers privilege and prestige.  As the historian 
Douglas R. Weiner reminds us, ―every ‗environmental‘ struggle is, at its foundations, a 
struggle among interests about power.  In fact, I would go further.  Every environmental 
story is a story about power.‖55 
 The dispute between the Moland farmers and the mighty SPM&M was 
fundamentally a conflict about the power and limitations involved in disposing of surface 
water.  Were there responsibilities and obligations involved in the disposal of surface 
water and, if so, to what extent did they influence where and how an individual or 
corporation could divert it?  In the spring of 1882, water from melting snowfall collected 
in the railroads‘ parallel ditches and again discharged onto the prairie after travelling 
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through the Moland Ditch.  The destructiveness and length of the 1882 flood dwarfed that 
of the previous year.   Pouring out of the ditch, the surface water diffused across the 
prairie at a brisk pace, covering an area of 18 square miles.  Peter Boen, who lived a mile 
northeast of Lommeland, claimed that the water lingered on his fields for a couple of 
months.  Though some local skeptics alleged that hard spring rains—and not the 
SPM&M ditch—were the source of the shallow flood, Boen drove his team of animals 
against the current until he reached the ditch‘s mouth.  He discovered water pouring out 
of it in the general direction of Lommeland, Hogenson, and his own farm.
56
 
 The SPM&M‘s diversion of surface water onto their farms dominated 
conversations in the close-knit rural community of Moland Township, where neighbors 
of different ethnic backgrounds shared seasonal work burdens.  When new settlers 
arrived, established farmers routinely assisted them in breaking and backsetting the 
tough, tall grass prairie.  Cooperation continued throughout the growing season and 
peaked in autumn as neighbors helped each other harvest, thrash, and load their wheat 
onto wagons for transport to local towns.  Minnesota‘s far northern climate rendered this 
communal work arrangement imperative if farmers were to get their crops harvested 
before the first frost.
57
 
 Despite the willingness of many neighbors to cooperate, conflict was not absent 
from everyday life.  Roaming livestock were a recurrent source of contention.  Before the 
late nineteenth century, the scarcity of trees in the Red River Valley made fence 
construction a laborious, expensive, and time-consuming process.  Rather than 
committing scarce resources to hauling wood from the banks of rivers and streams, 
                                                          
56
 ―Lommeland Paper Book,‖ 29. 
 
57
 Ibid., 31, 45-6. 
192 
 
residents concentrated on converting more and more of their land into crops, allowing 
cattle to wander freely in search of forage.  Fed up with livestock trampling their crops, a 
group of Moland farmers petitioned the state legislature in 1881 to ―make a special Herd 
Law for Restraining Cattle.‖  Conflicts involving roaming cattle belied the claims of 
contemporary elites, including Power and Hill, that Valley farmers needed to achieve 
diversification in part by raising cattle.
58
 
As the harvest of 1882 passed with disappointing losses due to flooding, the 
aggrieved Moland farmers rallied together to confront the mighty SPM&M.  Close-knit 
bonds established through years of mutual cooperation and a common grievance 
prompted the farmers to pursue collective litigation against the SPM&M.  On November 
14, 1882, sixteen Moland farmers filed lawsuits in county court against the SPM&M for 
―wrongfully, unlawfully, and maliciously‖ diverting surface water onto their property and 
ruining their 1881 and 1882 crops.
59
  The sixteen farmers were a diverse lot of 
homesteaders, timber culture claimants, and other small property-owners.  All of the 
litigants owned (or had the potential under federal homestead and timber culture laws to 
own) at least a quarter section.  Only one farmer was born in the United States 
(Hogenson), and his parents had emigrated from Norway.  All of the farmers but one 
(William Lloyd) emigrated from Norway or Denmark.  Land records indicate the farmers 
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preferred living near people with their ethnicity.  Ethnic clusters offered people an 
opportunity to reside next to someone who spoke the same language, shared a similar 
culture, exchanged stories from their home country, and discussed news from back home. 
 Agricultural census records for seven of the litigants shed insight into their 
husbandry practices for the year 1879.  The Moland farmers practiced a diversified form 
of agriculture.  They individually owned an average of 1.7 cattle and 1.6 oxen.  A handful 
raised calves to sell for extra cash.  Four of the seven farmers owned a total of eleven 
sheep, producing 52 lbs. of wool.  Most farmers raised chickens.  Records reveal that the 
farmers on average owned 8.1 chickens that dropped about 44 eggs each year.  In 1879, 
all of the farmers who had cultivated one crop planted both wheat and potatoes.  The 
farmers‘ wheat yields, which seldom exceeded 10 bushels per acre, probably remained 
low due to poor surface drainage.  One of the litigants harvested 36 bushels of oats from 
2 acres.  Within a few years, many others supplemented their wheat crops with oats and 
potatoes.  All of the farmers‘ few possessions, small quantity of cultivated acres, and 
unimpressive crop yields suggests that the farmers had a very narrow margin of success 
or failure.  Indeed, the total or partial loss of one year‘s crops could have been enough for 
the farmers to become insolvent.  It seems reasonable to conclude that the necessity of 
remaining afloat financially, in addition to a collective sense of injustice, motivated the 
farmers to pursue legal action.
60
 
 O. Mosness, the attorney representing the Moland farmers, feared that his clients‘ 
naturalization status might hamper their legal fight.  Within weeks of filing suit, several 
of the farmers traveled together to Moorhead, the county seat of Clay County, to take the 
oath of citizenship to the United States at the courthouse.  On November 27, 1882, Arne 
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Ostrem, Peder O. Boen, Ole Syverson, and Jens Pedersen collectively swore their fidelity 
to the Constitution, renounced their allegiance to the King of Sweden and Norway, and 
pledged that they had lived in the United States for at least five years and in Minnesota 
for twelve months.  Over the next few months, several more of the farmers took the oath 
of citizenship, probably less out of sense of fidelity to their new homeland than to 
facilitate the successful outcome of their litigation.
61
 
Mosness‘s predictions proved prophetic.  During the next few years, railroad 
attorneys vigorously contested farmers‘ surface water claims throughout Clay County by 
utilizing every legal tactic at their disposal.  Since Hogenson‘s 1881 petition to Hill, 
railroad leaders convinced themselves that the Moland farmers were conspiring to 
swindle the corporation out of large sums of money.  Convinced that the railroad could 
not receive a fair trial in Clay County, SPM&M attorneys in late 1882 asked the county 
court to transfer the ―flowage‖ cases to the U. S. Circuit Court for the District of 
Minnesota in St. Paul on the grounds that most of the plaintiffs were ―aliens‖ and lacked 
standing to sue.
62
  While the cases awaited adjudication in St. Paul, lawyers for both 
parties agreed to try the lawsuit of Hogenson, an American citizen, in county court.  On 
April 3, 1883, a county judge ruled against Hogenson on a defense motion for judgment 
on the pleading and ordered him to pay the SPM&M‘s court costs.  The verdict forced 
Mosness to ask for a continuance of the other cases while he studied the ruling and 
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considered appeal options.  In the meantime, a different Clay County judge ruled against 
the SPM&M in a similar case brought by Andrew N. Forsyth.  Judge W. K. Gould 
ordered the SPM&M to pay Forsyth $308 plus court costs for damaging his crops in 1881 
and 1882 by diverting surface water onto his property via the Moland ditch.  The split 
rulings ensured that the Minnesota Supreme Court would have the last say on the cases.
63
 
 Once the Minnesota Supreme Court agreed to hear Hogenson‘s case, attorneys for 
both parties submitted briefs.  Mosness argued that neither the civil law rule nor the 
common enemy doctrine (he mistakenly called it the ―common law‖) justified the 
railroad‘s actions.  In his opinion, it did not matter which surface water rule the 
legislature had adopted.  ―It is a maxim that everyone must so use his own property as not 
to injure his neighbor‘s,‖ Mosness argued, ―and if the law of surface water is an 
exception, it violates a maxim as just, as broad and as universal as reason itself.‖64  Since 
Minnesota had formally adopted the common enemy rule, Mosness insisted that justice 
and equity demanded that certain limitations be placed on the process by which an 
individual or corporation could remove of surface water.  In directly transferring the 
burden of surface water from its railroad tracks to neighboring farmers, the SPM&M‘s 
recklessness far exceeded any other comparable case.  ―This case differs from most of 
those found in the books in that the magnitude of the offense is greater, greater damages 
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are suffered.  In this case a large stream of water is wantonly thrown upon a farm verdant 
with growing grain, done at a season when the same are most susceptible of injury.‖65 
 Railroad attorneys dismissed Mosness‘s reasoning and manipulated the language 
of existing statutes to justify the SPM&M‘s actions.  First, they contended that surface 
water law generally applied to disputes between ―neighbors,‖ that is, adjacent proprietors.  
In the case at bar, Hogenson‘s farm was situated on higher land and 6 miles north of the 
ditch in question and, therefore, could not have been damaged by water discharged from 
distant ditches.  Second, they maintained that company engineers had no choice but to 
convey the surface water onto the prairie instead of the Buffalo River.  In the spring, 
tributaries of the Red River—including the Buffalo—flowed at their maximum capacity.  
Emptying the ditch into the Buffalo would have caused it to overflow its banks, 
something expressly forbidden by case law.  It was far better to allow the water to 
disperse across the prairie than flood downstream riparian proprietors.  With such 
tortured logic (it was acceptable to flood the land of farmers distant from rivers, but not 
the land of riparian landowners), the railroad appeared on shaky footing.  Nevertheless, 
railroad attorneys recognized that the case essentially involved determining what 
constituted the more efficient use of property and benefitted society the most:  the 
running or railroads or the growing of grain on a few isolated farms?
66
 
 In November 1883, the Minnesota Supreme Court sided with Hogenson.  Absent 
an explicit agreement from property owners consenting to the disposal of surface on their 
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land, the SPM&M had no right to commit the act in question.  Writing for the majority, 
Justice C. J. Gilfillan concluded: 
The right of an owner to improve his land … does not include the right to gather 
the surface waters on one‘s land and turn them upon the land of another, to its 
damage, even though the former land may as a consequence thereof be improved.  
In other words, [a landowner] may not in this way improve his own land, by 
merely transferring to the land of another a burden which nature has imposed on 
his own land.
67
 
 
 The decision symbolized a sweeping victory for the farmers‘ year-long pursuit of 
environmental justice.  Emboldened by the favorable verdict, dozens of additional Clay 
County farmers sued the SPM&M for property damage caused by the company‘s flawed 
system of drainage ditches.  General Manager Manvel complained that the Supreme 
Court‘s decision placed the company in a vulnerable situation.  As dozens of surface 
water lawsuits flooded the SPM&M‘s legal office, the company had to decide whether to 
fight the lawsuits, and alienate even more farmers, or negotiate out of court settlements.  
Although Manvel ―deprecate[d] and dislike[d] any litigation with the farmers along our 
line,‖ he initially favored fighting the lawsuits ―because if we settle with one [farmer] the 
other [litigants] will think they are as much entitled‖ to monetary compensation.68   In 
1885, however, Manvel and SPM&M attorney and legal advisor Solomon G. Comstock 
recognized the futility and exorbitant costs of contesting every individual case in court, 
especially given the Supreme Court decision, and began the laborious process of reaching 
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out of court settlements.  Over the course of the next decade, the SPM&M paid financial 
settlements to nearly four dozen Clay County farmers at a cost exceeding $100,000.
69
 
 Nothing angered Hill more than the actions of Clay County farmers towards his 
company.  Dismissing the lawsuits‘ merits, Hill interpreted the farmers‘ litigiousness as a 
financially-motivated conspiracy to swindle his railroad out of large sums.  Time and 
again he described the Hogenson verdict and consequent lawsuits as a frivolous attempt 
to ―take advantage of any and everything that came their way for their personal 
benefit.‖70  Solely motivated by financial gain, the famers had betrayed Hill‘s trust and 
perpetuated an egregious fraud.  A man with a towering ego and volcanic temper, Hill 
provided a compelling insight into his character and temperament through his statements 
regarding the company‘s abortive drainage program.  In dismissing every accusation of 
wrongdoing against his company as a dubious scam, Hill read conspiratorial ambitions 
into any person or institution contesting his actions.  People did not challenge the Empire 
Builder without suffering his wrath and hostility, regardless of their allegation‘s merit. 
 The most significant legacy of the string of lawsuits was the SPM&M‘s decision 
to retreat into the background of environmental planning.  Following the problems in 
Clay County, the company abruptly terminated the construction of new drainage ditches 
and disavowed future participation in direct environmental planning.  ―Under these 
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circumstances,‖ Hill informed a Polk County farmer in 1886, the SPM&M ―cannot 
undertake to do any more ditching or improve any ditches we have already made.‖71  By 
early 1886, Hill shifted his wetlands management strategy from direct involvement to one 
where his company remained in the background while local communities took the lead.  
To avoid new suits, the SPM&M dismantled many of its existing ditches and let others 
fill up with sediment.  The courageous efforts of the Moland farmers in standing up to the 
mighty SPM&M ironically proved detrimental to other Valley farmers who benefitted 
from the company‘s drainage program.  In early 1886, the extent and pace of Valley 
drainage was little better than at the beginning of the Red River Boom. 
 
Grassroots Mobilization:  Holding the Legislature‘s Feet to the Fire 
 In late 1885 or early 1886, Elias Steenerson made a fateful trip from his Polk 
County farmstead to the town of Fisher.  Born on November 4, 1856, in Houston County, 
Minnesota, Steenerson was one of nine children raised by Steenrson Knutson and Birgit 
Liefson Roholt, both Norwegian immigrants.  In September 1876, Steenerson followed 
his father to the Red River Valley.  After purchasing 160 acres from the railroad and 
homesteading on another quarter section, Steenerson established a farm near the Sand 
Hill River that he named ―Walhalla.‖  After a brief stint as a public school teacher, 
Steenerson took a part-time job selling farm machinery in nearby Grand Forks, Dakota 
Territory.  In 1881, he opened two machinery businesses with his brother, Christopher, in 
Fisher and Crookston, selling the famous twine binders and other implements.  Despite 
his entrepreneurial instincts, Steenerson remained focused on farming at the time he 
made the above trip.  While hauling a load of wheat to Fisher, which was some 15 miles 
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from home, Steenerson‘s wagon and oxen became struck in a marsh.  Unable to pull the 
wagon from the mire, Steenerson had to unload all eighteen sacks of wheat, dissemble the 
entire wagon, and reassemble it on dry land.  Exhausted and annoyed, he finally reached 
Fisher just before dusk.  The difficult trip reinforced Steenerson‘s belief that 
northwestern Minnesota would never become prosperous without better roads and a 
comprehensive system of drainage.
72
 
 Steenerson returned home resolute and purposeful.  Farmers in the vicinity of the 
Sand Hill River, Steenerson recognized, were at a ―disadvantage‖ because wetlands 
isolated their farms from markets.  The journey to Fisher was treacherous, but so, too, 
was the trek to Crookston.  The Beltrami Swamp, a marshy area that existed where the 
Sand Hill River lost its course and spread out over the prairie, forced Steenerson and his 
neighbors to take a circuitous 30-mile trip to reach Crookston, which on a straight line 
was only 15 miles away.   In early 1886, the Sand Hill farmers held a ―mass meeting‖ at 
the home of Elias‘s brother, Christopher, to discuss options for draining western Polk 
County.  ―All agreed that something out to be done,‖ Steenerson recalled, ―but what to do 
was the question.‖73  Vaguely remembering that the SPM&M had built numerous 
drainage mains, attendees implored Christopher to write Hill in the hopes that ―he could 
help us out.‖74  In his poignant letter to Hill, Christopher described how as the Sand Hill 
River crossed the flattest portion of the former bed of Lake Agassiz it lost its course, 
creating the Beltrami Swamp.  ―The Sand Hill River from Beltrami eastward is quite a 
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large and rapid stream capable of running mills,‖ Christopher explained, until ―the chanel 
[sic.] disappears [sic.] and all its waters spreads over the prairies.  About 4 miles from the 
Red River the chanel [sic.] forms again and is quite deep and wide.‖  The Beltrami 
Swamp, which was the name local citizens gave the overflowed section of prairie, 
constituted ―at least 4 or 5 townships of what otherwise would be the most fertile and 
well settled part of this country.‖75  Christopher told Hill that he was the Sand Hill 
farmers last hope since county officials had ignored their requests for help.  Since the 
drainage of the Beltrami Swamp would enhance the SPM&M‘s carrying trade, the Sand 
Hill farmers hoped that Hill would provide financial support or at least send an engineer 
to take levels and provide advice. 
 Steenerson‘s letter reached Hill‘s desk at a time when he was still brooding over 
the Clay County lawsuits.  He responded that his company had invested significant sums 
in trying to open up the Sand Hill River‘s middle channel and other Valley watercourses. 
―After spending several thousand dollars and getting the work well under way,‖ Hill 
complained, ―we found ourselves the object of several suits for damage at the hands of 
parties whose lands were benefitted by the better drainage facilities.‖  Farmers‘ 
ungratefulness and hostility convinced him that ―we are not the proper parties to move in 
any enterprise of that kind.‖76  Elias Steenerson later recalled that Hill encouraged him to 
reapply for assistance from the county.  In May 1886, their renewed efforts met with 
success when the Polk County Board of Commissioners appropriated $500 for a drainage 
survey of the townships between the Sand Hill River and Red Lake River on the 
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condition that the SPM&M contribute matching funds.  On May 12, E. D. Childs, a grain 
elevator proprietor and large land owner in Polk County, contacted Hill on behalf of 
county officials regarding the potential survey.  Guarded enthusiasm marked Hill‘s 
response.  He agreed to provide up to $1,500 as long as the contribution was proportional 
to the amount of railroad land surveyed.  Before consenting, Hill warned Childs that any 
additional litigation directed at his railroad‘s drainage program would result in the abrupt 
termination of his cooperation: 
This company does not desire to shirk its share of any improvement, or any 
common burden that is to be borne on the frontier.  At the same time, while we 
feel that in these matters we have been very liberal in the past, our efforts in that 
direction have been met by a disposition on the part of some localities to take 
advantage of any and everything that came their way for their personal benefit, 
and if this is to continue, the Railway company will have absolutely nothing 
whatever to do with any of these local enterprises.
77
 
 
 Popular enthusiasm for a comprehensive drainage program grew during May.  On 
June 5, 1886, a committee of five leading Valley residents, including Childs and Halvor 
Steenerson, the brother of Elias and Christopher and northwestern Minnesota‘s state 
senator, published a call for township, municipality, and county representatives from 
throughout the Minnesota side of the Valley to attend a drainage convention in 
Crookston.  Set to convene in early July, the meeting intended to consider ―the subject of 
drainage in said section generally, and to devise a means for the accomplishment of a 
thoroughly effectual and general system of drainage for said section of country.‖78  
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Unable to abandon his passion for drainage, Hill agreed at the last minute to attend the 
convention and provided cheap fares for delegates.
79
 
 The mobilization of Valley business leaders and farmers represented one of 
hundreds of local drainage movements that, when viewed as a whole, comprised a key 
segment of the American conservation movement, which emerged during the late 
nineteenth century.  For too long scholars have narrowly defined the conservation 
movement as a top-down social movement directed by national elites wielding new 
authorities vested in them by the emergent bureaucratic state.  Yet government grew at all 
levels in response to heightened popular interest in environmental matters before 1900.  It 
makes more sense to see conservation as a series of discreet local movements in which 
citizens collectively demanded government solutions to specific environmental problems 
than a unitary movement directed and dominated by elites.  The establishment of 
drainage districts, the creation of county or township drainage programs, and the 
formation of citizen organizations dedicated to securing appropriations for land drainage 
constituted local conservation movements where citizens crafted collective solutions to 
environmental problems.  Casting conservation as an elite crusade trivializes the broad 
and diverse involvement of local citizens, interest groups, corporations, and communities 
involved in natural resource planning prior to the twentieth century.  The social basis of 
support for land conservation was extensive and built from the ground up.
80
 
 In July 1886, delegates from Clay, Kittson, Marshall, Norman, Polk, and Wilkin 
counties assembled at the Crookston opera house.  During the drainage convention, 
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delegates agreed to a number of resolutions.  The most important resolution authorized a 
topographical survey of all six Minnesota Valley counties as ―preliminary to the adoption 
of such a [drainage] system by the people of the Red River Valley.‖  Hill, who attended 
the convention as the SPM&M‘s representative, offered to pay for half of the survey if 
the counties raised the other half.  Since his company still owned 1,013,000 acres of land 
in Clay, Kittson, Marshall, Norman, and Polk counties, the survey would benefit the 
SPM&M.  Before adjourning, delegates requested the formation of a permanent 
―executive committee‖ consisting of three individuals appointed by Hill and one 
individual from each of the six counties to supervise the survey, publish maps, and draft a 
general plan of action by December 5.
81
 
 Representatives of Kittson County put up the only opposition.  In his study of the 
wetlands of the American Midwest, Hugh Prince found that nineteenth-century 
―landowners who opposed drainage schemes were treated as reactionaries and 
obstructionists; they were not to be allowed to stand in the way of agricultural and 
economic progress.‖82  The pattern held true in the Red River Valley.  As the most 
northern Minnesota county on the American side of the international boundary, Kittson 
County delegates feared that upstream drainage projects, by conveying large quantities of 
surface water into the Red River, might elevate the river‘s volume to such an extent that 
riparian properties in their county would be subjected to chronic flooding.  William F. 
Kelso and a ―Mr. Hanson‖ argued that surface water should be stored in artificial 
reservoirs—rather than conveyed into the Red River—and that the increased tax burden 
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for Valley-wide drainage would be unsustainable.  Hill and Elias Steenerson did not 
tolerate dissent.  A strong-willed man, Steenerson insisted that drainage opponents should 
immediately leave the opera house and form their own ―anti-drainage convention.‖  The 
will of the majority, he fulminated, should not be sacrificed to accommodate a 
downstream minority.
83
 
 In December 1886, delegates and farmers again congregated in Crookston to 
discuss the completed topographical survey and plan a future course of action.  Charles 
G. Elliott, a drainage engineer from Illinois who later rose to become the head of the 
United States Department of Agriculture‘s Office of Drainage Investigations, and J. T. 
Fanning, a hydraulic engineer from Minneapolis, conducted the survey.  During the 
summer and fall, Elliott and Fanning surveyed 82 townships in five counties.  Since 
Kittson County refused to pony up its share of the contribution, it was excluded from the 
survey.  According to Fanning, the six Valley counties embraced a total area of 5.25 
million acres.  The survey found that at least 2 million acres required drainage to 
maximize agricultural output.  Fanning theorized that draining the Red River Valley, 
unlike many other sections of the country, was cost prohibitive for individual 
communities because a comprehensive plan could not proceed until the Red River‘s 
tributaries were improved so they could handle the influx of diverted surface water.  ―A 
prominent financial difficulty,‖ the final report explained, ―is the fact that the heaviest 
work must be done first, such as the opening of the natural streams where the channels 
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are not well defined.‖84  The Sand Hill, Middle, Tamarac, and Snake Rivers, at some 
point during their westerly descent towards the Red River, lost themselves on the prairie, 
creating large ―swamps‖ and marshes.  Conveying surface water into these rivers would 
be counterproductive since it promised to enlarge the areas of inundation on the prairie to 
the detriment of countless farmers.  Elliott estimated that improving those watercourses 
so that they remained within a narrow channel would require the princely sum of 
$191,066.00.  Until the outlets were improved, it made little sense for farmers to form 
drainage institutions or secure resources from county and township authorities.
85
 
 Fanning concluded that it was the state of Minnesota‘s responsibility to improve 
and clear the watercourses of obstructions.  Under the 1860 Swamp Land Act, the federal 
government donated 249,588 acres of ―swamp and overflowed‖ lands in the six Valley 
counties to Minnesota on the condition that the state sell the lands and invest the revenue 
in building drainage projects.  Instead of complying with the laws, Minnesota subsidized 
the construction of public works and internal improvements in other sections of the state.  
Justice and equity, Fanning declared, required Minnesota to live up to its responsibilities 
by returning those lands to the counties to facilitate ―the object for which the State 
received them in trust.‖86  Fanning urged the passage of a constitutional amendment that 
authorized the retrocession of an equivalent amount of state land in those counties that 
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could then be sold by local authorities to defray the expenses of improving the Red 
River‘s tributaries. 
 Delegates at the December convention heartily endorsed Fanning‘s 
recommendations.  They appointed a ―committee on legislation‖ and a ―committee on 
national and state aid for the drainage of the Red River Valley‖ comprised primarily of 
regional business elites and civic leaders.  The convention voted to call on Governor 
Lucius F. Hubbard and Governor-elect Andrew R. McGill to ―call attention to the urgent 
need of careful and judicious legislation upon this subject of drainage, also upon the 
justice and necessity of a very liberal appropriation from the state to open up the 
obstructed river channels of this section and of the wisdom of the State lending her credit 
to forward the scheme.‖87 
 Conspicuously absent from the December convention was James J. Hill.  
Lingering animosity and feelings of betrayal dominated Hill‘s attitude towards Valley 
farmers even after his July rapprochement with the drainage movement.   During the 
spring and summer of 1886, the SPM&M received a petition signed by 36 Polk County 
residents claiming that one of the company‘s ―large and valuable‖ ditches had an 
insufficient capacity.  Every spring, water from the ditch overflowed the surrounding 
prairie, flooding countless fields and meadows.  In addition, the SPM&M‖s roadside 
ditches in Clay County had proven too popular.  So many farmers connected their field 
ditches to the railroad‘s mains that they overflowed adjacent properties.  In November, 
Hill informed John M. Martin, a member of the Executive Committee on Drainage for the 
Red River Valley, that he would skip the upcoming convention because there was a 
―feeling on the part of the people of the Valley that the Railway Co. has some pecuniary 
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end to accomplish in this matter beyond the general good of the Valley.‖88  Skepticism 
regarding the SPM&M‘s motivations for underwriting the drainage survey, along with 
the threat of additional litigation, prompted Hill to eschew all further responsibility for 
drainage.  Or so it seemed. 
 
The Red River Valley Board of Audit 
 The alienation of the SPM&M inflicted a crippling blow to the Valley‘s drainage 
movement.  As the movement‘s primary corporate sponsor and most visible supporter, 
the SPM&M contributed invaluable financial resources.  Despite the loss, the drainage 
commission‘s committee on national and state aid pushed ahead.  Led by Ezra G. 
Valentine, a lawyer from Breckenridge, the committee unsuccessfully lobbied the state 
legislature for an appropriation to open up the Valley‘s watercourses in 1887, 1889, and 
1891.  Constitutional scruples dissuaded Governor Hubbard from endorsing state 
drainage aid for the Red River Valley.  In 1887, Hubbard conceded that Minnesota 
subverted the 1860 Swamp land Act by ―grant[ing] [ceded federal swamplands] as a 
gratuity to corporations to encourage the building of railroads in sections of the State 
remote from where they are located.‖89  Fidelity to the original law would have rendered 
the current dilemma unnecessary.  ―If these lands were now available for the purpose for 
which they were granted by Congress,‖ Hubbard admitted, ―the means would be at hand 
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for the prosecution of the contemplated work.‖90  Despite Hubbard‘s sympathy for Valley 
farmers, he feared that the state constitution prohibited the legislature from making an 
appropriation.  Section 5 of Article 10 prevented the state from contracting ―any debts for 
works of internal improvement‖ or acting as ―a party in carrying on such works except in 
cases when grants of land or other property shall have been made to the state specially 
dedicated by the grant to specific purposes.‖91  Section 10 of Article 9 presented an even 
greater obstacle:  ―the credit of the State shall never be given or loaned in aid of any 
individual, association or corporation.‖92  Since the drainage movement‘s mission was to 
enable drainage districts, counties, townships, individual farmers, and the SPM&M to 
drain their land into suitable outlets, the constitutional prohibition against extending state 
resources to certain entities, as expressed in Article 9, delivered a staggering blow. 
 During the next six years, Valley drainage proponents asserted that nothing in the 
state constitution impeded the legislature from belatedly fulfilling its responsibilities 
under the Swamp Land Acts.  Compliance with federal law trumped state constitutional 
scruples.  Congress gave Minnesota lavish grants of ―swamp and overflowed lands‖ with 
the understanding that the legislature invest revenue generated from the sale of those 
lands to drainage projects.  Valentine and other leaders of the drainage movement also 
tried to allay the legislature‘s fears that the SPM&M would be the chief beneficiary of a 
regional drainage program by inserting a provision into bills they presented to the 
legislature that required the company to contribute at least one-quarter of the total 
appropriation.  In 1887, 1889, and 1891, constitutional worries and intrastate sectionalism 
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doomed the proposals.  In 1891, for instance, State Sen. Frank Arah Day of Martin 
County in southern Minnesota objected to a bill allocating $12,000 annually for Red 
River Valley drainage because his constituents were ―as much entitled to drainage as 
northern counties.‖93  It was unfair for the state to create a new agency supervising the 
construction of drainage projects, using general tax revenues, in one region but not 
others.
94
 
 The string of failures left Valentine undeterred.  After the Red River Valley 
drainage commission convened in St. Paul in early 1893, he made one final push.  At his 
own expense, Valentine published and then circulated a pamphlet amongst influential 
state legislatures explaining the unique topographical conditions that complicated surface 
water removal on the former bottom of Lake Agassiz.  The pamphlet emphasized that 
Valley residents had not asked the state ―to drain the lands of anyone, but simply to put 
the natural channels and streams in condition to receive and carry off the water.‖95  
Valentine reminded legislators that the disposition of ceded ―swamp and overflowed 
lands‖ was inimical to the interests of northwestern Minnesotans.  Policymakers had 
given 261,163.28 acres of the 270,740.98 acres of swamplands ceded by Congress in 
Valley counties to railroad corporations in other sections of Minnesota.  The 1881 
constitutional amendment mandated that the remaining 9,577.70 acres be donated to 
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educational or charitable purposes.  ―The unjust course of Minnesota in this matter,‖ 
Valentine pointedly stated, ―diverted these lands and the proceeds thereof from the 
purpose to which they were dedicated by Congress.  We now ask that the State, in a small 
measure, make good to our people the loss sustained by depriving them of these lands at 
a time when we were too weak to make serious objection.‖96  Valentine estimated that 
most of the 129,062 acres of Valley lands still owned by the state required better 
drainage.  Furthermore, farmers cultivated less than half of the 2.5 million acres of lands 
in the Valley.  Improving the Red River‘s tributaries would open much of this land to 
settlement and fill the state‘s coffers with new revenue. 
 Written by Valentine, the 1893 bill was S. F. 182, entitled ―An Act to Appropriate 
Moneys for the Purpose of Opening of Closed Water-Courses Leading into the Red River 
and its Tributaries, and for Opening Existing Streams in the Red River Valley.‖  It varied 
little in its language, content, and scope from previous bills.  The bill appropriated 
$100,000 over four years for a Board of Audit to spend in the ―opening of closed water-
courses leading into the Red River … and for opening existing streams in the Red River 
Valley … for drainage purposes‖ in Clay, Kittson, Marshall, Norman, Polk, and Wilkin 
Counties.  A later amendment added the counties of Grant and Traverse to the Board‘s 
jurisdiction.  Empowered with plenary authority over the selection, location, and design 
of projects, the Board of Audit would be composed of four members:  the governor, 
secretary of state, an individual appointed by the boards of county commissioners of the 
eight counties under the bill‘s jurisdiction, and a final person chosen by the Great 
Northern Railroad (GN).  As in previous years, the bill stipulated that the GN (the 
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predecessor of the SPM&M) contribute an amount equal to one-quarter of the legislative 
appropriation as a precondition for the disbursement of $100,000 from the state.
97
 
 Unlike previous years, the bill authorizing the creation of the Red River Board of 
Audit sailed though both houses of the state legislature and became law on April 17, 
1893.
98
  The state Senate passed the bill by a vote of 41-3; the House by a final tally of 85 
to 5.  What led to the dramatic change in fortune?  Valentine‘s pamphlet apparently 
convinced legislators that Minnesota‘s disposition of ceded ―swamp and overflowed 
lands‖ had been particularly unfavorable to Valley residents.  As one state newspaper 
outside of the Valley editorialized, ―the general government had made grants of swamp 
lands to the state, to be used in draining and reclaiming these lands, but the proceeds 
arising from the sale had been diverted to the southern and eastern part of the state or the 
lands had been granted to railroads, while the counties in which the lands are located had 
received no benefit.‖99  By portraying the legislation as a sincere attempt to bring 
Minnesota into compliance with federal law and showing how the disposition of former 
federal wetlands had benefited other sections of the state, Valentine shrewdly undercut 
the opposition of southern and eastern representatives. 
 Despite the turn of events, Valentine had committed a fateful blunder.  Since 
1887, every bill that he submitted to the legislature mandated that the SPM&M contribute 
part of the total appropriation since submerged railroad lands would benefit handsomely 
from a state program.  In 1889, Hill formed a new company called the GN.  The 
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following year the GN completed a 999-year lease of the SPM&M.  The lease enabled 
the companies to operate in tandem as a single entity although they officially remained 
separate corporations governed by two sets of stockholders.  Before introducing his bill to 
the legislature in 1893, Valentine apparently inserted ―GN‖ in place of ―SPM&M.‖  
Upon learning of the bill‘s passage, Hill flew into a blind rage.  Since Hill had been away 
from St. Paul when the Red River Valley commission introduced the bill, they had not 
consulted with him as in previous years.  Nonetheless, since 1887 he had opposed an 
additional tax on the SPM&M to defray the costs of creating a new state agency.  ―The 
public should understand,‖ Hill scolded Valentine and newly-elected Governor Knute 
Nelson, ―that it has no more right to appropriate the Company‘s property or money than it 
has of any other citizen of the State.‖100  Giving in to self-pity, Hill defended his 
opposition on the grounds that Clay County farmers had responded to the SPM&M‘s 
previous efforts with insolence and avarice.  ―We have made several efforts to open up 
these water courses on our own lands, and these efforts have resulted in an attempt 
through law-suits, to collect heavy damages.‖101  Hogenson‘s actions still riled Hill: 
Years ago the Manitoba Company undertook to show the benefits of drainage in 
several localities, and to that end opened some considerable ditches, which to-day 
are doing an immense amount of good.  The Railway Company‘s efforts, 
however, were met with suits for damages.  I recollect one man (Hogenson) who 
brought suit for injuring his hay meadow, situated six miles away from the ditch 
… These suits for damages aggregated an amount of nearly $100,000, and the 
Company was forced to a heavy expense in defending them.
102
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Hill‘s primary source of contention centered on the fact that the law imposed a de facto 
tax on the GN to improve the SPM&M‘s land grant.  Since the GN did not own any lands 
in the Valley, its stockholders would receive no benefit for contributing the requisite 
$25,000.  The SPM&M, which still owned 363,450 acres in the Valley, would have been 
the proper party to participate.
103
 
 Backroom deals persuaded Hill to abandon his opposition.  In June 1893, H. M 
Donaldson, one of Hill‘s corporate point men in the Valley, met with Governor Nelson in 
St. Paul.  Donaldson secured promises from Nelson that if Hill followed through and 
made the contribution he would be given control over the Board of Audit‘s operations.  
Donaldson told Hill that the governor ―gave me to understand in plain language that the 
board of Audit would be composed of men of your choice and that he would allow their 
wishes to control the action of the board and in that way YOU would—through your 
representatives on the board—have the direction of the expenditure of the whole 
appropriation.‖104  Intrigued by the prospects of directing land drainage without the 
prospect of incurring liability, Hill acquiesced and put up $25,000.  Directing drainage 
work under the umbrella of a state agency now shielded Hill from potential lawsuits.  The 
Board of Audit initially consisted of Nelson, Minnesota Secretary of State Frederick P. 
Brown, GN chief engineer N. D. Miller, and Valentine, who served as the counties‘ 
representative.
105
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 During its four short years of operation, the Red River Valley Board of Audit 
served as the GN‘s personal land drainage company.  Just as the Swamp Land Acts 
subsidized the building of railroads in southern and eastern Minnesota, the Board of 
Audit subsidized the drainage of the SPM&M‘s unsold land grant.  In 1893 and 1894, the 
Board expended $69,515.18 to build 37 miles of large ditches in five counties.  The first 
project completed was the Sand Hill River Ditch in Polk County.  Like several other 
ditches authorized by the Board of Audit, the Sand Hill Ditch was dug through the middle 
plane of the Valley where the Sand Hill River lost its course on the prairie and created the 
Beltrami Swamp.  Since the ditch drained one of the last large blocks of SPM&M land, it 
was payback for Hill‘s generosity and covered 34% of the board‘s total expenditures 
prior to January 1, 1895.  Nonetheless, the project also benefited farmers like Elias and 
Christopher Steenerson whose actions launched the grassroots drainage movement and 
convinced the SPM&M to reemerge from the background of environmental planning.  
Completed in October 1895, the Otter Tail River ditch was the fourth ditch constructed 
by the commission and also proved valuable in draining railroad lands.  Towards the end 
of 1895, Hill heaped praise on the ―exceptionally good‖ work done by Board of Audit in 
stretching its limited funds as far as possible.
106
  In 1895, the legislature recognized the 
Board‘s progress and allocated an additional $50,000.  The bill passed with the caveat 
that the Board spend the additional appropriation to ―reclaim swamp lands granted to the 
state of Minnesota by [the 1860] act of congress … and lands owned by the state of 
Minnesota.‖107  After focusing its initial energy on addressing the SPM&M‘s drainage 
needs, the Board of Audit directed its energies toward ―bring[ing] relief as speedily as 
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possible to the greatest number and at minimum final cost.‖108  Up to February 2, 1899, 
the Board of Audit had constructed 117 miles of ditches at a cost of $162,412.62 across 
the 8 counties.  Board members estimated that the ditches improved more than one 
million acres and increased the median value of Valley agricultural lands from $5 to $20.  
Provided with suitable outlets, several Valley counties appropriated money to build 
supplementary lateral ditches.  Polk County, for instance, expended $100,000 between 
1893-1901 towards that end.
109
 
Historians have not adequately examined the complex relationship of western 
railroads to the environment.  They portray railroads as either rapacious consumers of 
natural resources or enlightened advocates of wilderness preservation; the railroad‘s 
environmental impact is straightforward and unambiguous.  Yet in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, many western railroads, including the SPM&M, developed 
natural resource strategies that resist such crude categorization.  The company‘s 
experiences in promoting wetlands drainage in Minnesota—and later in North Dakota 
and Washington—which blended support or opposition for initiatives based on its own 
self-interest and previous experiences, suggests that it embraced a pragmatic 
environmental agenda that defied such a dichotomous model.  Indeed, the SPM&M‘s 
involvement in land drainage does not bear out the conclusion of some historians that the 
GN system resembled a ―giant octopus with its head centered in St. Paul‖ whose leaders 
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imposed their will on western communities with a ―ruthlessness matched [by] that of … 
Napoleon and Genghis Khan‖110  Indeed, such sweeping morality tales distort history by 
obscuring how complex and unanticipated local events frustrated the grandiose plans of 
railroad managers.  After the SPM&M‘s brief, disastrous experiment in direct 
environmental planning, which alienated local communities and subjected the company 
to costly, lengthy, and embarrassing litigation, it retreated into the background of surface 
water removal and deferred to the will of local communities and drainage districts.  
Partnering with local communities was a pragmatic strategy that enabled the company to 
shield itself from future lawsuits, forge working relationships with residents along its 
line, and share the costs and burdens of environmental planning.  Small wonder that 
SPM&M/GN drainage policy before 1910 was shaped far more from the ground up than 
from the top down. 
 Nevertheless, in 1897, the Minnesota state legislature allowed the Board of Audit 
to expire.  During the same year, legislators created a Board of State Drainage 
Commissioners responsible for overseeing the maintenance and repair of state ditches 
built under the Board of Audit‘s supervision.  Appointed by the governor, the three 
commissioners served without compensation and were not authorized to construct new 
projects.  The Board‘s primary duty involved using its $500 annual appropriation to 
employ a professional engineer to examine the state‘s ditches and recommend repairs.  
Routine maintenance included the removal of debris and obstructions, the prevention of 
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caving banks, and the eradication of weeds such as flags, reeds, and rushes.  The 1897 
law transferred the burden of maintenance from the state government to the counties.  
Once the Board of State Drainage Commissioners instructed county governments 
regarding repairs recommended by its engineer, the counties had 60 days to comply.  In 
devolving responsibility to the counties, the legislature eschewed future responsibility for 
drainage outside of lands owned by Minnesota.  In 1901 and 1902, the legislature refused 
to approve further appropriations for the inspection of the state ditches.  Angered by the 
state‘s parsimony, Valentine donated $1,000 of his own money so the surveys could be 
completed and a report published regarding the ditches‘ condition.111 
 
Conclusion 
 Scholars of American wetlands have not studied the responses of individual 
communities to the failure of the Swamp Land Acts.  As long as local institutions such as 
drainage districts or county governments were capable of handling land drainage, 
communities had little reason to demand that state governments fulfill their obligations 
under the law.  In some places of the county, such as the Valley of the Red River of the 
North, drainage required broader coordination, centralized planning, and greater capital 
expenditures than local institutions could provide.  In the 1880s, Valley residents sought 
assistance from the SPM&M—the only private entity capable of providing the 
manpower, finances, and expertise to drain the Valley.  The SPM&M‘s failed experiment 
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in direct environment planning, which subjected it to costly litigation, prompted farmers 
to clamor for the state to live up to its responsibilities under the 1860 Swamp Land Act. 
 Farmers eagerly welcomed intervention by state government into wetlands 
management on the scale originally envisioned by Congress.  Elias Steenerson, whose 
daunting experiences hauling wheat to Fisher persuaded him to rally his neighbors in 
support for state involvement, applauded Minnesota‘s assumption of greater 
environmental responsibilities.  ―I am no socialist,‖ Steenerson reflected in his memoir, 
―but I have learned from my observation of the development of these times that there are 
certain enterprises which the State should take hold of, and among them are Drainage.‖112  
Steenerson touted the beneficial environmental outcomes—a landscape bereft of surface 
water—that accompanied the  enlargement of state and local governments.  ―State 
drainage has been and is recognized as one of the proper functions of the State, and has 
worked untold benefit in developing [Minnesota], especially in the northern part.  Large 
tracts of swamp lands have been reclaimed, and the Sand Hill ditch, and its tributaries 
have transformed a dismal swamp into cultivated fields.‖113 
Steenerson‘s actions (as well as those of his brother and neighbors) indicate that 
late nineteenth-century farmers perceived natural resource management—and especially 
wetlands drainage—as a legitimate and appropriate state function no less instrumental in 
building stable rural communities than the regulation of the railroad and financial 
industries.  Elizabeth Sanders has adeptly demonstrated how the expansion of the 
national regulatory and administrative state between the end of Reconstruction and World 
War I occurred largely as a response to farmers‘ demands for increased federal 
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supervision of railroad corporations and financial institutions.
114
  Yet Sanders‘ and other 
scholars‘ narrow focus on national state building obscures a broader and more complex 
process of state formation that encompassed the creation of thousands of autonomous 
local institutions and state agencies.  Farmers‘ pursuit of a drained landscape to enhance 
their agricultural production and shield their families from miasmas was the catalyst that 
promoted an expansion of local power rivaling the national state‘s growth.  Government 
grew at all levels before 1900 in response to farmers‘ attempt to cope with a changing 
world where powerful national and transnational corporations wielded unprecedented 
authority over the rural economy and population growth pushed more and more people 
onto marginal lands.  Farmers identified government institutions—be they federal, state, 
or local—as an indispensible ally in carving out farms able to withstand the test of time in 
a society and natural environment that seemed cruel, unfriendly, and unforgiving. 
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CHAPTER 5:  ―THE EXTENSION AND PERPETUATION OF A CLASS OF SMALL 
LANDOWNERS‖:  WETLANDS DRAINAGE IN AN AGE OF NATIONAL 
WATER POLICITCS AND SOCIAL REFORM, 1902-1917 
 
 By 1900, ordinary Americans identified wetlands drainage as an indispensable 
element of wise environmental stewardship.  The eighteenth-century Hippocratic revival, 
the predominance of miasmatic theories of disease, the belief that wetlands possessed no 
intrinsic or ecological value, and the desire of farmers in Midwestern, southern and 
Mississippi Valley states following the Civil War to build healthy and stable rural 
communities dictated the rapid removal of surface water.  The turn-of-the-century 
discovery that anopheles mosquitoes, and not miasmas, were the true vectors of malaria 
intensified Americans‘ antipathy towards wetlands.  The breakthrough produced a 
tangible, scientific link between wetlands and public health since the anopheles prefers 
breeding in stagnant waters shielded from wave action by vegetation.  The broad 
consensus that every wetland should be drained for reasons related to health, agricultural 
progress, and rural stability led increasing numbers of farmers, like those described in the 
previous chapter, to form local institutions dedicated to land drainage or demand action 
from township, county, or state authorities. 
 Despite the popular aversion towards wetlands and the unprecedented 
involvement of the national state in natural resource management during the 1890s and 
early 1900s, the central government did not intervene in drainage.  Responding to a host 
of cultural fears regarding the closing of the frontier, an imminent national timber famine, 
the rise of big business, and the decline of rural America, a new generation of university-
222 
 
trained experts and scientists appropriated the powers of the embryonic administrative 
and regulatory state to promote national land conservation initiatives.  The Reclamation 
Act of 1902 was one of the most important and far-ranging laws passed during the 
Progressive conservation movement.  The law created a new agency, the Reclamation 
Service, to irrigate the public domain in the western sixteen states and territories (initially 
excluding Texas) using revenue generated by public land sales.  Optimistic and confident 
conservationists in the national government predicted that the law would lead to an 
exodus of factory workers and wage earners from eastern cities to the West, revive the 
Homestead ideal, revitalize democratic institutions, and preserve the United States‘ 
agrarian heritage.  Conservationists never acknowledged the obvious contradictions 
inherent in perpetuating the family farm.  Restoring the ―independent‖ family farm in a 
rain-starved region required enhancing the power and influence of the federal 
government and creating a bureaucratic class of university-trained elites, experts, and 
professionals. The enduring specter of class conflict was enough to resolve all 
incongruities in the pursuit of achieving what one scholar describes as ―Jeffersonian ends 
through Hamiltonian means.‖1 
 The national irrigation program revealed serious divisions within the conservation 
coalition.  As early as 1904, congressmen from southern and Midwestern states 
demanded to know why Congress had subsidized irrigation in the American West but not 
wetlands drainage in the humid half of the continent.  In 1906, Halvor Steenerson, a 
second-term Republican from Minnesota who participated in the Red River Valley 
grassroots drainage movement and was the brother of Elias and Christopher, insisted that 
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drainage deserved federal subsidization no less than irrigation.  Steenerson‘s proposal set 
of a veritable mania for federal involvement in land drainage.  Policymakers from states 
with significant quantities of undrained wetlands attempted to divert revenue earmarked 
for western irrigation to drainage projects in their home states.  The requests ignited a 
political firestorm.  Western communities, the Reclamation Service, and national 
conservation organizations fiercely opposed the diversions and accused easterners of 
trying to undermine the irrigation program and keep the West in a state of economic 
vassalage.  Shifting tactics, Steenerson and Sen. Frank P. Flint from California implored 
Congress to pass a second reclamation act, modeled after the 1902 law, dedicated to 
wetlands drainage.  This chapter traces how a diverse coalition of federal bureaucrats, 
social reformers, southern and Midwestern congressmen, western irrigators, 
entomologists, and anti-mosquito activists rallied behind the proposed nationalization of 
drainage.  They heralded the program as the best means to expand the conservation 
program into the eastern United States, extirpate malarial mosquitoes, improve the health 
of rural Americans, convert the nation‘s ―wastelands‖ into homes, and finally spark an 
exodus of city dwellers into the countryside, which the Reclamation Act had failed to 
accomplish.  This chapter attempts to resolve an obvious paradox.  If support for 
nationalization received such overwhelming support from scientists and national 
conservationists, why did the campaign fail to shift control over drainage to the central 
government?  The answer to the paradox is complicated but has to do with sectional, 
bureaucratic, and political divisions within the American state itself and the tension 
between centralization and decentralization within the American federal system. 
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National Water Policy at the Turn of the Century 
 The Reclamation Act of 1902 was the crowning achievement of the Progressive 
conservation movement.  The origins of the law were complex and diverse.  First, 
lingering fears about the return of the 1893 economic depression, skepticism about the 
assimilability of waves of Eastern European immigrants, population growth, nostalgia for 
the frontier (which Frederick Jackson Turner famously declared in 1893 was finally 
closed), the rise of big business, and doubts about the future of rural America elicited 
support for the law‘s home building mission.  Second, the admission of Idaho, Montana, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Washington, Utah, and Wyoming between 1889-1896 
bolstered the political clout of western states by giving the region 3 out of every 10 
Senate seats.  Since the Civil War, westerners had cried foul over the inequitable 
distribution of annual river and harbor appropriations.  In 1901, the chorus of discontent 
reached a crescendo when Montana Sen. Thomas Carter filibustered to death the annual 
river and harbor bill after a conference committee stripped provisions favorable to the 
West.  The filibuster demonstrated the West‘s newfound political power and insistence 
on receiving a more equitable share of the nation‘s wealth.  Third, western 
transcontinental railroads desirous of disposing their land grants, increasing their carrying 
trade, and slowing the migration of Americans to Canada (which from 1896-1914 
exceeded 600,000 American) supported national irrigation.  In 1899, the Great Northern 
(GN), Northern Pacific, Santa Fe, and Southern Pacific each pledged $500 per month to 
California lawyer George H. Maxwell‘s publicity campaign on behalf of federal 
irrigation.  Fourth, southern support proved crucial to the bill‘s passage. Favoring western 
reclamation by a margin of 4 to 1, states-rights southern Democrats welcomed the law as 
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a prelude to a more comprehensive reclamation program that included western deserts, 
forest cutover lands around the Great Lakes, and southern wetlands.   In 1902, all of these 
factors contributed to the Reclamation Act becoming law.
2
 
 The Reclamation Act directed a newly-created Reclamation Service in the 
Department of Interior‘s United States Geological Survey (USGS) to construct irrigation 
projects in the sixteen western states and territories (initially excluding Texas) using 
revenue raised by western public land sales.  The law stipulated that at least 51% of the 
proceeds generated by each state or territory‘s land sales be spent on projects within their 
boundaries.  The terms of the Act were liberal and straightforward.  Settlers could claim 
up to 160 acres of public land within a reclamation project based on the optimum size of 
project farms as determined by the Reclamation Service and Secretary of Interior.  Except 
for a filing fee, settlers received the land for free and were only required to repay their 
share of construction costs for dams, storage reservoirs, and canals within ten years (at no 
interest).  Supporters envisioned reclamation as a self-supporting program.  Revenue 
from public land sales and repayment costs would make money constantly available to 
build new projects.  Under the law, the Secretary of Interior enjoyed full discretion to 
select project sites and to spend the agency‘s money, but he usually rubberstamped 
decisions made the Reclamation Service.  Under the leadership of first director Charles 
D. Walcott and chief engineer Frederick Haynes Newell, the Reclamation Service hoped 
to irrigate between 60 million and 100 million acres of land.  In the words of political 
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scientist Daniel Carpenter, ―there was no more autonomous bureau in the American state 
than the Reclamation Service.‖3 
 The agency wasted little time in tackling its homebuilding mission.  By the start 
of 1908, the Reclamation Service had approved 24 projects in each of the original 16 
states and territories (excluding Oklahoma) in addition to Texas, which Congress added 
to the Reclamation Service‘s jurisdiction in 1905-6.  Starting as many projects at once, 
the Service intended to curry political support across a wide geographic spectrum rather 
than building according to the dictates of efficiency and science.  Nonetheless, the initial 
flurry of action caught the attention of envious policymakers in the eastern half of the 
country who asserted that wetlands drainage constituted a ―meritorious‖ homemaking 
activity no less important to relieving urban congestion and revivifying rural America 
than arid land reclamation.
4
 
 
Beyond the Hundredth Meridian 
 Few national policymakers played a more decisive role in shaping national water 
policy east of the hundredth meridian than Minnesota‘s Halvor Steenerson.  Born on June 
30, 1852 at Pleasant Springs, Wisconsin, Steenerson was the fourth child of Steener 
Knutson and Birgit Liefson Roholt.  In 1853, Steenerson‘s parents moved the family to 
Houston County, Minnesota, and finally to Polk County in the valley of the Red River of 
the North.  As a young man, Steenerson worked as a farm laborer and rural school 
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teacher.  He eventually saved enough money to move to Chicago and study law.  In 1878, 
he enrolled at the Union College of Law, completed the curriculum, and within a short 
period of time was admitted to the Illinois bar.  In the spring of 1880, Steenerson moved 
back to Crookston, Minnesota, and, upon passing the Minnesota bar, opened his own law 
practice.  Steenerson‘s rise to civic prominence was meteoric.  Within six months of 
arriving in Crookston, Steenerson was elected as Polk County Attorney.  In 1883, 
northwestern Minnesotans elected him to the state senate, a position he held until 1887.  
A vigorous proponent of railroad and warehouse regulation, Steenerson was the youngest 
member of the state legislature and helped secure the 1885 passage of Minnesota‘s Board 
of Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners.  In 1884 and 1888, he served as a delegate to 
the Republican National Convention.  A large, physically-imposing man, Steenerson 
returned to Crookston after his senate term expired and practiced law.  In 1886, he helped 
organize the drainage campaign that resulted in the creation of the Red River Valley 
Board of Audit.  As a former farm laborer, attorney in several surface water cases before 
the Minnesota Supreme Court, and the brother of farmers, Steenerson had an intimate 
knowledge of the hardships swamps and flooded land imposed on rural Americans.  In 
1903, northwestern Minnesotans elected Steenerson to the 58
th
 Congress and reelected 
him to nine consecutive terms.
5
 
 Steenerson devoted his early congressional career to wetlands drainage.  In 
January 1906, he met with Walcott, the titular head of the Reclamation Service, and 
criticized the shortcomings and unfairness of federal water policy.  Minnesota‘s failure to 
comply with the 1860 Swamp Land Act, Congress‘s hesitancy to enforce the program‘s 
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reclamation provision, the fact that large areas of northern Minnesota‘s swamp and peat 
lands languished without drainage, and the unfair subsidization of western irrigation but 
not drainage influenced Steenerson‘s harsh critique.  He recommended expanding the 
operations of the Reclamation Service into Minnesota under the same financial 
arrangement as the West‘s reclamation program.  Steenerson argued it was unfair to 
subsidize irrigation in the West, but not drainage in Minnesota.  ―I can see no reason why 
the proceeds of the public lands remaining undisposed of in the State of Minnesota 
should not be devoted to drainage in like manner as public lands in arid land states are 
devoted to reclamation by irrigation.  The one method of reclamation is as meritorious as 
the other.‖  An equitable national water policy, Steenerson lectured Walcott, must 
transcend sectional favoritism and provide for the reclamation of all ―waste lands.‖6 
 Steenerson saw federal control as the best means of coordinating the drainage of 
northern Minnesota‘s patchwork of state, federal, and especially ceded Indian wetlands.  
In 1889, Congress applied its general allotment policy to Minnesota‘s Ojibwe Indians.  
Allotment envisioned extinguishing Indian cultures by privatizing their communal land 
bases.  The policy prescribed giving individual Indians small plots of land and selling the 
remainder of tribal reservations to white Americans.  Allotment intended to teach Indians 
to become sedentary, self-sufficient farmers and inculcate an appreciation for private 
property.  The 1889 law provided for the transfer of some 3,000,000 acres of Ojibwe land 
in Minnesota to the federal government.  In 1904, the Red Lake Ojibwe band, in order to 
avoid allotment and retain communal ownership of a reduced portion of their reservation, 
                                                          
6
 Halvor Steenerson to Charles D. Walcott, January 3, 1906, RG 115, Records of the Bureau of 
Reclamation, General Administrative and Project Records, 1902-1919, Entry 3, Box 97, Folder 110-G, 
―General Correspondence re. Federal Legislation for Drainage of Swamp and Overflow Lands,‖ National 
Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA), Denver, Colorado. 
229 
 
ceded an additional 255,000 acres to the federal government.  To the great dismay of 
northern Minnesota‘s business community, the string of Red Lake Ojibwe cessions did 
not spark a land run.  According to Steenerson, the area‘s landownership pattern and 
ecology undermined previous drainage efforts, leaving half of the ceded lands unsettled 
by 1906.  It made little sense for farmers to invest in drainage if adjacent federal and 
ceded Indian lands remained overflowed.  In northern Minnesota, drainage required 
constructing long ditches to convey water from farmers‘ fields to distant streams, rivers, 
and lakes.  But since most ditches had to intersect a combination of state, public, and 
ceded Indian lands, most drainage attempts failed since drainage districts lacked the 
statutory authority to encroach on federal or ceded Indian lands.  Encouraged by Duluth 
businesses, which envisioned profiting from the settlement of the ceded Ojibwe lands, 
Steenerson pursued federal intervention as the only means to prepare lands for settlement, 
tilt the balance of power in American society back to the countryside, and redistribute the 
nation‘s natural resources and wealth to rural communities.  Periodic episodes of fear 
regarding the decline of rural America punctuated Steenerson‘s political career.  In 1913, 
for instance, he broke with the national conservation coalition and criticized San 
Francisco‘s attempt to dam Hetch Hetchy Valley because he was ―opposed to the eternal 
drawing upon the Federal Government resources and of the people to make cities more 
attractive at the expense of the country.‖7 
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In January 1906, Steenerson introduced legislation applying the Newlands Act‘s 
principles to Minnesota.  Rather than raise westerners‘ ire by tapping the reclamation 
fund, his bill dedicated revenue from the sale of Minnesota‘s public lands to a ―Drainage 
Reclamation Fund‖ to be used by the Secretary of the Interior to drain Minnesota‘s public 
and ceded Indian wetlands.  During the previous fiscal year, the sale of public lands in 
Minnesota brought $346,000 into the general treasury, which was enough revenue to 
initiate surveys and general drainage plans for limited areas.  The bill empowered the 
Secretary to make surveys and examinations, withdraw public and ceded Indian lands 
from entry, select project locations, and condemn lands in preparation for project 
construction.  By entrusting the Secretary with such broad powers, the bill terminated 
Minnesota‘s participation in the Swamp Land program.  Steenerson‘s measure required 
that settlers pay for one-fifth of their proportion of construction costs at the time of entry 
and their remaining debt in four annual installments to limit land speculation.
8
 
 Steenerson and a growing number of conservationists came to believe that federal 
reclamation should have started with Midwestern swamps and proceeded to arid western 
lands only as population pressures demanded.  Settling factory workers and tenement 
dwellers on drained swamps was wiser, cheaper, and more efficient.  Compared to the 
remote West, the Midwest had a denser population, accessible major markets, integrated 
transportation networks, more stable communities, and established social institutions like 
schools and churches.  Steenerson‘s opinion that drainage constituted a more judicious 
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form of land conservation drew upon arguments first articulated by Nathaniel S. Shaler 
two decades earlier.  In 1888, when Congress appropriated funds for the USGS to 
conduct an irrigation survey of the American West, Shaler, a former director of the 
Kentucky Geological Survey, paleontology professor at Harvard, and head of the USGS‘s 
Atlantic division, questioned the wisdom irrigating isolated western deserts.   In 1885 and 
again in 1890, he submitted reports that evaluated the extent and potential agricultural 
productiveness of coastal and interior wetlands.  Shaler‘s second report estimated that 
freshwater wetlands, which were scattered throughout the eastern half of the United 
States, covered at least 105,000 square miles with Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Arkansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Maine having the largest quantity.  
Since Shaler feared that all of the nation‘s arable lands had already passed into private 
ownership, Americans had no choice but to bring land of ―inferior fertility‖ into 
cultivation.  Although Shaler did not criticize Congress‘s decision to fund the irrigation 
survey, he boldly emphasized that drainage represented a more sensible and prudent form 
of land conservation than irrigation due to wetlands‘ proximity to population centers, 
transportation networks, eastern seaports, and food markets. 
The arid but irrigable lands are in the main remote from the seashore, and 
therefore commercially at a disadvantage as far as our greater cities and foreign 
markets are concerned.  A large part of the swamp lands are situated near the 
Atlantic coast or in the immediate neighborhood of the greater rivers, and on that 
account are well placed for conveniently marketing their products… [I]t is an 
open question whether the drainable lands do not contain the most important part 
of our agricultural reserves.  Estimating the drainage area at a total of 100,000 
square miles, it seems to me likely that the aggregate value of the district 
measured in terms of production will be not less than that afforded by the fertile 
lands comprised in the States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois.
9
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Even though Shaler‘s assessment did not reverse the building momentum for nationalized 
irrigation, it anticipated the rivalry that developed between proponents of federal 
wetlands drainage and western irrigation after 1906. 
 Steenerson‘s drainage proposal received a warm reception from leaders of the 
USGS and Reclamation Service.  Walcott, Newell, and chief legal officer Morris Bien 
envisioned administering an enlarged reclamation program that provided the Reclamation 
Service with a national constituency, substituted the rational and disinterested decision-
making of bureaucrats and engineers for parochial drainage districts, increased the farm 
population, alleviated potential food shortages, expanded their agency‘s responsibilities 
at the expense of the Department of Agriculture (USDA), and made reclaiming deserts 
and wetlands equal priorities.  ―Reclamation,‖ Newell later explained, ―means regulation 
of water supply, putting it on where there is a deficiency, and taking it away where there 
is excess; substituting the will of man for the unregulated natural forces.‖10  Since the 
Swamp Land program exposed the corruption, dishonesty, and inefficiency of state 
administration, Walcott—like many Progressives—touted the benefits of federal control.  
Yet he criticized the narrowness of Steenerson‘s bill since Minnesota had a 
comparatively small amount of wetlands.  It had received only 4.5 million of the 
estimated 70 million acres ceded under the swamp land program.  Envisioning a 
comprehensive national program, as opposed to Steenerson‘s single-state scheme, 
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Walcott argued it was ―inadvisable to enact legislation of this kind which would be 
applicable to but one State when the provisions of the bill might be applied to a number 
of other States.‖11 
 The Department of Interior‘s General Land Office (GLO) reached far different 
conclusions.  The GLO‘s commissioner, W. A. Richards, maintained that the Swamp 
Land program delegated drainage responsibilities to the states.  As the swamp land 
program‘s administrator, GLO officials understood the difficulty of identifying what 
lands qualified as being ―swamp‖ and merited inclusion in Steenerson‘s program.  
Richards feared the proposal would create additional confusion and conflicting 
responsibilities within the program.  He doubted the federal government‘s authority to 
engage in such a scheme, emphasized drainage‘s place as a state responsibility under 
American federalism, and urged the bill‘s defeat.  Once word of the bill reached other 
congressmen, the commissioner gloomily predicted, they would demand similar 
privileges for their constituents.  Defending his agency‘s turf, Richards insisted that ―the 
legislation proposed is local in its effect, being applicable to but a single State, while any 
reasons which may support its enactment as to swamp lands in Minnesota would exist to 
a greater or less [sic.] extent in other States.‖12 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Walcott to Steenerson, February 23, 1906, RG 115, Entry 3, Box 97, Folder 110-G, ―General 
Correspondence re. Federal Legislation for Drainage of Swamp and Overflow Lands.‖ 
 
12
 W. A. Richards to Ethan Allen Hitchcock, February 15, 1906, RG 115, Entry 3, Box 97, Folder 
110-G, ―General Correspondence re. Federal Legislation for Drainage of Swamp and Overflow Lands.‖  
The eminent land historian Paul Wallace Gates argues that ―few problems have absorbed as much of the 
time and attention of Land Office officials …as the original swampland acts.‖  Richards feared federal 
drainage initiatives would complicate the already problematic administration of the program by creating 
new, unwieldy, and contradictory tasks.  See Gates, History of Public Land Law Development 
(Washington:  Public Land Law Review Commission, 1968), 334-5. 
234 
 
North Dakota and North Carolina Join the Crusade 
 Richards‘ forebodings proved prophetic.  Less than a month after Steenerson 
introduced his bill, Representative Asle Gronna and Senator Henry C. Hansbrough 
introduced legislation diverting the next $1 million generated by sales of North Dakota‘s 
public lands to wet prairie drainage in the state‘s valley of the Red River of the North 
instead of the reclamation fund.  Unlike Steenerson, Gronna and Hansbrough saw 
federalized drainage as a means to protest what regional boosters perceived as the 
Reclamation Service‘s bias against North Dakota.  In 1904, for instance, Louis W. Hill, 
the son of James J. Hill and GN‘s vice president, learned that Newell confided to another 
railroad leader that ―there is no considerable irrigation project practicable in North 
Dakota.‖13  The Great Northern, which helped bankroll Maxwell‘s publicity campaign on 
behalf of federal reclamation, expected the Reclamation Service to reward its diligence 
by building projects across the northern plains.  Since none of the first eleven projects 
authorized by the Reclamation Service in 1903-4 were in North Dakota, Hill concluded 
that ―the question of irrigation is being sidetracked along our line in Montana and through 
the State of North Dakota‖ because Newell‘s ―interests are all in the southwest.‖14 
North Dakotans endorsed Hill‘s grim appraisal.  In 1905, the legislature petitioned 
Congress to let the state use a portion of its share of the reclamation fund for the drainage 
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of wet and overflow lands in the valley of the Red River of the North and alongside the 
Mouse River.  A year later a statewide drainage convention held in Grand Forks, 
organized by the city‘s commercial club, voted to ask Congress to divert $1 million from 
the irrigation fund to drainage.  Gronna and Hansbrough also saw drainage as the only 
way for the Reclamation Service to comply with the Reclamation Act‘s 51% provision.  
By 1906, sales of North Dakota‘s public lands had contributed $5 million to the 
reclamation fund—one-sixth of its total.  Lacking deep canyons and solid gorges, the 
state had few suitable sites for dams and the Reclamation Service, according to 
Hansbrough, found it ―impossible … to expend there for irrigation more than $500,000,‖ 
far short of the required amount.  Gronna and Hansbrough sought to fulfill the law‘s 51% 
clause and embarrass the Reclamation Service since they entrusted the USDA with the 
drainage duties.
15
 
Democratic southerners looked upon the North Dakota bills as the perfect 
opportunity to participate in the federal reclamation program.  As early as January 1905, 
South Carolina congressmen approached Charles Q. Tirrell of Massachusetts, the 
chairman of the House Committee on the Irrigation of Arid Lands, to discuss borrowing 
money from the reclamation fund to drain southern swamps.  Though there is no 
evidence of how they justified the request and nothing came of the conversation, the 
meeting signaled that some southerners were ready to be rewarded for supporting the 
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Reclamation Act.
16
  In March 1906, North Carolina Rep. John Humphrey Small 
introduced legislation diverting $3 million from the reclamation fund to drain the Dismal 
Swamp.  The bill required project settlers to repay their share of the loan to the 
reclamation fund within ten years.  ―I was not aware that the reclamation fund could be 
turned to such a practical use,‖ Small told the Washington Post, until Gronna and 
Hansbrough introduced their bills.
17
  Draining the Dismal Swamp would bring a large 
return to the government‘s coffers and better fulfill reclamation‘s homebuilding mission 
since it promised to create new farms and not benefit existing landowners.  Another 
southern Democrat, Sen. Asbury Latimer of South Carolina, promised constituents that 
he would request a loan to drain his state‘s abandoned rice fields should the North Dakota 
or Dismal Swamp bills succeed.  Before the end of 1907, Democratic Sen. Lee S. 
Overman and Rep. Claude Kitchin, both of North Carolina, corresponded with Newell 
about potential wetlands drainage projects in their state‘s northern counties of Bertie, 
Halifax, and Warren.
18
 
 
The Angry and Uncompromising Backlash 
 Western politicians and communities fiercely opposed splitting the reclamation 
fund.  Samuel P. Hays identifies 1906-7 as the moment when western opposition to 
national conservation galvanized due to the implementation of policies levying fees for 
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grazing in the national forests and the leasing of water power and coal sites.  The 
proposed raids on the reclamation fund intensified the backlash.  Influential western 
Republicans like Wyoming‘s Frank W. Mondell, the chairman of the House Committee 
on the Irrigation of Arid Lands, opposed the North Dakota and Dismal Swamp bills 
because they threatened to imperil the completion of unfinished reclamation projects, lure 
home seekers to the Midwest instead of the West, and perpetuate the West‘s dependence 
on extractive and range industries.  Anger about the proposed diversions ran high in 
western newspapers.  The Idaho Statesmen and Olympia Record editorialized against the 
bills because they ―open[ed] the way for a general onslaught on the reclamation fund, and 
will lead to the demolition of the reclamation service.‖  According to the Anaconda 
(Mont.) Standard, the raids jeopardized the completion of government projects by 
throwing open the door for easterners to borrow money for ―queer things‖ such as 
dredging eastern harbors, exterminating mosquitoes, and reclaiming other wastelands.  
The Bellingham (Wash.) Herald criticized the propriety of using public land proceeds to 
improve private property since most wetlands were owned privately.  The Oregonian 
excoriated Hansbrough for initiating an ―unjust‖ raid on the reclamation fund by 
southerners.  ―The South is not entitled to a cent out of the reclamation fund for draining 
swamps,‖ editors lectured, ―for the South never contributed a cent to the reclamation 
fund, and never will.‖   Dominated by westerners, the annual National Irrigation 
Congress also heaped scorn on the proposed diversions.  The president of the 1906 
Congress, California Governor George Pardee, crowed that the federal reclamation of 
arid lands was ―first in time and should be first in right.‖  The central government should 
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avoid expanding federal reclamation into southern swamplands until western irrigation 
proved successful.
19
 
 Westerners‘ hostile reaction demonstrates that they took a pragmatic approach 
towards federal conservation that blended support or opposition for initiatives based on a 
narrow calculation of self-interest.  Western communities did not view the Progressive 
conservation movement as a monolithic set of policies that were either beneficial or 
inimical to their interests.  They cherry picked which conservation policies to support 
based on local loyalties and, in doing so, fragmented the West into rival communities.  
Small wonder Hansbrough saw his proposal as an attempt to get North Dakotans their fair 
share of the reclamation fund rather than an assault on the interests of the entire western 
bloc of states.  As the historian Richard White explains, ―the battles over conservation 
seemed to pit eastern experts and bureaucrats against western settlers and entrepreneurs, 
but both westerners and their opponents turned out to be divided.  Indeed, many 
westerners never thought of conservation as a unified set of programs.  They supported or 
opposed particular programs not out of ideology but according to calculations of how 
those programs affected their own immediate interests.  They supported some programs 
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and sought to derail others.‖20  National conservation policies did as much to fragment 
the West into competing communities than to foster regional unity and a collective sense 
of purpose. 
 National conservation organizations steered a middle course.  The editors of 
Forestry and Irrigation, one of the nation‘s leading conservation periodicals, worried that 
raids on the reclamation fund would be ―disastrous to the West,‖ delivering a ―mighty 
serious setback‖ to its economic development.  They opposed diverting money from the 
reclamation fund for drainage, but they endorsed a national drainage act for wetlands as a 
fair compromise.  Led by Maxwell, the National Irrigation Association also opposed 
reclamation fund diversions but supported integrating drainage into the existing federal 
reclamation program on an incremental basis.  Maxwell recommended amending the 
Newlands Act so it included Minnesota and, over time, additional public land states with 
swamps.
21
 
 Localism thus had the ironic and unintended consequence of making water 
resource proposals grow progressively larger over time.  The West‘s hostile backlash, 
Walcott‘s call for a wider program, and southerners‘ demands for inclusion compelled 
Steenerson to write a broader bill that provided something for everyone.  Introduced in 
March, the wider proposal sought to restore the grand alliance between the South, West, 
and Midwest the Newlands Act fostered.  It created a ―drainage fund‖ from public land 
proceeds in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin to reclaim wetlands in any state 
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or territory and in ceded Indian lands in states contributing to the fund.  It pleased USGS 
leaders for investing the Secretary of Interior and USGS director with plenary control 
over the selection of project sites and the process of surveying, examining, and 
withdrawing public lands from entry.  Unlike the Newlands Act, Steenerson‘s bill did not 
prescribe specific limitations on the distribution of funds other than giving preference ―as 
far as practicable to projects in the States in which the proceeds of sales and disposal of 
public lands have been greatest.‖  The bill empowered the Secretary of Interior to accept 
cessions of land from states and to include drainage districts and other private lands in 
projects—as long as no plots exceeded 160 acres—if they agreed to repay their share of 
construction costs.  It effectively terminated the Swamp Land program and transferred 
responsibility for drainage to the USGS (and Reclamation Service).
22
 
 Bureaucratic rivalries hampered nationalization no less than conflicts between 
communities.  The creation of new federal agencies around the turn of the century 
ironically fostered localism.  Bureaucracies often pursued contradictory agendas, waged 
protracted battles over new responsibilities, and undermined centralization if their rivals 
stood to benefit from such a shift in power.  In early months of 1906, the rift between the 
USGS and GLO over the future direction of national wetlands policy remained heated, 
bitter, and unresolved.  Steenerson‘s newest bill did nothing to overcome Richard‘s 
objections that state governments bore responsibility for surface water removal since the 
Swamp Land Acts had ―made ample and liberal provision for the reclamation of swamp 
lands.‖23  The GLO remained wedded to the status quo.  Nevertheless, the 
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intradepartmental feud became so disruptive that Secretary of Interior Ethan Allen 
Hitchcock was finally forced to intervene.  In early March, Hitchcock instructed John F. 
Lacey, the chairman of the House Committee on Public Lands, that he opposed 
Steenerson‘s legislation.  By siding with the GLO, Hitchcock temporarily undercut the 
prospects for reforming national wetlands policy.
24
 
 Tension also dominated the relationship between the USGS and USDA.  Created 
in 1895 and 1898, the USGS‘s Hydrographic Division and USDA‘s Office of Irrigation 
Investigations in the Division of Experiment Stations frequently clashed over irrigation 
responsibilities.  The turf war manifested itself most clearly in the rivalry between Newell 
and Elwood Mead, the Office of Irrigation Investigation‘s director.   Newell perceived 
Mead‘s agency as a subversive entity that duplicated the USGS‘s work, undermined 
federal reclamation‘s effectiveness by favoring states‘ water rights, and after 1902 sought 
to displace the Reclamation Service as the West‘s irrigator.  For his part Mead accused 
Newell of exaggerating the number of western acres available for reclamation and of 
knowing too much about engineering and too little about soils, farming, water rights, and 
the economy.
25
 
  The USDA envisioned itself as the administrator of a national wetlands drainage 
program.  Mead and A. C. True, the director of the USDA‘s Office of Experiment 
Stations, interpreted Congress‘s 1903 decision to change the name of the Office of 
Irrigation Investigations to the Office of Irrigation and Drainage Investigations (OIDI) as 
evidence that it, and not the USGS, was positioned to drain the nation‘s wetlands, an area 
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it estimated to be about 80 million acres.  Although the OIDI‘s responsibilities were 
demonstrational and educational, including helping farmers organize drainage districts, 
surveying and locating ditches, and disseminating information about proper drainage 
techniques, Mead and True anticipated building actual drainage projects.  After 1906 this 
ambitious agenda brought the OIDI into conflict with the USGS.  The turf war became so 
contentious that the Senate failed throughout 1906-7 to pass a resolution directing the 
Secretary of Agriculture to study the quantity and location of U. S. wetlands.  Perceiving 
the resolution as a backdoor attempt to position the USDA to assume drainage 
responsibilities, the USGS‘s Senate allies repeatedly blocked its passage.  As the third 
party to this dispute, the GLO opposed any overhaul of the Swamp Land program and 
continued to work behind the scenes to undermine both agencies.  Rather than ushering in 
an era of efficient, coordinated, and scientific decision-making, bureaucratization held the 
national state hostage to administrative rivalries, local jealousies, and confusion about 
institutional responsibilities.
26
 
 Loyalty to localism—not loyalty to science, efficiency, or disinterested 
administration by a technical intelligentsia—remained the basis by which the state 
mediated society‘s relationship with the environment.  Though Steenerson‘s national bill 
allowed every state to benefit from the drainage program, western politicians did not 
budge.  Behind their opposition was the persistent nineteenth-century fear that what 
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benefited one section harmed another.  Progressive water policies did far more to 
intensify these fears than displace them.  In May, Mondell and reclamation state 
representatives, supported by Hitchcock and GLO leaders, defeated Steenerson‘s bill in 
committee by suggesting that the sum available from Midwestern public land sales was a 
meager $5 million.  ―It is idle to talk of starting this great work with this small amount of 
money,‖ Mondell cautioned.  ―It would be all frittered away in making surveys and 
nothing would be left for actual work.‖  If this proved true, swamp states might demand 
appropriations from the general treasury or, even worse, tap the reclamation fund.
27
 
 The North Dakota and Dismal Swamp bills fared similarly.  Hansbrough‘s bill 
slipped through the upper chamber with Senators unaware of what they had approved, 
and it passed the House Committee on Public Lands in the early summer.  Committee 
dissenters from Nebraska, Idaho, and other states issued a scathing minority report 
criticizing the bill for creating a large and expensive new program, reversing the tradition 
of local control over drainage by shifting those responsibilities to the federal government, 
privileging private over public land development, benefiting landowners at the expense of 
home seekers, and postponing the completion of federal irrigation projects.  The same 
committee‘s decision to scold western parochialism, favorably report the Dismal Swamp 
bill, and challenge ―those States which expect such great benefits from irrigation [to] join 
with other States and sections in the reclamation of our fertile swamp lands‖ excited 
similar passions.  Fearful of a second reclamation act‘s divisive impact on the Republican 
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Party‘s unity and distributive program, which included western reclamation, Speaker Joe 
Cannon refused to allow an up or down vote on either bill.
28
 
 
Forging a National Consensus:  The Oklahoma City Drainage Convention 
 The string of setbacks did not deter supporters of national drainage.  Thomas L. 
Cannon, the executive secretary of the St. Louis sector of the National Irrigation 
Association, corresponded in length with Steenerson during the summer months 
regarding his proposal.  Like Mondell, Cannon doubted the legislation‘s potential 
effectiveness because the quantity of public lands available to entry in Alabama, 
Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Indian, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Ohio, and Wisconsin would ―not provide a drainage fund of sufficient magnitude to make 
drainage a question of importance.‖29  Cannon recommended that Steenerson scrap the 
bill, forge a coalition with western states, and focus on amending the Reclamation Act so 
that Midwestern and southern states could gain access to the reclamation fund.  Money 
from the reclamation fund could immediately open 16 million acres of wetlands in 
Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Illinois, southern Kentucky, western Tennessee, and 
Mississippi to at least 3 million settlers, quadruple the value of drained lands, and 
quintuple the crop yields of lands presently suffering from poor drainage.  Cannon 
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emphasized that the national reclamation program should transcend localism, rise above 
partisanship, and include both desert and swamp lands.
30
 
 Steenerson would not budge.  In response, Cannon took his campaign for 
modifying the Reclamation Act to Oklahoma Territory.  In 1905, J. B. Thoburn, the 
secretary of the Oklahoma Territorial Board of Agriculture, instructed residents that they 
might be better served if the territory‘s share of the reclamation fund was used to build 
drainage projects.  At the very least, Thoburn encouraged farmers living in the low-lying 
and flood prone watersheds of the Washita, Little River, and Deep Fork Branch of the 
North Canadian River to demand that the USGS survey those lands and distribute 
topographical maps to community leaders.
31
  In August 1906, Cannon echoed Thoburn‘s 
suggestions during a speech in Chandler, Oklahoma, to the Deep Fork Drainage 
Association.  During the presentation, Cannon lambasted the Reclamation Service for 
bypassing Oklahoma Territory despite its significant contributions to the reclamation 
fund.  Public land sales in Oklahoma had contributed $4 million to the reclamation fund 
but not a penny had been spent on irrigation projects inside the territory.  Cannon 
encouraged Oklahomans to clamor for the revision of the 1902 law.  ―By stretching the 
text of the act,‖ he maintained, ―land might also be reclaimed by drainage.  If the 
reclamation of land by irrigation is constitutional and right, then the reclamation of land 
by drainage is equally so.‖32  Cannon estimated that more than 1 million acres of land in 
Lincoln, Oklahoma, and Pottawatomie counties—many of which were probably owned 
by the railroad corporations Cannon represented—stood ready to benefit from drainage. 
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 By October 1906, Cannon‘s publicity tour caught the attention of the Oklahoma 
City Chamber of Commerce.  Along with the Oklahoma territorial government, led by 
Governor Frank Frantz, the Chamber of Commerce voted to organize the United States‘ 
first national drainage congress.  The Chamber of Commerce invited state governors, 
mayors, agricultural societies, commercial and industrial organizations, county and 
township representatives, drainage district administrators, railroad executives, and federal 
natural resource agencies to attend a December congress.  According to a circular 
disseminated by the Chamber and signed by Frantz, the congress‘s objective was to 
discuss: 
Those phases of the drainage question which are of common interest to all, the 
consideration of ways and means for the inauguration of a general movement for 
the reclamation of lands by the construction of drainage works, and to start a 
campaign of education for the purpose of enlightening the popular mind upon this 
very important subject to the end that public sentiment may be prepared to 
endorse and support the adoption of a practical and definite line of policy 
pertaining thereto.
33
 
 
Like commercial organizations in Duluth and Grand Forks, the Oklahoma City Chamber 
of Commerce deplored Congress‘s bias towards arid land reclamation.  Taking its cue 
from Cannon, the Chamber asserted that all of the attention heaped on the subject of 
western irrigation obscured the significance of wetlands drainage.  A campaign of 
education and publicity offered the only means of leveling the playing field.  The circular 
that announced the impending drainage congress publicized the tangible benefits of 
drainage.  In ―A Few Drainage Queries,‖ the circular asked: 
1. Do you know that while the population of the United States doubles itself about 
once every thirty years, its total land area remains unchanged? 
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2. Do you know that there are more acres of land in the humid region to be 
reclaimed by drainage than there are acres of arid land that can be reclaimed by 
irrigation with the available water supply? 
3. Do you know what land drainage would mean to your state in the way of 
increased agricultural production and added capacity for the support of its 
growing population? 
4. Do you know that drained lands are always fertile and productive? 
5. Do you know that lands which have been drained never suffer from drouth [sic.]? 
6. Do you know that drainage of land enhances its value many fold? 
7. Do you know that drainage would be a paying proposition from the viewpoint of 
public health if no other interests were involved? 
8. Do you know that proper drainage means the solution of the good roads problem? 
9. Do you know that the people of the arid region secured the creation of a national 
reclamation fund by means of which irrigation development on a large scale has 
been inaugurated under the auspices of the general government? 
10. Do you know that such a progressive step is the result of organization and 
concerted action on the part of people interested and do you not think it about 
time for the drainage people to get together for united action?
34
 
On December 5-7, 1906, the first annual drainage congress assembled in 
Oklahoma City.  Sponsored by Oklahoma territorial government and the Oklahoma City 
Chamber of Commerce, the congress attracted seventy-five representatives from 
seventeen states, railroad corporations, and four national agencies (the Reclamation 
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Service, USDA, USGS, and Forest Service).  Acrimony plagued the early proceedings.  
Representing a consortium of business interests centered in St. Louis, Cannon persuaded 
a sizable number of delegates to support a resolution calling on Congress to amend the 
1902 Reclamation Act so that money from the reclamation fund would be available for 
wetlands drainage projects in any state or territory.  The Reclamation Service‘s official 
representatives—assistant chief engineer Arthur Powell Davis and chief statistician C. J. 
Blanchard—vigorously opposed Cannon‘s proposal.  They objected that diverting money 
from the reclamation fund would jeopardize the completion of unfinished reclamation 
projects, alienate western communities, and redistribute public land revenue to states who 
had not contributed to the fund.  The Reclamation Service favored the creation of a 
national drainage law applicable to all states and modeled after the 1902 law.  Dissension 
finally subsided when Davis and Blanchard convinced enough delegates to endorse a 
resolution recommending the speedy passage of a bill authored by Sen. Frank P. Flint of 
California, which was largely a replica of Steenerson‘s initial national bill.  After 
approving another resolution praising Steenerson for making drainage a national priority, 
agreeing to hold another meeting in 1907, and forming a permanent national association 
dedicated to securing the passage of a national drainage law, the congress adjourned.
35
 
 
The Last Great Hope for Social Engineering:  Drainage and the Disappointment of Arid 
Land Reclamation 
 Enacted with lofty hopes and optimism, the Reclamation Act of 1902 failed to 
live up to the dreams of its supporters.  By 1907, the Reclamation Service was in big 
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trouble as public land sales failed to meet expectations; western projects did not attract an 
exodus of eastern factory workers, tenement dwellers, and farmers; project construction 
costs soared to over six times initial estimates; the price of private land on government 
projects increased 759% between 1902-13; the authorization of 23 projects in four years 
stretched the agency‘s resources too thin; and by year‘s end the reclamation fund was 
broke.  In its haste to start as many projects as quickly as possible, the Reclamation 
Service overextended itself and eroded public confidence.
36
 
 No one was more disappointed in the reclamation program‘s chronic 
shortcomings than Frederick Haynes Newell.  Born on March 5, 1862, in Bradford, 
Pennsylvania, Newell‘s childhood was punctuated by stays with different relatives as a 
result of his mother‘s 1863 death in childbirth.  A smart and diligent student, Newell 
excelled in school and, in 1880, enrolled in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  
Five years later he graduated with a B. A. in mining engineering, worked for his one of 
his father‘s businesses, and then joined the Ohio Geological Survey, where he researched 
oil-bearing rocks.  In 1888, the course of Newell‘s life changed when he met John 
Wesley Powell, the head of the USGS, and other prominent leaders of the scientific 
agency.  Powell, who gained national fame during his daring run down the Colorado 
River decades earlier, had charge of the USGS‘s Irrigation Survey, which intended to 
locate, map, and segregate potential dam and canal locations.  Powell was so impressed 
with Newell‘s talents that he hired him to lead a group of recent engineering graduates to 
study the volume, velocity, and features of western streams and rivers.  Upset with the 
leisurely pace of Powell‘s survey, Congress revoked the Irrigation Survey‘s funding in 
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1890 and dramatically slashed the USGS‘s budget in 1892.  Despite the setbacks to the 
USGS, Newell remained active in Washington scientific circles.  In the 1890s, he 
participated in the Cosmos Club, the National Geographic Society, the American 
Geographical Society, and the American Forestry Association and gave numerous 
lectures on natural resource matters.  Newell also befriended the forester Gifford Pinchot, 
who in 1900 introduced him to the rising governor of New York, Theodore Roosevelt, 
who soon became the Republican Party‘s Vice President.  When an assassin‘s bullet 
claimed the life of President William McKinley in 1901, Roosevelt was elevated to the 
Presidency.  Pinchot and Newell became his closest advisors on natural resource policy.  
It was thus no surprise that Newell was selected to become the first chief engineer of the 
Reclamation Service.  In 1907, Newell became the second director of the Reclamation 
Service after Walcott resigned to become the secretary of the Smithsonian Institution.
37
 
 The early twentieth-century conservation movement blossomed during a period of 
epochal social and political reform known as Progressivism.  One of the core missions of 
Progressive reformers was confronting the corruption, inequity, and social ills spawned 
by the rise of big business and urban political machines.  According to the historian 
Shelton Stromquist, the Progressive movement, with its varied, diverse, and often 
contradictory goals, ―defined its enemies … as parochial, corrupt, and antisocial 
‗interests‘ that bred the twin evils of greed and inefficiency.  The corrupting influences, 
represented by urban boss rule and corporate ‗robber barons,‘ threatened democratic 
institutions and the expansion of economic opportunity.  These interests conspired to 
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produce a dysfunctional industrial society that eroded public virtue.‖38  Progressives 
eagerly enlisted the support of the embryonic administrative state to purge corruption 
from the democratic process and revitalize democratic institutions by promoting 
enlightened political participation by individual citizens.  Unfortunately, Stromquist‘s 
study completely ignores the most obvious manifestation of the reform sentiment he 
describes as the ideological basis of Progressivism:  federal reclamation. 
 Newell‘s political and social sensibilities were enmeshed in his intense 
ambivalence and apprehension about the fate of American democracy.  Between 1870 
and 1900, the population of the United States, bolstered by unprecedented immigration 
and natural increase, doubled from 38 million to 76 million.  During the same three 
decades, the industrial workforce increased to a third of the entire population.  Foreign-
born Americans accounted for a third of the population increase from 1860 to 1900; in 
the period between 1870 and 1920, one out of every three industrial laborers was an 
immigrant (the ratio stayed unchanged during the period).  By 1920, the national 
population jumped to 105 million and the census reported that, for the first time in U. S. 
history, more people lived in urban areas than on farms.  The demographic upheaval 
troubled Newell.  He regretted that the concentration of people in cities and their 
dependence on venal and corrupt industrial and political bosses was slowly eroding the 
character traits that had long defined American character—industry, individualism, and 
self-reliance.  Nothing less than the wholesale relocation of people from the city to the 
farm could preserve American democracy, revitalize its institutions, and breed the 
hardiness and independence for which Newell expressed nostalgia.  Newell insisted that 
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the federal government had a sincere responsibility to ―promote land-owning 
citizenship.‖  As the western irrigation movement sputtered along, the Flint drainage bill 
became the last best hope of social engineers to suspend the ascendancy of the city.  ―In 
any scheme the part played by the United States and its employees is that of initiating, 
guiding, and securing … the best use of the [drainage] fund in securing what is vital to 
the life of the commonwealth, namely, the extension and perpetuation of a class of small 
landowners.‖39  The destiny of democratic society depended on turning wasted lands into 
rural homes for wasted people.  ―The success of democratic institutions is tied up with 
this class of citizens and the largest menace to the maintenance of the institutions of a 
free country,‖ Newell insisted, ―come from the concentration of citizens in a few large 
industries, crowded in big cities, and under the control of a few capitalists.‖40  Rather 
than constituting a latter-day Jeffersonianism, Newell‘s sweeping vision represented a 
grand utopian scheme dedicated to preserving the virtue of ordinary Americans by 
buffering them from economic vicissitudes, avaricious factory owners, and selfish 
political bosses.  ―The safeguard [to political corruption] is … the securing of able, 
independent men throughout the country, each as an independent owner of a small tract 
of land from which he is deriving his living.‖41 
 Newell was not a solitary voice crying out in the wilderness.  As Laura Lovett 
demonstrates, several leaders of the conservation movement shared his views about the 
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human junk produced by industrialization.  Lovett argues that George Maxwell, who 
spearheaded the campaign for the passage of the Reclamation Act, envisioned federal 
reclamation and the creation of ―homecrofts‖ as a means to shield American families 
from the ebb and flows of the market economy, relieve urban congestion, eliminate class 
strife, and promote an ideology of pronatalism.  Disturbed that the rise of grocery chains 
and national distribution networks eroded familial self-sufficiency, Maxwell touted 
federal reclamation and homecrofts as the best strategy for transforming the American 
home back into a site of production rather than consumption.  ―The rise of the suburban 
life and the emergence of domestic science,‖ Lovett contends, ―shifted the home and the 
woman in it from a domestic manager who oversaw the production of household goods 
into one of educated consumer.‖42  Maxwell brooded over this transition because it made 
American families perilously dependent on the husband‘s wages and vulnerable to 
market forces that were unpredictable.  His family producer ethic revised the notion of an 
exclusive male breadwinner by introducing the idea that ―women‘s responsibilities 
included productive labor in the garden, the orchard, and the livestock yard as well as the 
guildhall and community center.  This labor by women was interpreted as freeing the 
family from total dependence on industrial wages.‖  ―Reclaiming the land was a means of 
reclaiming the family.‖43 
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Anti-Mosquito Hysteria, Wetlands, and Public Health 
 The Progressive conservation movement coincided with a national crusade for 
mosquito eradication.  In 1897, English physician Ronald Ross discovered that the 
anopheles mosquito—and not miasmatic vapors rising from stagnant marshes and 
swamps—was the true vector of malaria.  As a result of the discovery, anti-mosquito 
hysteria swept the nation.  Communities directed much of their hostility towards wetlands 
since the anopheles and many other mosquito species preferred laying larvae in interior 
and coastal wetlands shielded from wave action.  The consignment of the miasmatic 
theory of disease to the dustbin of history and the gradual acceptance of the germ theory 
intensified Americans‘ antipathy towards wetlands, led to the proliferation of local and 
national interest groups dedicated to mosquito extirpation, and prompted several state 
governments to create mosquito control agencies that generally involved draining 
wetlands or dumping kerosene into them to kill larvae.
44
 
 Early twentieth-century entomologists touted wetlands drainage as an effective 
strategy of mosquito control.  During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the field 
of medical entomology took shape and emerged as the servant of local and state 
governments influenced by anti-mosquito hysteria.  Probably the most influential 
entomologist of the Progressive Era was John Bernhard Smith, who served as the state 
entomologist at New Jersey‘s Agricultural Experiment Station from 1889 until his death 
in 1912.  Trained as an attorney, Smith was a self-educated entomologist whose 1883 
hiring at the USDA‘s division of entomology jumpstarted his scientific career.  After 
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1900, Smith persuaded the New Jersey legislature to appropriate money for his a study of 
the behavior, breeding habits, and species of New Jersey mosquitoes.  Smith‘s The 
Common Mosquitoes of New Jersey (1904) proved an instant success and shaped the 
contours of the national mosquito extermination crusade.  Rather than employing 
kerosene as a larvicide, which was popular in many communities, Smith favored drainage 
and the introduction of mosquito-devouring fish into breeding environments.  Smith was 
just adept at politics as entomology.  In 1904, he helped persuade the New Jersey 
legislature to pass an amendment to the state‘s 1887 health act that added the phase 
―waters in which mosquito larvae breed‖ to the section describing public nuisances.  
Soon thereafter, the legislature allocated money for Smith to drain New Jersey‘s salt 
marshes to control the mosquito population.
45
 
 Word of New Jersey‘s anti-mosquito crusades spread to other states.  Influenced 
by Smith‘s experiments, affluent residents of the California cities of San Rafael and 
Burlingame formed improvement associations committed to mosquito control and 
subscribed money for drainage projects.  In New York, the Long Island Railroad, New 
York City Health Department, and nearby horse racetracks donated money to exterminate 
the mosquitoes of Coney Island.  Comfort, desire to enhance property values, and fears of 
malaria influenced the anti-mosquito hysteria.  In late 1903, Henry Clay Weeks, the 
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famous leader of New York‘s anti-mosquito campaign and Smith‘s rival, invited lawyers, 
physicians, politicians, business leaders, lawyers, and entomologists to New York city for 
the ―First General Convention to Consider the Questions involved in Mosquito 
Extermination.‖  Delegates chose a motto of ―No Stagnant Water‖ and voted to form the 
National Mosquito Extermination Society.  A year later the organization changed its 
name to the ―American Mosquito Extermination Society‖ (AMES) to demonstrate its 
national ambitions.  As the society‘s secretary and chief publicist, Weeks unsuccessfully 
attempted to persuade Congress to create a national mosquito commission. Despite 
AMES‘s best efforts, mosquito control remained the responsibility of local and state 
governments, where it flourished throughout the first half of the twentieth century.  Prior 
to the outbreak of World War II, local anti-mosquito commissions were organized in 
New Jersey, California, Florida, Utah, and Illinois.  Massachusetts, Rhode Island, 
Connecticut, New York, and Delaware also appropriated money to eradicate mosquitoes.  
By the close of 1907, the anti-mosquito crusade converged with the national wetlands 
drainage movement to form a formidable coalition.
46
 
 
The Natural Resource State and Nationalization 
 In early 1907, the budding support for the creation of a second reclamation 
program attracted the attention of eastern farm journals.  Ever since the 1902 passage of 
the Reclamation Act, the eastern rural press excoriated the wisdom, ineffectiveness, and 
exorbitant costs of nationalized irrigation.  The Albany-based Country Gentleman, which 
was one of the nation‘s most respected and widely read farm periodicals, supported the 
principles of the Flint Bill.  In 1907 and again in 1909, the journal ran a series of articles, 
                                                          
46
 Patterson, The Mosquito Crusades, 10, 58-79; and McWilliams, American Pests, 124. 
257 
 
authored by W. F. Massey, that compared the advantages and disadvantages of drainage 
and irrigation.  Massey contended that Congress‘s decision to subsidize western irrigation 
constituted an act of ―folly‖ because so much unimproved and abandoned farmland 
languished without settlers in the east.  Citing a Department of Agriculture study, Massey 
complained that 170,000 acres of abandoned farmland existed in New York state alone.  
Furthermore, vast stretches of coastal wetlands in North and South Carolina, Virginia, 
Georgia, and Florida obviated the need to open up western land.  ―If this state of affairs 
… is really true,‖ Massey asked, ―where is the need for spending millions for the 
redemption of the deserts of the West?‖  ―What is needed is not so much the reclamation 
of the arid West as the reclamation and settlement of the humid East.‖47 
 Massey elucidated three reasons why drainage constituted a more expedient form 
of land conservation than irrigation.  First, wetlands contained ―the most fertile soil[s] in 
the world.‖48  Following ideas previously articulated in the antebellum rural press, 
Massey apparently attributed the unrivaled fecundity and ―inexhaustib[ility]‖ of drained 
soils to the fact that they were the product of the slow accumulation of decomposing 
vegetable and animal matter.
49
  Farmers who grew crops on fields improved by drainage 
enjoyed higher yields and belated soil exhaustion.  Second, outside of scattered pockets 
in the American West, undeveloped wetlands were concentrated in the humid half of the 
United States.  Reclamation projects constructed on former wetlands were closer to 
northern cities that had large food demands and transportation facilities like railroads and 
ports, which reduced farmers‘ shipping expenses.  Finally, in addition to creating new 
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farms, wetlands drainage destroyed the breeding habitat of anopheles mosquitoes while 
irrigation, by creating artificial water impoundments, potentially increased the range of 
malarial mosquitoes.  Boosters of drainage often gloated that at the same time agricultural 
progress transformed the eastern United States into a salubrious and healthy paradise, 
irrigation degenerated the West into a malarial and pathogenic wasteland.  In a final plea, 
Massey implored Congress to abandon its unwillingness to participate in drainage 
because of the legal precedent of the Swamp Land Acts:  ―As the swamp land now 
belongs largely to the states, having been transferred to them by the federal government, 
it might not be practicable for the central government to undertake its reclamation, but it 
could lend its aid to the states and hold a lien on the lands reclaimed till repaid.‖50 
 Ironically, the most vocal and enthusiastic support for some of Massey‘s ideas 
came from western policymakers.  While scholars since Walter Prescott Webb have 
described the West‘s environment in terms of its aridity, pockets of wetlands scattered 
throughout the Pacific and Great Plains states reveal a diverse, complex, and varied 
landscape altered no less by people than arid lands.  Sen. Hansbrough of North Dakota 
remained one of the most prominent proponents of a second program.  Disappointed by 
the pace of federal reclamation in North Dakota, Hansbrough published an article in 1907 
that laid out the case for a federal drainage program.  Like many Progressive Era 
conservationists, he blamed the leisurely pace of drainage on the inability of local 
communities to administer land conservation in an effective, efficient, and timely 
manner.  In particular, state legislatures had been dilatory in passing drainage laws that 
unleashed the collective energy of people against nature.  As Hansbrough put it, the 
creation of drainage districts or county drainage boards, which had the ability to impose 
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assessments on lands included under their jurisdiction, often provoked disagreements that 
led to judicial gridlock and delay.  ―The question of drainage invariably becomes a sort of 
local political issue with one faction of the people in favor of drainage, another faction 
opposed to drainage, and still another faction hostile toward the drainage board.‖  Local 
conflicts produced the kind of inefficiency and waste that Progressive Era 
conservationists abhorred.  ―Wherever these local feuds are engendered,‖ he explained, 
―the courts are resorted to, and in the end little progress is made.  It must be apparent to 
everybody that … there is great necessity for turning drainage work over to the steady 
hand of the Federal Government … In other words, the Federal Government can loan its 
credit, without interest charges, and proceed to drain the lands under a broad and 
comprehensive system which will accomplish results in the shortest possible time.‖51 
Although future events revealed that Hansbrough‘s unfettered faith in Congress 
proved misguided, proponents of federal drainage predicted speedy passage of the Flint 
drainage bill after the Senate Committee on Public Lands unanimously approved it in 
March.  The perceived need to open up more farmland for settlement and the nearness of 
many wetlands to large cities, which would facilitate the relocation of factory workers to 
reclamation projects, inspired the committee‘s favorable report. 
The demand for lands is increasing every year by the natural increase of native 
born and by the addition of 1,000,000 foreigners annually who must be provided 
with homes … These vast [swamplands] right at the doors of our great cities offer 
an ideal opportunity for relieving the overcrowding of cities.  Their nearness to 
centers of population is assurance that when made habitable they will in a 
measure turn the pendulum of population from the city back to the farm.  On these 
farms there will be no isolation, no loneliness.  The fertility of the soil and the 
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nearness to markets assure dense population, with all the comforts and luxuries of 
the town and with the healthfulness and freedom of the farm.
52
 
 
A faithful friend of Walcott and federal reclamation, Flint himself pushed the measure to 
fulfill the Reclamation Service‘s vision of institutional aggrandizement, receive a 
political payoff, and promote public health.  He hoped Walcott and Newell would reward 
his diligence by appropriating money from the drainage fund to drain the overflowed 
lands of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys—something for which he and Rep. 
James Norris Gillett of California a year earlier had tried unsuccessfully to convince 
Congress to appropriate.  Nevertheless, Flint‘s bill passed the committee too late in the 
congressional session to be considered by the full Senate.  Supporters would have to wait 
until the next congressional session.
53
 
 
American Federalism, National Water Policy, and Kansas v. Colorado 
 The delay proved fateful.  Since the summer of 1906, skeptical legislators and 
GLO officials reasoned that the Swamp Land Acts shut the central government out of 
surface water removal.  Although those laws did not prohibit the federal government 
from draining the public domain, they severely limited the amount of federally-owned 
wetlands available for improvement.  ―In regard to the swamp lands,‖ Oregon Senator 
Charles Fulton argued in 1906, ―they occupy a very different position [than arid lands].  
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The swamp lands have been given to the several States by Congress…  Surely, it was not 
intended that Congress should go to work and reclaim the swamp lands.‖54  Furthermore, 
policymakers did not dispute that the Constitution‘s property clause conferred 
unambiguous authority on Congress to improve its own property, but they were uncertain 
that Congress possessed the authority to improve private or state property. American 
federalism—the distribution of power to different and competing levels of government—
intervened in the period between the 59
th
 and 60
th
 Congresses to help reinforce local 
control over drainage by rejecting a federal role.
55
 
A 1907 Supreme Court case having little to do with drainage confirmed the 
doubts of those who demanded a limited federal role.  Kansas v. Colorado stemmed from 
a dispute between Kansas and Colorado over the Arkansas River, which from its source 
in Colorado flows through Kansas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas before merging with the 
Mississippi River.  Kansas argued that irrigation and manufacturing diversions in 
Colorado diminished the Arkansas‘s flow to the detriment of western Kansas farmers, 
and it asked the Court for relief.  Kansas based its suit on riparian rights, the legal 
doctrine reserving an undiminished flow of water to riparian landowners.  Claiming the 
right to appropriate water within its borders as it saw fit, Colorado invoked state 
sovereignty in defense of the diversions. Unsatisfied with both states‘ reasoning, the U. S. 
government intervened on behalf of the Reclamation Service.  The agency attacked 
Kansas‘s argument since it imperiled the government‘s authority, under the property 
clause, to improve and dispose of its arid public lands by threatening the legality of 
                                                          
54
 Congressional Record, Senate, 59
th
 Congress, 1
st
 Session, June 26, 1906, p. 9248. 
55
 The standard works on federalism remain Harry N. Scheiber, ―American Federalism and the 
Diffusion of Power:  Historical and Contemporary Perspectives,‖ University of Toledo Law Review 9 
(Summer 1978):  619-80; and Scheiber, ―Federalism and the American Economic Order, 1887-1910,‖ Law 
and Society Review 57 (Fall 1975):  57-118. 
262 
 
upstream dams.  Riparian rights, the Reclamation Service contended, were not in tune 
with agricultural development of arid regions that required the storage and conveyance of 
water over long distances since they made it difficult to evaluate the quantity of water 
available for reclamation and threatened the federal government‘s monopolization of 
surplus water in interstate streams.  The agency also balked at Colorado‘s claim of 
sovereignty since it violated the theory reserving control over unappropriated waters to 
the central government.   The Reclamation Service‘s broader goal, however, was to have 
the Court invalidate riparian rights, the doctrine predominating in the eastern United 
States, so that it could pursue wetlands drainage and fulfill its vision of institutional 
aggrandizement.
56
 
 In May 1907, Justice David J. Brewer delivered the Court‘s unanimous decision.  
For the purpose of this essay Brewer‘s decision to uphold the diversions in Colorado was 
much less important than his dismissal of the United States‘ petition of intervention and 
warnings against expanding the reclamation program.  Expounding a narrow view of 
federal power, Brewer emphasized the Court‘s ―constant declaration … from the 
beginning that this Government is one of enumerated powers.‖  Brewer admitted the 
commerce clause gave Congress broad authority to regulate and control navigable 
interstate streams, as he himself recognized in United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation 
Company (1899), but the case at bar differed because all parties agreed that the Arkansas 
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was not navigable.
57
  Brewer next dismissed the idea that the property clause handed the 
central government a blank check to override or invalidate state laws in pursuit of the 
improvement or disposal of public lands.  Though the Court had never fully evaluated the 
reach of the property clause, Brewer emphasized ―it does not grant to Congress any 
legislative control over the States, and must, so far as they are concerned, be limited to 
authority over the property belonging to the United States.‖  The Court clung to a narrow 
view of federal power based on the Tenth Amendment‘s reservation of all powers not 
specifically granted to the federal government by the Constitution.   Brewer hinted, but 
did not explicitly declare, that the reclamation program was unconstitutional.  But he was 
less ambiguous in asserting how the Court would look upon the extension of reclamation 
to other areas of the country:  ―While arid lands are to be found, mainly if not only in the 
Western and newer States, yet the powers of the National Government within the limits 
of those States are the same (no greater no less) than those within the limits of the 
original thirteen, and it would be strange if, in the absence of a definite grant of power, 
the National Government could enter the territory of the States along the Atlantic and 
legislate in respect to improving by irrigation or otherwise the lands within their borders.  
Nor do we understand that hitherto Congress has acted in disregard to this limitation.‖58 
 Brewer‘s ruling slammed the door shut on the implementation of a uniform 
federal wetlands policy since he denied that the national government possessed the right, 
either real or implied, to improve private land even if a project also involved the 
reclamation of some public lands.  By devolving responsibility to the states and providing 
for the privatization of wetlands, the Swamp Land Acts blocked the implementation of 
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federal drainage.  In 1907, the USDA estimated that the federal government owned only 
5% of the 77,000,000 acres of wetlands east of the 115
th
 meridian.  Since the drainage of 
the scattered pockets of public wetlands depended upon compelling the participation of 
adjacent private landowners and drainage districts and, in many cases, required 
superseding state drainage laws, Bien took a dark view of the government‘s authority to 
engage in drainage, especially since reclamation was not perceived as an enumerated 
power after Kansas:  ―So far as the public lands of the United States are concerned, the 
question [of drainage] presents but little difficulty from a legal standpoint, but where a 
large portion of a project is not owned by the United States, the power of the Federal 
Government to engage in construction must be regarded as doubtful.‖59 
 National newspapers agreed that Kansas v. Colorado cast doubt on the 
constitutionality of federal drainage.  Quoting from Justice Brewer‘s ruling, the 
Washington Post editorialized in September that ―the authority of Congress within the 
States is limited to control over the property belonging to the United States within their 
limits.  Congress cannot enact laws overriding State laws relating to reclamation and it 
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cannot assume control of lands owned by the States.‖60  As a result, the editors disputed 
that Congress could directly intervene in drainage unless the state governments agreed to 
retrocede their wetlands to the federal government.  Although USGS staffers had 
explored the option of retrocession in an internal memo, it was unlikely that the states 
would accede to such a proposal since they had already disposed of the majority of their 
grants.
61
 
 
The Baltimore Drainage Congress:  Reconciliation and Compromise 
 On November 26 and 27, 1907, the National Drainage Association (NDA), which 
had adopted the motto ―drain the swamps for health and homes,‖ held its second annual 
meeting in Baltimore.
62
  Congressmen, leaders of natural resource agencies, prominent 
entomologists, AMES leaders, and sanitarians congregated at Johns Hopkins University 
to hear lectures on a wide range of topics including drainage, home making, mosquito 
eradication, malaria reduction, and so forth.  The meeting adjourned without endorsing a 
specific congressional bill or course of action.  Napoleon Bonaparte Broward, the 
governor of Florida, newly-appointed NDA President, and firm proponent of draining the 
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Everglades, demanded that the organization should remain bipartisan and uncommitted to 
any specific piece of legislation.  ―It would be manifestly unjust and unwise for the 
National Drainage Association, or any of its members[,] to attempt any influence 
whatever in the legislative action of Congress.‖  Broward encouraged proponents to 
―confine ourselves to urging national drainage as a general policy and not as any 
particular project.‖63  Sen. Asbury Churchill Latimer of South Carolina, who had long 
fought to win federal drainage funding for his constituents, marveled that the sentiment in 
favor of nationalization at the conference was ―stronger than I anticipated.‖  Vexing 
constitutional questions nonetheless undermined the bill‘s prospects.  Echoing the fears 
of the Reclamation Service, Latimer told the Charlotte Observer that ―I fear some trouble 
on constitutional grounds.  All the swamp lands held by the Federal government have 
been turned over to the States and the States have … disposed of them to corporations or 
individuals…  In the reclamation service some private lands are being reclaimed, but the 
title to much of it still remains in the Federal government; while the government has title 
to none of the swamp lands.‖64  Since the colonial period, Americans assumed that 
individuals or collections of individuals, who acted under the authority of a local court or 
legislature, bore the financial responsibility for drainage.  Whatever his misgivings, 
Latimer consoled himself that ―there are many good lawyers who take the position that 
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the government has a right to co-operate with the [individual] State[s] in this 
enterprise.‖65 
 In a desperate act of arrogance and hubris, the Reclamation Service and its 
congressional allies tried to get around Brewer‘s ruling.  On January 25 and February 1, 
1908, Newell and Secretary of Interior James R. Garfield, the son of a former President 
and Theodore Roosevelt‘s choice to succeed Hitchcock the previous year, hosted two 
meetings with congressional allies to write a new drainage bill capable of passing a 
constitutional challenge.  A staunch supporter of enlarging federal responsibilities over 
natural resource administration, Garfield ignored the GLO‘s repeated objections to 
nationalized drainage and touted surface water removal as a responsible strategy to 
promote public health and open up new farmland.  The bill which emerged from the 
negotiations in Garfield‘s office, which Flint introduced on behalf of the Reclamation 
Service in early February, dedicated all of the proceeds of public and ceded Indian lands 
in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin, since June 30, 1901, to a ―drainage fund‖ to 
be used by the Secretary of the Interior to reclaim public wetlands in any state.  The bill 
gave public land to settlers in plots not exceeding 160 acres and required them to 
cultivate half of that land and repay their share of construction costs in annual 
installments, not to exceed ten years, as set by the Secretary of Interior.  Sections 5 and 6, 
inserted to accommodate southerners, constituted the bill‘s most controversial provisions.  
Those sections empowered the Secretary to loan money from the drainage fund to states, 
municipalities, drainage districts, or corporations engaged in reclaiming private wetlands 
by purchasing their bonds.  A first lien on the land secured the loan, which the measure 
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required to be repaid within ten years.  The section instructed the Secretary to divide the 
private land into plots, not to exceed 160 acres, before settlement and to set the costs of 
the land.  The conferees agreed to these provisions to attract support from North Carolina 
and Alabama congressmen whose respective states prohibited the issuance of bonds for 
drainage and had not passed drainage district legislation.  The word ―corporation‖ was 
specifically included to accommodate those states.  The conferees also declined without 
comment to support the proposal of Sen. Newlands of Nevada, the original sponsor of the 
1902 Reclamation Act, to create an Inland Waterways Commission to oversee the 
simultaneous and coordinated development of river basins from their sources to the sea, 
including wetlands drainage, arid land reclamation, navigation improvement, reservoir 
construction, and forest headwater preservation.
66
 
 During the conferences in Garfield‘s office, conferees agreed that the moment had 
arrived to strip local communities of their autonomy over drainage.  In the tradition of 
Progressive Era conservation, Garfield, Newell, and the dozen congressmen and Senators 
in attendance touted the advantages of federal control.  Local efforts at drainage, they 
insisted, had resulted in ―confusion‖ and ―delay.‖  Only the federal government had the 
power to ―make general surveys and broad plans of development, involving all questions 
of the use of the water from the headwaters down to the navigable portions of streams.‖  
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Furthermore, only federal agencies had the ability to provide coordination in matters that 
involved states, counties, and drainage districts.  The bill in question accomplished these 
goals by ―leav[ing] to qualified men the solution‖ of the national drainage problem.67  
Conservationists in the Reclamation Service and Congress were disdainful of local 
communities and judged them to be inefficient, dilatory, and ineffective at removing 
surface water.  But the facts on the ground belied their condescending conclusions.  At 
the same time conferees drafted the Flint bill, a revolution was taking place in water 
resource management at the grassroots that shaped the contours of the national resource 
state and carved out a thriving role for local communities. 
 The confidence and cocksureness of conferees did not relieve tensions that were 
beginning to surface in the drainage coalition.  As the leading Democratic supporter of 
nationalized drainage, Latimer acted as an intermediary between the Republican-
dominated inner circle of drainage supporters and his own party.  During the first meeting 
in Garfield‘s office, Flint presented a motion calling for the lawyers in attendance to be 
appointed as a committee to draft the bill that would go before the Senate.  Since Latimer 
was not an attorney, the proposal excluded him from participating in drafting the final 
bill.  Enraged and despondent, he confided to Broward, his close friend and ally, that 
Flint intended to ―have the bill that passes the Senate go to the country as a republican 
measure.‖68  Latimer‘s pointed accusations of partisanship compelled Flint to soften his 
stance.  The California Senator finally realized that the alienation of southerners spelled 
doom for the bill since he could not count on many members of his own party from New 
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England for support.  Although the historical record is sketchy, it is clear that Flint and 
Moses Clapp, a Republican Senator from Minnesota, smoothed over their differences 
with Latimer between the two meetings.  Less than a week later, Latimer abandoned his 
opposition, predicted the bill‘s swift passage, and instructed Broward to write the 
governors of Iowa, Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New 
York, Rhode Island, and Vermont to lobby their congressional delegation to support the 
legislation.  Latimer identified House Speaker Joe Cannon as the biggest potential 
obstacle to passage.  If Cannon refused to allow the Senate bill to reach the House floor, 
drainage proponents would need to rally the support of two-thirds of the legislative body 
to take the bill up under the suspension of rules.
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 As the NDA‘s president, Broward tried to cultivate a sense of urgency.  He 
concluded that the 60
th
 Congress represented the best, and perhaps final, opportunity for 
national drainage.  The critical moment had arrived.  In soliciting the support of 
governors throughout the country, Broward portrayed the Flint Drainage bill as a 
reasonable attempt to bridge the political and geographic divide produced by the nation‘s 
national water policy, which privileged western agriculture.  ―There has been a 
movement on foot,‖ Broward told the governors, ―that several localities of the country 
may be benefitted by swamp land reclamation by drainage through the United States 
Government, as are the persons, counties and states in the West benefitted by the 
reclamation of the arid and semi-arid lands by irrigation, done by the United States 
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Government.‖70  Secretary of Interior Garfield, USDA Commissioner James Wilson, and 
President Roosevelt all supported some form of nationalized drainage.  Indeed, Broward 
contended that a side-by-side comparison of drainage and irrigation demonstrated that the 
former was cheaper because it did not require a ―constant outlay of money.‖71  In 
building support for the bill, Broward gloomily predicted that the failure of the Flint 
drainage bill would forever doom national drainage.  Hesitation, delay, and debate were 
unacceptable.  The time to act was at hand. 
 
Setbacks and Defeat 
 Supporters of nationalized drainage suffered a string of setbacks following the 
meetings in Garfield‘s office.  First, the GLO continued to work behind the scenes to 
derail the Flint bill.  Second, the bill opened old wounds between the Reclamation 
Service and USDA over who should be responsible for administering the new program.  
According to Broward, the bitter ―rivalry‖ undermined supporters‘ momentum.  Third, 
lingering doubts persisted over the constitutional propriety of placing the federal 
government in charge of draining private land, a task historically reserved for local 
communities.  Fourth, states-rights Southerners increasingly looked upon federal 
drainage as a thinly-veiled attempt by Republicans and the Reclamation Service to profit 
at the expense of their constituents by funneling public land proceeds from Democratic 
sections of the country to drainage projects in Republican-dominated communities.  
These fears intensified on February 20, 1908, when Latimer died unexpectedly in 
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Washington, D. C.  His death dealt the drainage movement a crippling blow by robbing it 
of its chief bipartisan intermediary at the critical moment. 
 Proponents pushed forward in spite of setbacks and opposition.  When Flint‘s bill 
reached the floor in April 1908, Democratic Senators immediately raised constitutional 
issues and condemned the measure for jeopardizing the institutional framework for land 
drainage in place since colonial times.  Colorado‘s Henry Teller regarded Kansas v. 
Colorado as proof that ―the Government could not go into a State and improve lands that 
do not belong to the General Government.‖  Georgia‘s Alexander Clay criticized the 
measure for going too far beyond the 1902 law.  ―The reclamation act,‖ he insisted, ―did 
not contemplate that the Government funds should be utilized for the purpose of loaning 
money to private individuals to develop and reclaim their lands.‖  Georgia‘s other 
Senator, Augustus O. Bacon, described Section 5 as ―one of the most stupendous and 
unlimited projects for emptying the Treasury that I have ever heard of‖ and dismissed 
Alabama‘s Joseph Johnston‘s explanation of why he requested including the word 
―corporation.‖  James Clarke of Arkansas opposed the measure because it consolidated 
too much autonomy in the Secretary of the Interior, lacked a provision guaranteeing 
states contributing to the fund a proportionate return of their contribution, and departed 
from the Newlands Act‘s example of ―using the public lands in a locality for the 
improvement of that particular locality.‖  Clarke argued that the proposal set a dangerous 
precedent by replacing the sovereignty of hundreds of new drainage districts with that of 
a single administrator, the Secretary of Interior.  Finally and most significantly, Clarke 
condemned the needlessness of a federal takeover.  Drainage and levee districts in 
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Arkansas and throughout the South, he emphasized, had drained an immense quantity of 
wetlands, rendering federal intervention unnecessary and superfluous.
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Southern opposition doomed the bill.  Flint was furious and accused southern 
Democrats of turning the debate into a partisan fracas by rejecting portions of the bill 
written to accommodate them.  Yet he misidentified the source of their opposition.  
Southerners blocked nationalization less out of a desire to embarrass the Republican 
Party or Reclamation Service than out of their conviction that local control over drainage 
offered a more efficient, democratic, and wise solution than nationalization.  Bacon, 
Clay, and Clarke articulated an alternative vision of water resource development at odds 
with the era‘s supposedly uncontested drift towards centralized water management.  
Accusations of hypocrisy also flew across the party aisle.  By the second day of debate, 
southern Democrats cried foul over the West‘s unveiled hypocrisy and accused 
Republicans of trying to redistribute the proceeds of their public lands.  In 1906, 
westerners flew into a rage when asked to share the reclamation fund during debate over 
Small‘s Dismal Swamp bill, but now they intended to benefit from other states‘ public 
lands.  On Bacon‘s recommendation, the Senate struck out sections 5 and 6, narrowing 
the bill‘s scope so that it applied only to public wetlands.  Bacon then offered an 
amendment to kill the entire bill, but the Senate rejected it by a near party line vote of 15-
37.  The amended bill never came up for another vote, and any hope Congress would 
nationalize drainage died that day on the Senate Floor.
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Retrenchment and Capitulation 
The defeat of Flint‘s bill revealed the primary lesson of Progressive water politics:  
the federal government proved more adept at dispersing power than consolidating it.  By 
1910, the NDA abandoned its long-cherished objective of federal control.  The NDA‘s 
new goal was to persuade states that had not passed drainage district laws to enact 
enabling legislation.  Broward, who was still the NDA‘s president, reluctantly 
acknowledged the foolishness of pursuing a uniform wetlands policy:  ―undoubtedly 
there is a difference between the irrigation of public lands and the drainage of private or 
state lands.‖74  Congress was unlikely to approve a national drainage law during the 
current session for either the purpose of converting swamps into farms or ―national 
sanitation.‖  Rather than ―wasting time … struggling for something which we have 
reason to believe is absolutely impracticable,‖ Broward emphasized, ―the wiser and better 
course to pursue would seem to be in the direction of state drainage—that is drainage 
under the authority of state laws and under the supervision of state officials.‖75  Broward 
estimated that the nation‘s 80 million acres of ―swamp and overflowed lands‖ were 
distributed throughout 40 different states but that only 26 had passed drainage laws.  He 
encouraged the NDA to direct its energies towards convincing states to pass legislation 
authorizing the formation of drainage districts and overcoming the ―indifference‖ of 
many communities to the matter at hand. 
 The NDA‘s policy shift reflected the crumbling political support for federal 
control.  Few policymakers understood the lessons of Progressive Era water politics 
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better than John Humphrey Small.  Between 1906, when Small first proposed 
nationalizing the drainage of the Dismal Swamp using money from the reclamation fund, 
and 1910, when he took to the floor of the House of Representatives to deny the wisdom 
and necessity of centralized control, Small underwent a profound ideological 
transformation.  Small‘s anger towards western parochialism, the inequity of federal 
reclamation policy, and the subsidization of western agriculture with public land revenue 
remained unchanged.  An attorney and member of the House Committee on Rivers and 
Harbors, Small by 1910 understood that federalism limited federal involvement with 
drainage.
76
 
 Small accepted the relationship between the Office of Drainage Investigations 
(formerly the OIDI) and drainage districts as an adequate accommodation between 
centralization and decentralization.  During congressional debate in 1910 on a proposed 
$20 million bailout for the Reclamation Service, Small pledged his continued support for 
western reclamation as long as westerners agreed to fund the Office of Drainage 
Investigations:  ―There has been some movement in the past with a view of asking aid 
from Congress [for drainage], but I do not believe that is necessary.  All that Congress 
will be asked to do [in the future] will be to survey these [swamp]lands and to loan 
engineers for that purpose; and this can well be accomplished through the Bureau of 
Drainage Investigation … .  We will aid you to put water on your arid lands, but at the 
same time we will ask your support in removing the surplus water from out wet lands.‖  
Small‘s correspondence reveals the interworking of this federal-local partnership.  Upon 
initiating the formation of a drainage district, farmers in Small‘s district petitioned him 
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for assistance from the Office of Drainage Investigations.  If Office leaders approved the 
request, they dispatched engineers to conduct field surveys, run levels, recommend ditch 
locations, and estimate construction costs.  The engineers did not interfere in legal 
proceedings and let the farmers work out the financing details.  The program became so 
popular with southern and Midwestern farmers that in 1913 USDA leaders implemented 
a policy that required farmers and drainage districts to put up one-half of the costs before 
approving a request.  Farmers did not want federal control; they only wanted logistical 
and engineering advice.
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 Despite his agency‘s shortcomings (Congress approved a $20 million program 
bailout in 1910), declining reputation, rocky relationship with the Taft administration, 
and the fact that eastern and southern farmers were far more likely to see the Reclamation 
Service as an interloper than a useful ally, Newell in 1912 proposed to Joseph E. Ransdell 
of Louisiana, another member of the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors, that the 
Reclamation Service, in cooperation with states and drainage districts, set up a drainage 
demonstration project on an interstate swamp in the South.  Newell hoped the project 
would attract support for federal drainage in the Mississippi River Valley.  In 1911, the 
Louisiana Development League, a consortium of real estate developers, instigated the 
breakaway of drainage supporters from the National Irrigation Congress.  Benjamin A. 
Fowler, president of the National Irrigation Congress, welcomed the split, agreeing that 
interests of irrigation and drainage advocates ―can never be satisfactorily merged.‖  Over 
the next decade, the National Drainage Congress advocated on behalf of federal drainage 
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and flood control.  Ransdell, like Small, thought the central government possessed no 
authority to drain wetlands ―except to clear out the navigable streams for purposes of 
navigation and thereby incidentally aid them in carrying off waters [from drainage 
ditches].‖  The Reclamation Service‘s dream of centralized control over drainage outlived 
Newell‘s tenure as director—which ended in 1914—as it considered southern expansion 
several times between 1912 and the beginning of the Great Depression.  Sectionalism, 
American federalism, and the growth of the American state, which triggered turf wars 
and rampant confusion about responsibilities within the central government, conspired to 
defeat national control.  By the close of 1912, nationalization was no longer a realistic 
policy option, and probably never had been.  Drainage largely remained under the control 
of drainage districts and county governments for the rest of the century.
78
 
 
A Revolutionary Expansion in Local Government 
The absence of federal participation did not prove fatal.  In the intervening period 
between the defeat of Flint‘s drainage bill and the end of World War I, the conversion of 
wetlands into cultivated monoculture fields occurred at a breakneck pace.  The period 
between 1905-1919, which the agricultural historian David B. Danbom calls the ―golden 
age of agriculture,‖ witnessed a surge in the organization of drainage districts (and 
irrigation districts) across the United States.
79
  High commodity prices, soaring farm 
incomes, and a growing population provided fertile conditions for the expansion of 
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existing drainage districts and the organization of new units.  During the debate on the 
Flint drainage bill, government bureaucrats rarely consulted with local communities 
about the real or perceived need for federal intervention.  The social basis of support for a 
second reclamation program originated solely with the emerging technical intelligentsia. 
From 1847 to 1917, 37 states approved laws establishing a procedure for drainage 
district formation.  A few states, notably Arkansas, California, and Florida, passed laws 
establishing specific drainage districts.  By 1920, when the federal government published 
the nation‘s first general census of land drainage, 69,419,859 acres—or 3.65% of the total 
surface area of the coterminous U. S.—had been organized into what the authors 
described as ―drainage enterprises.‖   In the census, drainage enterprises consisted of 
drainage districts, public drains operated by counties or townships, state drainage 
projects, western irrigation districts that drained irrigated water off the land, land 
companies or corporations draining vacant wetlands for eventual sale, and individual 
farmers engaged in draining 500 acres or more.  Drainage districts and county drains 
comprised 96% of the total land area serviced by drainage enterprises and accounted for 
94% of the invested capital.  Approximately 65,495,038 acres included in organized 
drainage operations, or 94.3% of the total, were already operational while the remainder 
awaited completion.
80
 
 The 1920 census did not evaluate the geographical distribution of drainage 
enterprises prior to its publication.  By the end of 1919, however, the Midwest had the 
largest percentage of land organized into operating drainage enterprises.  Indeed, 78% of 
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the land included in operating enterprises was located in the states east of the Rocky 
Mountains and north of the Missouri and Ohio Rivers, including Kansas and Missouri.  
The American South accounted for approximately 19% of the land included in functional 
enterprises.  In 1920, Michigan, Indiana, and Minnesota each had over 9 million acres 
serviced by drainage enterprises.  With 8.1 million acres organized into enterprises, Ohio 
had the fourth largest amount of land.  Collectively, the amount of land included in 
drainage enterprises in the four states of Michigan, Indiana, Minnesota, and Ohio 
constituted 52.8% of the national total.  Other states with a significant number of farms 
serviced by drainage enterprises included Iowa (5.2 million acres), Illinois (3.9 million 
acres), Arkansas (3.4 million acres), Missouri (2.6 million acres), Louisiana (2.7 million 
acres), and Texas (2.2 million acres).  Florida, North Dakota, Mississippi, and California 
had over 1 million acres each.  By 1920, one out of every ten American farms was 
improved by drainage or classified as needing additional improvement.
81
 
 
 
Table 1: 
Years Number of Acres Organized 
into Drainage Enterprises 
Before 1860        
1860 to 1869         
1870 to 1879           
1880 to 1889           
1890 to 1899           
1900 to 1909            
1910 to 1919            
Unreported         
TOTAL:            
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Table 2: 
Years Capital Invested in Drainage 
Enterprises 
Before 1860          
1860 to 1869           
1870 to 1879           
1880 to 1889            
1890 to 1899            
1900 to 1909             
1910 to 1919             
Unreported           
TOTAL:             
 
Table 3: 
Years Number of Miles of Ditches 
Constructed by Drainage 
Enterprises 
Before 1860            
1860 to 1869         
1870 to 1879         
1880 to 1889          
1890 to 1899          
1900 to 1909          
1910 to 1919          
Unreported       
TOTAL:           
 
Up to December 31, 1919, drainage enterprises had constructed 111,770 miles of ditches 
(enough ditches to wrap around the earth‘s equator four times) and 4,330 miles of levees.  
The formation of drainage districts occurred ploddingly following the Civil War but 
gained momentum afterwards as shortages of arable land, attributable to population 
growth, pushed more and more rural home seekers onto marginal land.  The heyday of 
drainage district formation occurred between 1900 and 1919, when Americans organized 
more drainage enterprises, invested more capital in drainage, constructed more ditches 
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and tile drains, and transformed more wetlands into fields than at any previous point in 
American history.
82
 
 By the end of 1919, the 53 million acres of American farmland improved by 
drainage dwarfed the 19 million acres improved by irrigation despite the latter‘s 
tremendous federal subsidization.  Although environmental historians have ignored 
drainage as a core element of Progressive Era land conservation, wetlands losses during 
the twentieth century‘s first two decades constituted the most significant environmental 
changes wrought by human activity.  By early 1920, the administration of wetlands 
drainage, despite the best efforts of prominent national leaders, remained firmly under 
local control. 
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CONCLUSION:  WETLANDS DRAINAGE AND THE PROGRESSIVE  
ERA CONSERVATION MOVEMENT IN RETROSPECTIVE 
 
 Draining wetlands is one of the oldest forms of land modification in American 
history.  Since the arrival of English colonists on the eastern seaboard, communities have 
waged a relentless and ―successful‖ battle against landscapes characterized by an 
abundance of surface water.  Colonial and later American farmers dug drainage ditches, 
buried underground clay tile networks, straightened watercourses, and removed 
obstructions from creeks and streams to drain riparian and inland wetlands for 
agriculture.  In the second half of the eighteenth century, the revival of ancient 
Hippocratic medical theories in Europe, which were later disseminated in the United 
States by agricultural journals, lent a particular urgency to drainage.  Formerly, stagnant 
surface waters had been stigmatized as an obstacle to agricultural progress and 
prosperity, but Hippocratic reformers vilified them for discharging miasmas and 
miasmata into the atmosphere attributed to the seasonal cycle of febrile illnesses that 
sickened and killed rural Americans every year.  Economic and medical justifications for 
drainage reinforced one another and transformed hatred of wetlands into a fixture of 
nineteenth-century American environmental thought.  By 1900, agricultural journalists, 
physicians, ordinary farmers, and political leaders celebrated land conservation by 
drainage as a form of enlightened land stewardship that rivaled forest preservation, 
regulating grazing on public lands, irrigating western deserts, preventing floods, and 
curtailing the wanton slaughter of animal and bird species in importance to the nation‘s 
economic and environmental future. 
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 The removal of surface water became one of the paramount public policy objects 
in American history.  Congress and local governments responded to the public‘s 
antipathy for wetlands by institutionalizing the principle that every wetland must be 
drained, occupied, and cultivated.  In the Swamp Land Acts of 1849, 1850, and 1860, 
Congress took the unprecedented step of creating and subsidizing a water resource 
program dedicated to promoting wetlands drainage in public land states.  Throughout 
United States history, Americans‘ water needs have shaped the contours of American 
federalism, and the passage of the Swamp Land Acts defined the relationship between the 
central and state governments in matters of surface water management by limiting 
Congress‘s role to ceding swamp and overflowed lands to the states.  Although the laws 
did not bar Congress from paying to drain the public domain at a later time, most 
policymakers insisted that the laws precluded the federal government from doing 
anything to drain wetlands other than providing public land subsidies to the states.  
Plagued by fraud, corruption, and indifference, the Swamp Land program never met 
proponents‘ lofty expectations.   And although the states‘ refusal to comply with the laws 
prompted them to assign drainage responsibilities to drainage districts and other local 
institutions, the national-state partnership envisioned under the Swamp Land Acts, 
despite its limited effectiveness, remained settled policy well into the twentieth century. 
 Congress revisited the issue of drainage during the Progressive Era.  The early 
twentieth-century conservation movement, which occurred as part of a broader series of 
social and political reforms known as Progressivism, was a seminal moment in American 
environmental history when conservationists in Washington shifted responsibility over 
western irrigation, flood control, forest preservation, and the regulation of grazing and 
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mineral extraction on the public domain to the federal government.  Wielding the 
authority of the embryonic administrative state, conservationists elevated science above 
politics, collectivism above individualism, and national control above localism.  They 
maintained that ―efficient‖ natural resource management flowed from the application of 
scientific principles to environmental problems by disinterested professionals and 
technocrats.  Most scholars of the Progressive Era conservation movement identify 
centralization as the movement‘s primary historical theme.  According to this 
interpretation, the genesis and evolution of the nascent administrative state in the early 
1900s revolutionized natural resource administration by stripping local communities of 
control over the most basic and elemental decisions of natural resource allocation, 
regulation, and administration.  As the most recent historian of the Progressive 
conservation movement blithely puts it, ―conservation was controlled by the elites by 
1900.‖1 
 Yet the story of wetlands drainage does not bear out this thesis.  The centralizing 
currents of the Progressive Era, which proved instrumental in shaping the fate of so many 
other natural resources, did not influence drainage‘s future despite the broad political 
coalition that favored unifying the nation‘s water policy by putting irrigation and 
drainage on an equal footing.  Indeed, the abortive effort to nationalize drainage offers 
several lessons about the limitations of federal power and the persistent tensions between 
decentralization and centralization, hinterland and metropolis, and localism and 
collectivism in a federal system of government where sovereignty is diffused and shared 
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between competing levels of government.  By reducing ideological disputes over 
complex policy decisions to a simple matter of efficiency, expertise, and modernization, 
conservationists (and many later historians) overstated that central state‘s ability to 
impose unified water resource policies on peripheral communities.  As Progressive Era 
political battles over water reveal, the flows of power in a federal system go both ways 
and Congress has often been just as adept at dispersing power as consolidating it.  By the 
end of World War I, for instance, the federal government assumed growing 
responsibilities over the irrigation of western public lands and flood control, but it proved 
unable, or unwilling, to compel local communities to relinquish their autonomy over 
drainage to distant administrators.  The Progressive Era thus witnessed a surge in 
administrative authority at all levels of government to accommodate Americans‘ 
demands for more control and supervision over the nation‘s waters.  Centralization was 
neither inevitable nor inexorable. 
 In the case of early twentieth-century drainage, three critical factors impeded the 
implementation of centralized control:  initial western opposition, bureaucratic 
territorialism, and the dynamic robustness of American federalism in the policy area of 
drainage.  First, western opposition to early proposals to incorporate drainage into the 
existing framework of federal reclamation forced proponents of nationalized drainage to 
accept a strategic compromise that limited their ability to forge a political consensus.  On 
the heels of the Depression of 1893 and a century of federal favoritism towards eastern 
communities in the annual rivers and harbors appropriations, western communities 
applauded the passage of the Reclamation Act of 1902.   Westerners predicted that 
federal irrigation projects would serve as a magnet for displaced eastern laborers and 
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immigrants, revive the rural West, liberate the western economy from its traditional 
dependence on range and extractive industries, and perpetuate a stable and prosperous 
class of small farmers.  Given these lofty expectations, it is unsurprising that western 
policymakers perceived any attempt to divert revenue from the reclamation fund as a 
nefarious plot hatched by outsiders to perpetuate the region‘s ―colonial‖ or ―inferior‖ 
economic status for their own advantage.
2
 
 In 1906, this conspiratorial mindset required westerners to defend the reclamation 
fund as a sacrosanct entity and to respond to diversion attempts with suspicion and scorn.  
Echoing fears articulated by Charles D. Walcott, the first director of the Reclamation 
Service, western newspaper editors and influential politicians like Wyoming‘s 
Representative Frank Mondell worried that reclamation fund diversions would postpone 
the completion of unfinished irrigation projects and delay the diversification of the 
western economy.  Yet Mondell and western periodicals were most irritated about the 
fact that westerners offered the most vocal and enthusiastic support for incorporating 
drainage into the framework of federal reclamation.  Although scholars have traditionally 
looked on the western environment as a monolithic entity dominated by aridity, the West 
is a diverse region where riparian marshes, wet prairies, prairie potholes, tule lands, and 
other forms of wetlands sometimes imperiled agricultural progress and prosperity no less 
than aridity.  The attempt of communities in North Dakota, California, and Oklahoma 
Territory to secure reclamation funds for drainage purposes revealed that the West itself 
was deeply divided over even the meaning and purpose of federal reclamation policy.  In 
any case, western proponents of arid land reclamation were far better organized and 
                                                          
2
 The best study of the American West‘s economy before World War II remains Gerald D. Nash, 
The American West Transformed:  The Impact of the Second World War (Bloomington:  Indiana University 
Press, 1985), part I. 
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funded than their drainage counterparts and, at the 1906 Oklahoma City drainage 
convention, conspired with the Reclamation Service to block any proposal that tampered 
with the reclamation fund but agreed to support the creation of a second reclamation 
program dedicated to drainage.  Although this compromise mollified westerners, it 
ultimately proved decisive since persuading national policymakers to create a second 
reclamation program before western irrigation had proven itself worthy of federal 
subsidization proved problematic.    
 Second, the genesis and growth of the administrative state also ironically 
hampered efforts to create comprehensive water resource programs.  Federal agencies 
served different constituencies, pursued different and sometimes contradictory agendas, 
worked at cross-purposes, and had divergent institutional memories.  In the apt judgment 
of Stephen Skowronek, early twentieth-century state building efforts, which led to the 
creation of new autonomous and centralized agencies, sometimes served as the 
handmaiden of inefficiency:  ―modern American state building progressed by replacing 
courts and parties with a national bureaucracy, and this dynamic yielded a hapless 
confusion of institutional purposes, authoritative control, and government boundaries.‖3 
 The case of wetlands drainage tested the embryonic administrative state‘s ability 
to take up new water resource responsibilities without succumbing to the kind of 
institutional fragmentation and confusion that Skowronek identifies as the unintended 
byproduct of the growth of federal administrative capabilities.  The Progressive Era 
national state‘s inability to steer the public‘s wide support for federal drainage into a 
coherent centralized program stemmed primarily from bureaucratic territorialism and 
                                                          
3
 Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State:  The Expansion of National Administrative 
Capacities, 1877-1920 (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1982), 287. 
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conflicting institutional memories regarding the legacy of the 1849, 1850, and 1860 
Swamp Land Acts.  Infighting within and between the Interior Department and the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) over who deserved to administer a 
second reclamation program, and whether such a program was indeed necessary, 
fragmented the state into an collection of quarreling agencies each staking their claim to 
new turf.  Indeed, internecine strife between the Interior Department‘s Reclamation 
Service and General Land Office (GLO) over the wisdom of extending federal drainage 
aid to local communities, especially given the states‘ abysmal record of subversion and 
noncompliance under the Swamp Land Program, produced confusion, gridlock, and split 
institutional loyalties.  Even more significantly, on the verge of the 1908 Senate vote on 
the Flint drainage bill, the basic question over whether the Interior Department or the 
USDA was better equipped to administer the new drainage program remained 
unresolved. 
 Third, American federalism was critical in buffering drainage from the 
Progressive Era‘s centralizing currents.  Legislative precedent, the Supreme Court ruling 
in Kansas v. Colorado, chronic problems in the western reclamation program, and the 
impressive track record of drainage districts in converting wetlands into crop fields 
reinforced federalism‘s robustness in the policy area of drainage.  Early in 1906, a good 
number of Congressmen joined with W. A. Richards, the GLO‘s commissioner, in 
protesting against any proposal aimed at overturning the half-century old swampland 
program.  They argued that the clear intent of the Swamp Land Acts was for Congress to 
cede swamp and overflow lands, not drain them.  In addition, opponents of federal 
intervention underscored that creating a national drainage program raised serious 
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constitutional issues.  Few legislators doubted that Congress possessed the constitutional 
authority to improve the public domain, but by 1907 the Swamp Land Acts had 
privatized an estimated 95% of the country‘s wetlands east of the 115th meridian.  
Questions about the propriety of using federal money to drain private lands remain 
unanswered.  But it was the Supreme Court‘s ruling in Kansas v. Colorado, delivered in 
1907, that cast doubt on the constitutionality of the entire scheme.  Numerous Senators, 
national newspaper editors, and Morris Bein, the Reclamation Service‘s chief legal 
officer, interpreted Justice David J. Brewer‘s ruling to disqualify Congress from paying 
to drain private lands.  Constitutionally, American federalism reserved drainage 
responsibilities on private property for states, local communities, and individuals. 
 Plummeting political support for western reclamation fortified federalism‘s 
strength.  By the end of 1907, the reclamation fund teetered on the brink of insolvency, 
public land sales had failed to meet expectations, projects had failed to attract an exodus 
of factory workers and tenement dwellers from eastern cities, construction costs soared to 
over six times initial estimates, the price of land on government projects increased 759% 
between 1902-13, and the authorization of 23 projects in four years stretched the 
agency‘s resources too thin.  In 1910, Congress was forced to approve a $20 million 
bailout for the faltering program and project farmers fell behind on their repayment 
schedules.  Small wonder that many legislators balked at launching a second reclamation 
program until and unless the western program yielded results.  Furthermore, the track 
record of drainage districts and county drainage projects in draining wetlands before 1900 
obviated the need for federal intervention.  Unlike irrigation, for instance, drainage did 
not require the lengthy adjudication of water rights, the construction of large dams and 
290 
 
reservoirs, or the conveyance of water over long distances.  According to United States 
Geological Survey estimates, drainage was at least 5 or 6 times cheaper than irrigation.  
While only the federal government had the time and resources to wait out the completion 
of irrigation projects, local communities proved adept at raising enough revenue for 
drainage by incurring bonded indebtedness.  The drainage districts that did experience 
intractable engineering problems received assistance from the USDA‘s Bureau of 
Drainage Investigation, but very seldom did farmers clamor for the transfer of authority 
to distant administrators.  Along with western opposition and bureaucratic territorialism, 
American federalism helped insulate drainage from the Progressive Era‘s centralizing 
currents and reserved a significant share of power over water to local communities, as the 
proliferation of drainage districts between 1905-1919 so clearly attests. 
 Conservationists‘ self-serving predictions that the pace of wetlands drainage 
would languish without federal involvement never materialized.  By the end of 1919, 
drainage districts, county governments, and public corporations managed 107,468 miles 
of ditches, 42,311 miles of tile drains, 3,519 miles of levees, and had improved at least 34 
million more acres of American farmland than irrigation.  From an instrumental 
perspective emphasizing the rapid conversion of natural resources into marketable 
commodities, wetlands drainage was better off decentralized than centralized.   By the 
end of World War I, local control constituted the most efficient administrative solution 
for drainage because of the degeneration of national water policy into a bitter and venal 
feud between local communities over federal funding.  In the early twentieth century, 
reformers touted national irrigation and drainage programs as a panacea for the nation‘s 
perceived and real social ills, including urban poverty, overcrowding, crime, and 
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corruption.  After 1910, however, the persistent nineteenth-century fear that what 
benefitted one community harmed another overwhelmed and displaced the lofty idealism 
that undergirded early twentieth-century national water policy.  Localism had the benefit 
of avoiding these paralyzing disputes, as well as the fragmentation of the federal 
government, by keeping the power of the purse close to home. 
Over the long run, however, local control constituted more of a curse than a 
blessing.  As twentieth-century Americans slowly came to recognize that wetlands 
possessed intrinsic value, provided crucial habitat for wildlife and waterfowl, stored 
water and thus mitigated flood damage, renewed ground water supplies, filtered 
sediments and pollutants from water, protected shorelines from erosion, and promoted 
clean air by removing carbon and mercury from the atmosphere, the decentralized and 
fragmented structure of drainage undercut Congress‘s ability to implement uniform 
policies in response to new challenges and changing environmental values. 
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